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This research aims (1) to risk-modify the functional forms applied to estimate technical 
efficiency in European banking, and (2) to evaluate the sensitivity of estimates to risk 
and to functional forms’ specification. 
 
This research methodology applies the Fourier Flexible functional forms to derive 
estimates using accounting data from the Bankscope database. For efficiency 
analysis, profit and cost frontiers are estimated using the Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) in a single-stage estimation approach where the inefficiency term is specified 
under the time-flexible Battese & Coelli (1995) model. 
 
The past studies tend to overlook a number of significant banking risks, or restrict the 
estimated functional form, or do both. This research demonstrates that it is paramount 
to comprehensively accounting for risk in the analysis of efficiency to obtain accurate 
estimates, and that estimates are very sensitive to the specification of the underlying 
functional form. 
 
The main limitation to this research related to data availability: data covers 10-year 
period (2008 – 2018) with 541 only observations. Moreover, risk factors could have 
been measured using more advanced methodologies (e.g. Merton Approach for 
measuring the probability of default) which paves the way for further research. 
 
The findings result show that unless risk is adequately accounted for, efficiency 
estimates tend to be misleading or even erroneous. Findings indicate that European 
banks can enhance their cost efficiency: (1) by being better capitalized, and (2) by better 
managing the exposure to trading risk. On the other hand, European banks can 
enhance their profit efficiency mainly by: (1) maintaining high quality loan portfolios, 
(2) focusing on interest-based income, (3) relying more on customer deposits as a 
main source of funding and (4) better managing trading risk exposure to enhance the 
risk-return payoff. Moreover, results suggest that there is more profit inefficiency than 
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“Banks are of central importance for economic growth, credit allocation, and financial 
stability” (Molyneux and Wilson, 2007, p 1907). Banks play a key role in allocating 
financial resources in the economy, and for banks to do this actively they need to be 
sound and efficient. Operating efficiently is important for banks to achieve growth, 
maintain competitiveness, increase profitability, and to contribute in to the stability and 
efficiency of the entire financial system.   
 
An efficient banking system is a socially desirable target to achieve since it reduces 
the average cost of financial transactions and enhances the society’s welfare. With 
regard to European banking, efficiency has become an important topic given the 
increased competition the sector has been undergoing even though full integration is 
yet to be realized. The formulation of the Single European Market, the Second Banking 
Directive, and the adoption of the Euro for instance have opened new business places 
for banks to develop, but also intensified competition, squeezing bank margins and 
prompting banks to improve their cost and profit efficiency (Pastor, 2002).  
 
Banks can operate efficiently by achieving technical efficiency and by take advantage 
in potential economies. This results in reducing costs and increasing profitability as 
well. However, risk should not be ignored in this case, and that is why this research 
attempts to align more closely the analysis of technical efficiency with banking risks. 
Ignoring risk may yield misleading results and therefore produce unreliable policy 
implications. For instance, banks could reduce their costs and take excessive risks in 
the short-run to enhance their profitability. These banks could be erroneously labelled 
as cost efficient if their risk profiles are not considered in the analysis. In any case, 
correct and accurate estimates are vital to policy makers. 
 
This observation is confirmed by Girardone et al (2004) who find that “risk and asset 
quality factors appear to matter in relation to estimation … and these factors should 
be borne in mind in any future evaluation of the efficiency characteristics of European 
banking markets” (p 225). Therefore, accounting for risk in analysing and technical 
efficiency is pivotal. This research confirms this observation and further demonstrates 





or even erroneous. This constitutes a key contribution of this research.  
 
The following sections will be discussing the motives behind investigating technical 
efficiency in European banking. 
 
1.2 Research Aims 
 
This research motives to investigating profit and cost efficiencies in European banking 
are threefold: (1) incorporating risk into the analysis of efficiency more 
comprehensively, (2) conducting a European cross-country efficiency analysis, and 
(3) investigating the correlates of both cost and profit efficiencies in European banking.  
 
Concerning the first motive, risk in this analysis is more comprehensively accounted 
for by incorporating bank- as well as country-level risks into the specification of cost 
and profit functional forms. These risks constitute the main banking risks including 
credit, trading, liquidity, and insolvency risks. Moreover, credit risk is accounted for 
from two perspectives: an ex ante (using the credit risk appetite measure) and an ex 
post (using the loan loss provisions ratio). Despite that many authors have stressed 
the imperativeness of accounting for risk, the vast majority of past efficiency research 
accounts for risk incomprehensively and at a bank-specific level only in the form of 
equity capital (to proxy for insolvency risk) and loan loss provisions ratio (to proxy for 
credit risk or output quality). Mester (1996, p 1026) for instance asserts, “Unless quality 
and risk are accounted for, one might easily miscalculate a bank’s level of inefficiency”. 
Drake et al (2006, p 1451) confirms the vitality of incorporating risk factors in into the 
cost function as “failure to adequately account for risk can have a significant impact 
on relative efficiency scores”. 
 
As for the second motive, Berger et al (1993b) highlight a significant gap in the 
literature in that there is a limited cross-country banking efficiency analysis and 
suggest that “much more research is needed measuring and comparing the efficiency 
of banks and other financial institutions across international borders” (p 232). Berger 
et al also argue that the integration of European banking systems would suggest that 
the most efficient institutions may eventually dominate world markets, thus it is a 





by Maudos et al (2002) who find that cross-country efficiency studies are quite limited 
because “there are few studies that run comparisons at an international level” (p 33). 
In light of this, it is an interesting project to investigate a European cross-country 
efficiency research.  
 
With regards to the third motive, investigating efficiency correlates is important 
because it can provide insights into factors driving banks efficiency so that policy 
implications can be drawn. Goddard et al (2007, p 1925) stated, “The investigation of 
factors that are correlated with measured operational efficiency at bank level seems a 
worthwhile enterprise”. Such an issue is of a particular relevance to European banks 
given the regulatory transformation it is experiencing and the attempts to achieve 
further integration in the EU banking system (European Commission, 2007). In 
addition, Girardone et al (2004) also stress that future research should investigate both 
cost and profit efficiencies in European banking as banks should not only be evaluated 
in terms of their ability to use resources effectively to produce a given level products 
and services (minimize costs), but also their skill at generating maximum revenues 
from their outputs (maximize profits). 
 
The abovementioned arguments and quotes from past research give a strong 
rationale to the need to more comprehensively incorporate risk into efficiency analysis, 
to conduct a European cross-country analysis, and to investigate the correlates of both 
cost and profit efficiencies in European banking. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
This research has four main objectives: 
 
1) to risk-modify the profit and cost functional forms applied to estimate technical 
efficiency in European banking using proxies for: credit, trading, liquidity, and 
insolvency risks. The central added-value of this research is measuring market 
and credit risks differently. Market and credit risks will be measured using the 
VaR model and Merton Approach respectively. These risk variables are 
comprehensively incorporated in the functional forms at bank- and country-





to investigate whether or not the introduction of these risk variables has a 
significant impact in terms of improving the functional forms’ specification prior 
to estimating the model. 
 
2) to evaluate the sensitivity of profit and cost efficiency estimates as well as 
estimates to the introduction of these risk factors, and to the different (flexible  
Vs. restrictive) Fourier series specifications.   
 
3) to provide European banking cross-country profit and cost efficiency estimates 
at both bank- and country-specific levels, and also to provide estimates for 
European banking over 2008 – 2018. 
 
4) to draw implications for policy makers in the European banking industry which 
will be based on the findings of the two empirical analyses. 
 
1.4 Research Contributions: Contribution to Efficiency Literature 
 
This research contributes to efficiency literature in three aspects. First, the introduction 
and the specification of Fourier terms is shown to be an important factor for the cost 
function to satisfy the regulatory conditions. Introducing the Fourier terms is motivated 
by the observation of Gallant (1982) who finds that Fourier terms significantly improve 
the model’s fit to the scatter of the data (i.e. it being a global approximation). This 
agrees with Berger and Humphrey (1997, p 9) who observe that the way to improve 
the performance of parametric approaches “lies in adding more flexibility” to the cost 
function. This research confirms the observations of Gallant (1982) and Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) and finds that unless the 1st order Fourier terms are accounted for, 
the cost model violates the regulatory conditions, particularly in relation to the 
concavity condition1. Furthermore, unlike most efficiency studies, this research follows 
a careful procedure in specifying the Fourier terms and reveals that the most suitable 
specification, given the underlying data, is a specification, which comprises of both 
rescaled input prices and output quantities. In addition, the choice of normalizing input 
prices was also carefully considered on the basis of satisfying the cost function’s 
                                               
1 Introducing the second-order Fourier terms seem to overfit the scatter of the underlying data and causes the 





regulatory conditions. The study finds that the most suitable procedure is to normalize 
input prices by the price of labour.   
 
Second, this research estimates a common EU-14 profit and cost frontiers and 
accounts for differences between the countries involved via the incorporation of a 
range of country-specific macroeconomic variables (including inflation rate, GDP 
growth, Herfindahl index for loans, and a measure of financial intermediation), 
dummies to control for EU membership and euro adoption, and risk variables. Past 
European research is typically restricted to accounting for macroeconomic differences 
only. Moreover, this contribution is motivated by the observation of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) in its 2003 banking stability report stating that “aggregate EU data 
tend to conceal significant differences between countries, as business is still 
predominantly local” (ECB, 2003, p 8). This in fact highlights the importance of 
accounting for country-specific characteristics in terms of risk and macroeconomic 
conditions into the analysis. What is more, it is shown in the literature (as in Berger 
and Mester, 1997) that accounting for country differences serves the purpose of 
overcoming the potential shortfall of assuming a single or common frontier for the 
entire sample. Estimating country-specific or year-specific frontiers on the other hand 
will create degrees of freedom problems given that the sample used is about 200 
observations (McAllister and McManus, 1993), therefore the choice of this research is 
fitting a single frontier. A number of previous European studies have estimated single 
frontiers however; they mostly overlooked the issue of accounting for country-specific 
(i.e. banking systems-specific) differences specifically in terms of their risk profiles.  
 
Third, this study attempts to explain technical efficiency scores by regressing the latter, 
in a single-stage estimation procedure, against a wide set of explanatory variables 
reflecting business, funding, and income structures in addition to the set of risk 
variables. This is motivated by the significant gap in literature observed by Berger and 
Mester (1997, p 944) where the authors stress the importance for research to further 
explore the “potential correlates” of profit and cost efficiencies. Risk variables 
introduced include bank-specific credit risk (that is considered both from an ex ante 
and ex post perspectives), trading risk, liquidity risk, and insolvency risk. The 





most importantly, the credit risk appetite measure CRA (= risk weighted assets RWA 
/ total assets) which was suggested by the Bank of England in its Financial Stability 
Review of 2003, as it takes an ex ante perspective on credit risk. Credit risk is normally 
accounted for in the literature form an ex post perspective as represented by the loan 
quality measure (loan loss provisions / total loans). This research also draws some 
important policy implications based on the findings of cost and profit efficiency 
correlates. 
 
Fifth, this research finds that the technical inefficiency term should be specified under 
a time-flexible specification. This is because estimates show that the time progression 
as well as the level of technical inefficiency are sensitive to the time-flexibility allowed 
in the specification of which. The conclusion therefore is not to impose a systematic 
trend of time progression as in Battese and Coelli (1992), but to allow for greater time 
flexibility as in Battese and Coelli (1995). 
 The closest study to this analysis is that by Altunbas et al (2001) where similar 
methodology to investigate cost efficiency was used (the application of SFA, and the 
single-stage estimation approach), however the study incorporates Fourier series that 
are truncated at the 2nd order terms including rescaled values of outputs only, 
accounts for limited number of risks at a bank level including insolvency risk (equity 
capital/ total assets), liquidity risk (liquid assets / total assets), an ex post measure of 
credit risk (non-performing loans/ loans), an ex-ante measure of credit risk (risk 
weighted assets / total assets), accounts for the funding structure (short-term funding 
and customer deposits / total funding), accounts for business mix effect (the nominal 
value of OBS items / total assets) , accounts for a limited number of country-averaged 
risks including insolvency (equity capital only), liquidity and credit risks, and uses data 
between 1989 and 1997.   
 
The edge of this research is manifested in using a wider range of bank-specific risk 
including liquidity, credit (from ex ante and ex post perspectives), insolvency, and 
trading risks (trading risk is proxied by the ratio of net trading revenue to total 
revenues). Moreover, this research uses a wider range of country-specific risks 
including insolvency (equity/ total assets), liquidity, credit, and trading risk. To the best 





comprehensively account for banking risks at bank- as well as country- levels, and to 
carefully consider the specification of the underlying functional form in terms of 
satisfying the cost function’s regulatory conditions. More importantly, there seems to 
be no previous research that has attempted to test for the impact of CRA, although 
the concept of risk-weighted assets has existed since Basel I was founded in 1988. 
What is more, this research incorporates a wider range of macroeconomic variables 
including EU membership and Euro adoption variables, Herfindahl index for loans, and 
a proxy for financial intermediation (M2/GDP). Lastly, from a methodological 
perspective, this research carefully considers the appropriate specification and level 
of expansion of the Fourier series applied in both empirical chapters using the 
fulfilment of the concavity condition and the log-likelihood ratio test as the two defining 


































































This chapter provides and extensive review of efficiency literature. The chapter is 
presented in three main sections: Efficiency Analysis in European, US, and 
International contexts. Each of these sections is concluded by highlighting the 
envisaged contribution of this research to the literature respectively. 
 
This review of both cost and profit efficiency literature covers studies that were 
conducted using European, US, and International sample banks. These studies are 
displayed and discussed by date beginning with the earliest in each of the subsections. 
This section of the literature review chapter concludes by extended summaries that 
sum up the findings of past research accordingly. 
 
2.2 Efficiency Analysis – European Studies 
 
 
Altunbas et al (2001) examine a sample of European banks in the EU-15 countries 
over 1989 – 1997 using balance sheet data from Bankscope. The study applies SFA 
approach to estimate a Fourier Flexible cost function, with the Fourier series including 
rescaled output quantities only and truncated at the second-order terms.  
 
Altunbas et al (2001) found substantial cost X-inefficiencies ranging between 20 – 25% 
across European banks. These X-efficiencies were found to considerably vary across 
European banking markets, bank size, and over time. Technical progress was also 
found to have a significant impact on total costs, as it seemed to contribute in reducing 
cost by about 3% over 1989 – 1997. These cost savings were found to increase 
proportionately with bank size, indicating that Europe’s largest banks seemed to 
benefit most from technical progress.   
 
Cavallo and Rossi (2001) investigate cost X-inefficiencies for a sample of 442 
European banks with 2516 observations from France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, and the UK over 1992 – 1997. The authors obtain accounting data from 
Bankscope. The study estimates a Translog cost function and uses Battese and Coelli 
(1992) inefficiency model in the second-stage estimation. Cavallo and Rossi find 





of 15.64%. In terms of size-efficiency relationship, cost efficiency seems to decline as 
size grows; accordingly, smallest banks were found as most cost efficient as opposed 
to larger banks. Banking system in Germany was found to be the least cost inefficient, 
whereas the UK’s was found as the most cost inefficient over the study’s period.   
 
Vennet (2002) analyse cost and profit efficiencies for financial conglomerates and 
specialized banks in Europe using SFA approach. Vennet estimates a Translog cost 
and profit model covering the period 1995 – 1996 and forming a sample with 2375 
observations on banks from 17 European countries. The rationale for choosing this 
time period is that it coincides with the impact of the Second Banking Directive, which 
has enabled European banks to form financial conglomerates2 and hold equity stakes 
in financial and nonfinancial companies, i.e. form universal banks. The study aims at 
comparing cost and profit efficiencies of European financial conglomerates and 
specialized banks, and between universal and non-universal banks.   
 
Vennet (2002) considers the level of financial capital as a ‘rough’ proxy for the risk of 
default and the risk preference of the bank management. However, the study seems 
to completely ignore accounting for credit risk as many earlier studies did (in terms of 
the ratio of problem loans to total loans for instance).  
 
On the other hand, operating costs of financial conglomerates are found to be lower 
compared to specialized banks due to cost savings realized by exploiting (which were 
exhausted) and lower funding costs realized by the effects of market power.   
 
Furthermore, universal banks are found to be more profit and cost efficient than their 
non-universal counterparts. The study attributes this to the better information universal 
banks (given their equity holdings in the firms they lend to) can access which enables 
them to mitigate the impact of moral hazard and adverse selection. As results indicate 
that conglomerates are more revenue and cost efficient than their specialized 
counterparts. 
                                               
2 Financial conglomerates are financial institutions that offer the entire range of financial services. Next to 
performing the traditional banking operations, they may sell insurance, underwrite securities, and carry out security 
transactions on behalf of their clients. Universal banks are allowed to hold equity stakes not only in financial but 






In terms of efficiency scores, Vennet (2002) finds that an overall cost inefficiency for 
the entire sample of European banks of about 20%. This is consistent with Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) who also finds cost inefficiencies to range between 20 – 25% using 
a large sample drawn from 21 countries. On the other hand, the study also finds 
average profit inefficiency for European banks at about 30%, suggesting greater 
inefficiencies on the profit side relative to cost inefficiencies. In terms of the size-
efficiency relationship, the study finds little evidence on the correlation between size 
and efficiency. The only clear evidence found is that smallest universal banks (assets 
< 500 million ECU) and smallest specialized banks (assets < 100 million ECU) are 
less profit efficient compared to the corresponding largest banks. 
 
Maudos et al (2002) analyse profit and cost efficiencies using a sample of 3328 
observations belonging to 832 banks with minimum asset value of $1bn in ten EU 
countries over the period 1993 – 1996. The study mainly uses the parametric 
estimation approach Distribution Free Approach (DFA) suggested by Berger (1993)3 
(which assumes inefficiency as constant or persistent) over time while random errors 
tend to cancel out over time, therefore it entails no distributional assumptions for the 
inefficiency term). The study aimed at establishing comparisons between profit and 
cost efficiencies and also at investigating their potential correlates. Maudos et al use 
the Translog functional form to describe both cost and alternative profit functions.   
 
In a second stage, the estimated efficiency is regressed against a set of potential 
correlates. The key finding suggests more bank-specific profit than cost inefficiencies.  
 
As for the profit and cost inefficiency terms’ potential correlates, Maudos et al account 
for several bank-specific characteristics including: bank size, risks, and specialization. 
Bank-specific risks include: (a) insolvency (or overall) risk proxied by the level of 
financial capital and the standard deviation of returns on assets ROA (the latter 
measure was introduced under the assumption that equity capital may not fully capture 
the amount of risk taken by each bank) and (b) credit risk exposure proxied by the 
                                               
3 Maudos et al (2002) also apply the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and Random Effects Model (REM) to produce 
efficiency estimates. However, the results of these models are not discussed here because of relative irrelevance 





ratio of loans to total assets. Findings show a non-linear relationship between bank 
size and profit efficiency, as results show that only medium size banks (up to $10bn) 
have a negative and significant correlation with profit efficiency, whereas large banks 
($10bn to $100bn) and huge banks (over $100bn) have shown no significant 
correlation with neither profit nor cost efficiencies.   
 
With regards to bank risks, findings indicate that credit risk (loans/assets) has no 
significant impact on both technical efficiencies, while the standard deviation of ROA 
(SD-ROA) was found to be significantly and positively correlated with profit efficiency, 
and negatively correlated with cost efficiency. This suggests that the riskier the bank 
is (i.e. the higher the SD-ROA) the more profit efficient but less cost efficient it 
becomes.  
 
Casu & Girardone (2004) investigate profit and cost efficiencies of large EU banks 
(assets > € 27 bn) using a sample of around 2363 observations from five EU countries: 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK over 1993 – 1997. The parametric 
estimation approach SFA is applied. The study aimed at examining the potential 
impact of the introduction of the Single Market Programme SMP in 1992. 
 
Following Berger and Mester (1997), Casu and Girardone apply the alternative profit 
function, which has the same specification (exogenous variables) as the cost function. 
The authors use the two-stage estimation approach where the inefficiency term is 
regressed against a set of correlates in a separate stage to estimating the frontier. 
Accordingly, the study uses Battese and Collie (1992) specification for the inefficiency 
model, which assumes that inefficiency change systematically with time.   
 
Concerning cost efficiency results, Casu and Girardone (2004) find average cost 
efficiency to range between 85.5% to 86.5% (i.e. 14.5% to 13.5% of cost inefficiency) 
showing around a 1% improvement over time. As for-profit efficiency, average scores 
were found to be around 87% (or profit inefficiency of 13%) with a significant and 
dramatic increase of 37% from 53.6% in 1993 up to 90.9% in 1997.     
 





country to the EU-5 frontier), cost efficiency scores show that Italy and the UK were 
the most and least cost efficient in 1993 (with scores of 89% and 79.9%) and in 1997 
(89.7% and 81.1%) respectively. From the profit efficiency perspective, Spain and 
France where shown to be the most and least profit efficient in 1993 (with scores of 
49.9% and 58.2%) and in 1997 (90.6% and 92.6%) respectively.  
 
The authors observe that there is little evidence that cost efficiency levels of the large 
EU-5 has converged over 1993-97, as country-specific differences seem to play a 
significant role in the efficiency gap. Such discrepancies in country-specific cost 
efficiencies can be suggestive of remaining differences in cost bases of the different 
EU-5 banking systems as a result of considerable differences in taxation, fiscal 
policies, labour markets flexibility, money and capital markets … etc. On the other 
hand, profit efficiency estimates show more evidence of narrowing efficiency gap 
indicating a shift in the focus of EU-5 banks towards becoming more profit-oriented 
and shareholder value maximizing firms (Casu and Girardone, 2004, p 139). This can 
support the view that the SMP may have contributed in increasing competition across 
EU, pressurizing profit margins and therefore reducing the dispersion of profit 
efficiencies according to the authors.  
 
Girardone et al (2004) estimate cost efficiency in Italian banking between 1993 and 
1996. The study mainly aims to investigate the impact of the EU’s 1992 Single Market 
Programme (SMP), explore the potential correlates of efficiency, and to examine the 
impact of risk of default and asset quality factors (as in Hughes and Mester 1993, 
McAllister and McManus 1993, Clark 1996, Mester 1996, Berger and Mester 1997, 
and Altunbas et al, 2000). The introduction of the SMP in 1992 contributed in relaxing 
the regulatory constraints such as regional branching restrictions, balance sheet 
portfolio limitations, deposit and loan rate caps, and state ownership. Further, capital 
markets have become more important in the Italian banking system, as in France, 
Germany and Spain, which were mainly bank-based financial systems. Against this 
backdrop of landmark development, the Italian banking sector constituted an 
interesting area for efficiency research as the authors explain. 
 





specified contained rescaled outputs only as input prices were left to be fully described 
by the Translog terms. The justification for this is that there is little variation in input 
prices hence the Translog can be more stable (good approximation) near the average 
of the sample data (Girardone et al, 2004, p 216). The Fourier series, as in Berger and 
Mester (1997), was truncated at the 3rd order terms. Following the intermediation 
approach, the authors specify two outputs: loans and other earning assets, while off-
balance sheet items were obviously unaccounted for. The study normalizes input 
prices (labour and financial capital) by the price of real capital (fixed assets). In a 
second-stage, the estimated inefficiency was regressed (in a logistic regression) 
against a set of potential correlates. 
 
Findings indicate that overall cost inefficiency levels range between 13 – 15%, 
indicating that an average Italian bank could have produced the same amount and mix 
of outputs with 13 – 15% less cost relative to most efficient banks. Results also show 
that inefficiency seems to decline over time, which can be attributed to the positive 
impact of deregulation. Also, by plotting X-efficiency scores against size (log of 
assets), the authors observe a wide dispersion in scores implying that many banks 
with similar sizes seem to have different cost efficiency levels due to their widely 
different costs. It follows that X-efficiencies show a declining trend with size, however, 
no significant correlation between size and cost efficiency was found, despite the 
overall negative trend found between efficiency and size, implying that larger banks 
are relatively as cost efficient as their smaller counterparts. 
 
Concerning the correlates of cost inefficiency, results show that cost inefficiency is 
significantly and positively correlated with the level of none performing loans (NPLs) 
which indicate that cost efficiency is positively correlated with better credit risk 
management (credit profile evaluation, loan generation, and loan monitoring). 
Moreover, cost inefficiency is found to be negatively correlated with capital strength 
as in Mester (1993 and 1996), that is, banks with better capitalization tend to be more 
(less) cost efficient (inefficient). Such inverse relationship between capital and cost 
inefficiency can be explained in two ways. First, banks with low cost inefficiency are 
more capable of generating profits and therefore retaining more earnings as capital. 
Second, higher equity capital entails that shareholder have more capital at risk, and 





efficiently, that is to say, cost efficiency seems to be negatively correlated with 
incentives to moral hazard. 
 
What is more, Girardone et al (2004) further investigate the characteristics of efficient 
and inefficient banks from different perspectives, including earnings, expenses and 
balance sheet structure. Findings indicate that efficient banks have higher interest 
income (in terms of net interest revenue or margin to total assets ratio), better control 
staff expenses (but no advantage in funding costs), more securities, more equity 
capital, and better asset quality. 
 
Weill (2004) investigates cost efficiency of European banks over 1992 – 1998 using a 
sample of 688 banks in five countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. 
The study aims at crosschecking efficiency results produced by DFA, SFA and DEA 
using European data as evidence from the US concludes that there is clear 
inconsistency between efficiency results under parametric and non-parametric 
techniques (Bauer et al, 1998). Accordingly, Weill (2004) estimates a separate frontier 
for each country (national frontiers which do not assume that all countries have similar 
technologies) since the aim is to provide evidence on the consistency of the efficiency 
results under the different frontier techniques in each of different frameworks 
(countries). The common frontier methodology, on the other hand, allows for cross-
country comparison of efficiency scores but assumes similar production technologies 
for all countries.  
 
Inputs and outputs are specified according to the intermediation approach, which 
assumes that the bank transform deposits using labour and capital into loans. Outputs 
include loans and other earning assets (however off-balance sheet items are ignored), 
and inputs include labour, physical (real) capital, and borrowed funds (financial 
capital).  
 
The study finds consistency in cost efficiency results among parametric approaches 
for all countries (positive and significant correlation), while there seems to be no 
positive relationship between any parametric approach and DEA. The study also 





found is mixer as DEA shows a positive relationship with size, whereas SFA provided 
no clear correlation between size and efficiency. 
 
To draw further conclusions and cross-check the validity of efficiency estimates under 
SFA and DEA approaches, Weill (2004) establishes correlations between cost 
efficiency scores and two profitability indicators: ROA –return on assets– and ROE –
return on equity, and a cost effectiveness measure represented by the cost-to-income 
ratio (all ratios are calculated at the mean for the entire study’s period). The following 
presents the most notable results.   
 
DEA’s cost efficiency scores have shown a significant and negative correlation with 
the two profitability indicators for Switzerland, indicating that banks with higher 
profitability tend to be less cost efficient. Weill (2004) findings implied by SFA’s cost 
efficiency estimates are in line with those under the standard measure of cost 
effectiveness, i.e., cost-to-income ratio. Findings show a strong and significantly 
negative correlation between cost efficiencies and the corresponding results of the 
cost-to-income ratio for all countries expect for France (where the correlation found 
was not significant, but negative). In other words, this indicates that greater cost 
efficiency is associated with lower value of the cost-to-income ratio and vice-a-versa. 
Such finding indicates to the consistency of cost efficiency estimates under SFA 
approach, the study concludes.   
 
Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2004) examine productivity change for large banks in 
five European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK) with a panel of 
2000 observations drawn from Bankscope over 1994 – 2000 using a Translog cost 
function. Total factor productivity (TPF) – which measures changes in total output 
relative to inputs – is decomposed into its core elements: technical efficiency change 
(TEC) which embodies the effects of pure technical efficiency change TE and scale 
efficiency change SE, and technological change (TC). 
 
Results indicate that productivity change during 1990s in European banking was 
mainly driven by technological change (TC). Productivity growth for all counties 





significant differences among the 5 banking systems in this respect. More specifically, 
the authors report a general decline in total costs for the largest Italian and Spanish 
banks over 1994 – 2000 in contrast to other banking systems. The authors attribute 
this decline in costs for Spanish and Italian banks to the positive impact of 
technological change. Furthermore, banks in Spain and Italy experienced a dramatic 
increase in off-balance sheet activities with the slowest growth in their on-balance 
sheet assets, suggesting a significant change in the make-up of outputs for Italian and 
Spanish banks. Results for Germany, France and the UK were inconclusive. 
 
Bos and Kolari (2005) examine profit and cost efficiencies of European and US banks 
using SFA to estimate cost and profit X-efficiencies. The authors use data on large 
banks (multibillion dollars in assets) over the period 1995 – 1999 and apply a Translog 
cost function claiming that Translog and Fourier Flexible functions provide similar 
results with negligible differences4. The intermediation approach is applied in 
specifying banks’ inputs and outputs (which included off-balance sheet items). Risk is 
accounted for via the ratio of equity to total assets.  
 
In Europe, cost efficiency estimates show that European banks have average score 
of 0.947 implying that operating costs can further be reduced by 5.3% on average if 
they were to operate more efficiently. The distribution of efficiency scores was also 
found to be significantly skewed with the minimum score of 0.064. Further, profit 
efficiency estimates for European banks were found at a lower average of 0.721 
implying that profits can be improved by a further 27.9% on average. The dispersion 
of profit efficiency results was more substantial as standard deviation of profit 
efficiencies was found to be as twice that of cost efficiencies which probably indicates 
to the imperfectly competitive output markets (i.e. the existence of price 
differentiation). On the other hand, other European studies such as Altunbas et al 
(2001) found less dispersion in profit efficiencies for large European ranging between 
0.20 and 0.25. For US banks, cost efficiency estimates were higher compared to 
European banks at 0.976 with a lower dispersion (a standard deviation of 0.047).  
 
                                               
4 This can only be credible if the data is concentrated around the mean (i.e. local), whereas most banking data is 
rather scattered (global). Furthermore, this research demonstrates that the choice between the Translog and 





In general, results show that European banks seem to have lower cost and profit 
efficiencies than US banks. were US banks are found with smaller dispersion of both 
profit and cost efficiency sores than European banks. The study also concludes that 
US and European banks’ profit efficiency seems to increase when they expand beyond 
their home country. Furthermore, evidence from the US and Europe indicates that 
small banks are less cost and profit efficient than large banks. 
 
Kasman and Yildirim (2006) examine cost and profit efficiencies in commercial 
banking in eight new member states of the European Union in 2004. The sample used 
consists of an unbalanced panel data on 190 commercial banks with 977 observations 
over 1995 – 2002 drawn from Bankscope. The study estimates a single (common) 
stochastic cost and profit frontiers for the entire sample but accounts for country-
specific variables to accommodate for differences in macro-economic and financial 
sector conditions, which may vary overtime. Such variables included: capital ratio 
equity/total assets which was used as a proxy for insolvency risk such that lower 
capital ratio would imply higher insolvency risk resulting in increased cost of borrowed 
funds), market concentration (Herfindahl) index, inflation, GDP growth, and a measure 
of banks’ financial depth in the economy (proxied by M2/GDP and included to capture 
differences among the different banking systems in terms of their ability to mediate the 
lender-borrower relationship). Interestingly, the study uses the single-stage SFA 
approach to estimate a Fourier Flexible cost and profit functions (that is truncated at 
the 2nd order terms) where determinants of the inefficiency term are estimated 
simultaneously with the frontier.  
 
The study found a negative and significant correlation between cost inefficiency and 
capital ratio implying that well-capitalized banks can provide banking services less 
costly since they can borrow funds more cheaply. As for the Herfindahl concentration 
index, the authors explain that if higher concentration is associated with higher cost 
efficiency (lower costs), it is then attributed to superior management or greater 
efficiency of the production process. On the other hand, if higher concentration is 
associated with lower cost efficiency (higher costs), this suggests that higher 
concentration is the result of market power, which provides less incentive for banks to 






Furthermore, results showed a positive correlation between market concentration and 
cost inefficiency, which is consistent with the market power argument. The rate of 
inflation was also found to cause higher costs given its positive coefficient with cost 
inefficiency, suggesting that banks incur higher costs under inflationary pressures. On 
the contrary, GDP growth was found to negatively correlate with cost inefficiency 
suggesting that with higher growth rate banks tend to bear lower costs. Finally, the 
measure of overall financial development (M2/GDP) is found to positively contribute 
to higher cost efficiency suggesting that banks in courtiers with more developed 
financial intermediation systems tend to operate more cost efficiently.   
 
As for-profit efficiency correlates, findings showed no significant correlation between 
capital ratio and profit efficiency. The Herfindahl concentration index was found to 
negatively correlate with inefficiency suggesting that banks are more profit efficient in 
less concentrated markets. Similarly, inflation was found to negatively impact profit 
efficiency, implying that inflation contributes to lower profits. On the other hand, the 
level of financial depth in the economy (M2/GDP) was found to positively impact banks’ 
profit efficiency suggesting that the higher the level of financial intermediation and 
development the more profit efficient banks are. Unexpectedly, the study found 
negative correlation between GDP growth and profit efficiency indicating that the 
higher the GDP growth rate the lower the profits are. 
 
Regarding the size-efficiency relationship (where banks were divided into small banks 
with less than $1 bn, medium banks with assets greater than $4 bn and less than $5 
bn, and large banks with more than $5 bn in total assets), the study found no significant 
correlation between bank size and profit or cost efficiencies. In terms of efficiency 
scores, cost inefficiency was found at an average of about 0.20 suggesting that an 
average bank in new EU member states is incurring 20% more costs than the best-
performing or frontier bank. Further, average profit inefficiency was found at around 
0.36 suggesting that profits of an average bank are 36% less than those achieved by 
best-practice banks. This is consistent with earlier evidence from the US in that there 






Altunbas et al (2007) investigate the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency 
in European banks operating in 15 European countries over 1992 – 2000. The study 
applies SFA approach to estimate a Translog cost function, which specifies off-
balance-sheet items as a third output in addition to loans and securities. Moreover, 
cost efficiency estimates are regressed against a set of banks- and country-specific 
variables in a second stage. Bank-specific variables include: (1) credit risk proxied by 
the ratio of net loans to total assets and the size of loan loss reserves, (2) insolvency 
risk (proxied by the ratio of equity to total assets), (3) bank size proxied by the log of 
assets, and (4) liquidity risk proxied by the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-
term deposits. 
 
Country (or banking system) specific variables mainly include: (1) interest rate spreads 
over 3-year government, and (2) the solvency of the European corporate (non-
financial) sector proxied by the ratio of firms’ current assets to liabilities. (3) loan loss 
provisions to total loans, (4) cost to income ratio, (5) return on capital, (6) banking 
system liquidity. All of the last four ratios were averaged country-wise. 
 
Findings indicate that cost efficiency is negatively and significantly related to the risk 
and capital ratio. This possibly supports the argument that regulators allow banks that 
are run in a cost-efficient manner to take more risk (because they can manage it better 
and accumulate less loan losses accordingly) and therefore hold less capital (become 
more leveraged), which may reflect greater flexibility towards efficient banks to trade-
off capital and risk.   
 
As for country-specific indicators, results show a positive relationship between banking 
system liquidity and cost inefficiency. However, cost inefficiency was found to 
negatively correlate with system-specific cost-to-income ratio. The authors attribute 
such counterintuitive result to the fact that cost efficiency measure was produced from 
a cost function that links costs to outputs, not income. Therefore, putting this in the 
context of the positive (negative) correlation found between risk (capital) and cost 
efficiency, Altunbas et al (2007, p 65) argue that such unexpected result could also be 
due to the possibility that risk and capital have different impacts on income and outputs 






Furthermore, European banks’ net lending (net loans to total assets ratio) was found 
to positively correlate with cost efficiency, indicating that efficient banks are more 
successful in managing and expanding their loan business. Cost inefficiency was also 
found to positively correlate with the level of bank capital (represented by the ratio of 
equity to total assets), suggesting that inefficient banks tend to hold more capital. In 
terms of size-efficiency relationship, the authors find evidences of a positive 
correlation between asset size and cost inefficiency, suggesting that larger banks tend 
to be less efficient than their smaller counterparts. Finally, the study finds mixed 
evidence on the relationship between liquidity and cost efficiency.   
 
Barros et al (2007) analyse profit and cost efficiencies of European commercial banks 
using a sample of 1384 observations over the period between 1993 and 2001. The 
aim is to investigate the determinants of best and worst European domestic and 
foreign banks’ performance. Best (worst) performing banks are defined as those with 
profit and cost efficiencies in the upper (lower) quartiles of the distribution of estimated 
efficiency (Barros et al, 2007, p 2198).  To this end, the study estimates a Fourier 
Flexible cost and profit functions to produce efficiency estimates. A logit regression is 
then applied to examine efficiency correlates in order to investigate factors explaining 
the probability of banks becoming best or worst performers, however the authors seem 
to ignore risk completely. Efficiency correlates investigated in this respect include bank 
location, balance sheet structure and bank ownership.   
 
Results indicate that the probability of being a worst performer is in Denmark, 
Germany, Portugal or Sweden. However, this probability increases if the bank 
operates in Finland, Luxembourg or the Netherlands. Competition levels can offer 
some explanation to these results according to the authors. For Germany and 
Denmark, the study observes an increased competition in their banking markets, 
which may have prompted banks to operate more efficiently to secure their market 
shares. Similar logic can be drawn on Finland’s situation where banking markets are 
more concentrated. 
 
However, this argument does not precisely extend to the case of the Netherlands and 





reason why banks in these markets are more likely to be worst performers is related 
to their profit and cost efficiencies, as they seem to have achieved the lowest efficiency 
scores. 
 
With regard to the impact of ownership structure, domestic banks were found to be 
more cost and profit efficient, hence less likely to be labelled as worst performers as 
opposed to foreign banks. In terms of factors related to banks size and business 
structure, findings indicate that smaller and loan-intensive banks are unlikely to be 
among the worst performers compared to bigger and more diversified banks. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that these results should probably be treated with 
caution, as risk –at least in the form of loan losses– was not accounted for in the 
analysis. Therefore, findings might be biased in favour of riskier banks as earlier 
research have found that the diversification of risk helps in reducing average costs as 
it allows for greater exploitation of technical efficiencies (Drake and Hall, 2003).   
 
All in all, the study of Barros et al (2007) provides some interesting results in that there 
is strong evidence that competitive markets seem to induce banks to become more 
profit and cost efficient. This has implications for the EU policymakers in that 
competition should be advocated as this can promote greater efficiency in the banking 
market EU-wide. This may encourage the provision of more diverse, better-quality, 
and less-costly products and services by avoiding waste in resources and by fully 
exploiting under-utilized capabilities. 
 
Iannotta et al (2007) explore the impact of ownership, risk and performance factors on 
the profitability (operating profits to total earning assets) of 181 largest European 
banks (forming 1674 observations) from 15 European counties between 1999 and 
2004. The study applies OLS regression (as opposed to the frontier estimation) 
methodology and regresses profitability against a set of banks- and country-specific 
controlled variables. The study considers several proxies for risk, amongst which are: 
(1) the ratio of liquid assets to total assets to control for liquidity risk, (2) the ratio of 
loan loss provisions to total loans to control for credit risk and output quality, (3) the 
volatility (standard deviation) of asset returns (SD-ROA) to proxy for the bank’s 





Confirming McAllister and McManus (1993), Iannotta et al (2007) find that larger banks 
can better exploit the advantages of diversification to reduce liquidity risk hence 
enjoying lower funding costs (and hence higher profitability) compared to smaller 
banks. The authors observe that this size-risk relationship is partly driven by the too-
big-to-fail argument which implies an implicit bail out guarantee that eventually 
translates into lower costs, which on the other hand encourages larger banks to invest 
in riskier assets. The study points out that privately-owned bank outperforms mutual 
and public banks in terms of profitability despite that they have cost advantages. 
Moreover, public banks were also found to have the lowest loan quality and highest 
insolvency risk.   
 
On the contrary, mutual banks were found to exhibit the better loan quality and the 
lower asset risk compared to private and public banks. Ownership concentration was 
found to be strongly correlated with higher loan quality, lower asset and insolvency 
risks such that banks with dispersed ownership were found to run higher operational 
costs per euro of earning assets – a finding that is probably consistent with the 
implications of agency theory. Given the revealed poor performance of public banks 
(as they run higher insolvency risk and have lower loan quality), Iannotta et al (2007) 
recommend that European banking regulators need to abolish any implicit or explicit 
guarantees to protect government-owned banks and to inform capital markets that the 
bailout policy of too-big-to-fail is redundant. This way, the authors argue, public banks 
will be motivated to operate more profitably. 
 
Yildirim et al (2007) investigate cost and profit efficiencies of banks in 12 transition 
economies in Europe between 1993 and 2000. The aim is to investigate the impact of 
ownership structure on bank efficiency. The study employs a two-stage estimation 
approach and uses SFA approach to estimate a Translog cost and alternative profit 
functions. In the second stage, inefficiencies are regressed against a set of potential 
determinants. A sample of 325 banks with 2042 observations (drawn from Bankscope) 
forming an unbalanced panel dataset is used.   
 
Consistent with earlier international and European studies (as in Berger and 





side than on the cost side. Specifically, the study reports average cost efficiency for 
the entire sample banks of 77%, whereas (alternative) profit efficiency was found at 
about 68%. 
 
The second-stage regression analysis showed that higher efficiency levels are 
associated with well-capitalized banks. This is confirmed by the findings of this 
research as will be seen in the first empirical chapter. On the other hand, the degree 
of competition was found to negatively impact profit efficiency whilst positively impact 
cost efficiency. 
 
Pasiouras (2008) investigates the technical efficiency of the Greek commercial 
banking industry over 2008 - 2018 following DEA methodology and then conducts a 
Tobit regression of the inefficiency term against a set of determinants. The study finds 
that accounting for loan loss provisions (a proxy for credit risk considered) increases 
efficiency scores. This probably is a result of well-managed loan portfolio in the sense 
that efficient banks are more capable of managing credit risk more effectively, i.e. 
maintaining low levels of loan loss provisions. This can further be explained by the 
positive relationship the author finds between the level of loan activities and efficiency, 
suggesting that efficient banks are relatively more capable of lending less costly and 
therefore offer more competitive loan rates, and ultimately expand their loan books 
and gain greater market share.   
 
On the other hand, the inclusion of off-balance sheet items (OBS) into the analysis as 
an additional output seems to have no significant impact on efficiency scores. In 
contrary to the latter finding, this research finds that OBS has a very significant impact 
on technical efficiency as will be shown later in the first empirical chapter. Interestingly, 
the study finds that efficiency is positively correlated with the bank’s capitalization 
which is confirmed by the findings of this research as well despite using SFA instead. 
The argument here is that equity capital represents the capital at risk for shareholders, 
thus with higher level of equity capitalization, shareholders have more incentive to 
monitor the bank management and ensure that it is operating efficiently (Pasiouras, 
2008, p 313). 
 





transition countries in South-Eastern Europe over the period 1998 – 2008. Fang et al 
(2008) used SFA (Stochastic Frontier Analysis) approach. Results show that average 
cost efficiency of bank in these countries is around 69% while average profit efficiency 
is around 54%. The study regresses determinants of bank efficiency and finds that 
foreign banks enjoy greater profit efficiency yet lower cost efficiency. Moreover, 
government-owned banks are associated with lower profit efficiency compared to 
domestic private banks. The study also finds a strong relationship between market 
power a bank can have and profit and cost efficiencies. Methodologically, the study 
uses the Translog form and estimate both cost and profit efficiencies using the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis approach SFA which has the advantage of disentangling 
the error term into stochastic noise and inefficiency. Moreover, the specification of the 
functional of Fang et al (2011) uses proxies for time, region, GDP growth, and inflation 
whereas the study completely ignores banking risks. This gap in the literature was 
clearly highlighted by Fang et al (2011, 517) "Although this article contributes to a 
better understanding of the determinants of bank efficiency, it is important to highlight 
that advances in financial sector development will also depend on other critical factors 
that need future research attention". This statement indeed confirms the importance 
of introducing risk into the analysis of efficiency in banking, a key prospective 
contribution to this research. 
 
Now, having reviewed EU-related literature, the next section will review the part of 
efficiency literature that is US-related. This will be followed by international studies and 
a summary that gives the gist of all of these sections. 
 
2.3 Efficiency Analysis – International Studies 
 
2.3.1 US Studies  
 
Berger et al (1993a) investigate X-efficiency of US commercial banks over the period 
of 1984 – 1989 using the DFA estimation approach. The study aims primarily at 
analysing profit efficiency correlates. The authors explain that estimating the profit 
function has a key advantage in that it allows for detecting inefficiencies not only on 
the output side (revenue effects) but on the input side (cost effects) of the production 





combinations of outputs, and cost effects are attributed to deploying the incorrect 
levels or mixes of inputs. The study specifies the profit function according to the Fuss 
function which is an improved functional form of the Translog function. It has an 
advantage over the Translog in allowing for negative profits and zero values for fixed 
netputs with the restriction of linear price homogeneity maintained. 
 
Findings indicate that technical inefficiencies dominate allocative efficiencies, 
suggesting that US banks seem to be less efficient in producing given mixes and levels 
of outputs using given levels of inputs and input prices than in allocating inputs and 
choosing output mixes to produce. The other key finding is that there are more output 
inefficiencies stemming from deficient output revenues than input inefficiencies 
caused by excessive input costs.   
 
The study also involved regressing profit inefficiency results (expressed as the ratio of 
profit inefficiency/total assets) against a set of factors including bank risk and size. 
Risk is accounted for in terms of the standard deviation of the return on assets (SD-
ROA). Findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between profit 
inefficiency and bank risk, suggesting that efficient banks may take fewer risks or be 
more effective in managing their risks (through diversifying risks) so as to protect their 
profitable business lines. Finally, in terms of the impact of size (represented by the log 
of assets), Berger et al find a strong and significant negative correlation between size 
and profit inefficiency. The authors find the correlation coefficient of this size-efficiency 
relationship so large suggesting that this is more likely to be a real event as the 
direction and the significance of this correlation persists even when the data is 
segmented into different asset groups. This led to the conclusion that larger banks are 
more profit efficient than smaller banks. 
 
Most importantly, Berger et al (1993a), as later confirmed by Mester (1996) and 
Mitchell and Onvural (1996), provide evidence that there are more costs to be saved 
by being technically efficient than by fully exploiting. This suggests that greater cost 
savings can be made through X-efficiencies in terms of better resource and revenue 
management, the application of new technologies etc, compared to the potential cost 





Berger et al (1993a) found that X-inefficiencies account for 20% or more of banking 
costs (with technical dominating allocative inefficiencies), whereas make up 5% or less 
of total costs.   
 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas published a banking efficiency study conducted 
by Spong et al (1995) in which a risk-modified Translog cost model was applied to 
produce cost efficiency estimates. The study incorporates the ratio of total loans/ total 
assets (loan-to-asset ratio) and equity capital / total assets (capital buffer ratio) ratios 
in the model as proxies for credit and insolvency risk respectively. The study also 
accounts for output quality by including the ratio of net loan losses/ total loans. Results 
indicate that banks tend to be more cost efficient if they take more credit risk, i.e. higher 
loan-to-assets ratio, as opposed to their least efficient counterparts. Moreover, cost 
efficient banks seem to hold higher levels of capital compared to the less efficient 
banks. Consequently, there is little support for the argument that efficient banks may 
have achieved their enhanced efficiency by allocating fewer resources to manage and 
control risk which probably is suggestive of a positive relationship between risk 
management and cost efficiency.   
 
Clark (1996) examines X-inefficiencies in US banks using a panel data on 110 publicly-
traded commercial banks between 1988 and 1991. The study applies a Translog cost 
function to produce efficiency estimates. Using the standard deviation of ROA ‘returns 
on assets’ as a proxy for risk, Clark finds that X-inefficiency tend to be overestimated 
if risk is not accounted for. Specifically, X-inefficiencies were found to dramatically 
drop from 9% to 3% as a result. 
 
Berger and Mester (1997) investigate cost and ‘alternative’ profit efficiencies in US 
banking using a sample of about 6000 US commercial banks over 6 years period 
between 1990 and 1995. The two-stage estimation approach is applied to Fourier 
Flexible functional forms which were estimated using SFA methodology and followed 
by a second-stage regression to investigate potential correlates of the estimated 
inefficiencies.   
 





efficiencies for the fact that banking data does not fully capture the heterogeneity in 
bank output5 which will ultimately affect the credibility of the measured inefficiencies 
(Berger and Mester, 1997, p 908). To this end, the study uses the proportion of 
nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL) as a proxy for output quality. However, 
Berger and Mester draw attention to the issue of how exogenous NPL is to the cost 
and profit models6 so as to be correctly included as an independent variable. 
Therefore, they distinguish between two factors driving the NPL ratio: ‘bad luck’ as an 
exogenous factor that is caused by negative economic conditions such as recessions, 
and ‘bad management’ as an endogenous factor caused by deficiencies in managing 
the loan portfolio such as allocating insufficient resources –or ‘skimping’ – to assess 
and originate loans to cut down short-term expenses.   
 
The study solves the exogeneity problem in the frontier models by using the ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total loans as a state average or state-specific which allows 
for negative economic shocks to affect banks while being exogenous to individual 
banks (Berger and Mester, 1997, p 909). On the other hand, bank-specific NPL ratios 
(attributed to bad management) were included in the second-stage efficiency 
regression as explanatory variables. 
 
Furthermore, the authors emphasize the significance of accounting for financial capital 
in the cost and profit functions. The argument here is that these functions assume risk 
neutrality in banks unless equity capital is introduced such that, risky (risk-averse) 
banks would be expected to hold relatively lower (higher) level of capital. Berger and 
Mester (1997, p 909) stress that “if financial capital is ignored, the efficiency of these 
banks would be mismeasured, even though they behave optimally given their risk 
preferences”. Accordingly, financial capital is accounted for such that outputs and the 
dependent variable (profits or costs) are normalized by which to accommodate for 
banks risk preferences and to reduce the effect of size-bias. 
 
Empirically, the study reports higher levels of profit than cost inefficiencies. Mean cost 
                                               
5 Commercial loans for instance may differ in size, collateral quality, repayment schedules, risk ...etc. these 
differences will ultimately impact bank cost and profits, hence ignoring output quality would produce incorrect 
measures of cost and profit efficiencies.   
6 I.e. how exogenous NPL is to the other independent variables defining the frontiers, as the endogeneity of NPL 





efficiency was found at 0.86, suggesting that about 14% of costs are wasted by an 
average US bank compared to the best-performing banks, while average profit 
inefficiency was found at around 50% suggesting that about half of an average US 
bank’s profits were lost due to operational inefficiency. Cost efficiency estimates were 
found to be more tightly distributed (with standard deviation of 6.2 percentage points) 
while profit efficiencies were found to be quite dispersed (with standard deviation of 
20 percentage points). This implies that the earnings of many US banks were 
considerably dispersed around the average figure compared to the dispersion of their 
costs.   
 
In terms of efficiency correlates, Berger and Mester examine 25 explanatory variables 
that mainly include bank size, funding structure (the ratio of purchased funds to total 
assets), market power (approximated by the HERF index), and risk (approximated by 
the standard deviation of the bank’s annual return on assets SD-ROA and loan-to-
asset ratio).  As for the size-effect, the study found that larger banks are more cost 
efficient but less profit efficient compared to their smaller counterparts, that is, as 
banks grow larger, they become more effective in controlling cost but find it harder to 
create revenues efficiently. Furthermore, the study finds no significantly positive 
correlation between profit and cost efficiencies.   
 
In relation to the funding structure, the study reports significant and negative 
correlation between the ratio of purchased funds to total assets and profit efficiency, 
suggesting that profit efficient banks would tend to relay more on core deposits and 
use less purchased funds. As for market concentration, the study finds that market 
power is negatively related to cost efficiency yet positively correlated with profit 
efficiency.   
 
As for risk, the study found that riskier banks (i.e. those with higher SD-ROA or more 
volatile returns) tend to be less profit and cost efficient. The authors attribute this 
negative relationship between credit risk and technical efficiency to endogenous 
reasons or bad management. This implies that bad managers are poor at-risk 
management in terms of taking on poor risk-return trade-offs which involve higher risk 





returns. This is in contrast to the notion that riskier banks can be expected to be more 
profit efficient as they trade risk with higher returns.   
 
All in all, the 25 potential correlates were able to explain about 7% of cost efficiency 
scores’ variance and about 35% of profit efficiency scores only. The authors partly 
attribute this relatively low degree of the model’s explanatory power to potential 
efficiency correlates that are unaccounted for, including risk other factors. 
 
Berger & De Young (1997) specify a Fourier Flexible cost model (that is truncated at 
the 3rd order terms) and estimate it with SFA approach using US commercial banking 
data over the period between 1989 and 1994. The frontier function was estimated 
separately for each year to produce year-wise frontiers under the assumption that an 
efficient bank in one year may not continue to be so across time.  
 
The study mainly aims at (1) measuring cost efficiency and (2) investigating sources 
of NPL (non-performing loans) by regressing the latter against a set of variables 
including the estimated cost efficiency to test the effects of several hypothesis 
including: bad luck (as proxied by GDP growth), bad management in which loan quality 
is driven by internal factors (this is proxied by the level of estimated cost efficiency), 
risk management skimping in which higher loan quality is traded for short-run 
expenditure savings (this is proxied by the level of financial capital allocated to absorb 
loan losses), and moral hazard (that is reflected by the nature of the relationship 
between capital ratio and nonperforming loans). 
 
First, the study finds average cost efficiency over the entire sample period at 0.92, 
indicating that the average bank incurs about 8% more costs than a best-practice 
bank. Further, Berger and De Young (1997) test whether specifying a Translog cost 
function would alter the results. They found cost inefficiency estimates to significantly 
increase as much as twice the estimate under the Fourier Flexible. The authors 
attribute this to the global flexibility of the Fourier Flexible specification which enables 
the frontier to better fit the data compared to the more restricted Translog specification.   
 
Second, the study finds support for both bad management and skimping hypotheses. 





to dominate the skimping hypothesis (as implied by the corresponding variable’s 
coefficients). This implies that increases in cost inefficiency are generally the cause of 
increases in nonperforming loan levels. Put differently, the deterioration in the quality 
of loan portfolios, industry-wise, is a result of bad management practices in terms of 
incurring excess expenditures, poor loan underwriting, and monitoring practices that 
ultimately lead to increased nonperforming loans.   
 
At a bank level, findings seem to favour the skimping hypothesis, suggesting that 
increases in cost inefficiency are associated with decreases in loan quality such that 
banks would purposefully trade short-term cost cuts for lower loan quality in the long-
term. Furthermore, the study also finds support for the moral hazard hypothesis as 
suggested by the negative relationship between capital strength and the level of 
nonperforming loans. In other words, thinly capitalized banks (i.e. those with low 
capital ratios) would tend to hold loan portfolios with lower qualities (i.e. riskier loans) 
due to moral hazard. In line with this, Pastor and Serrano (2005) explain that over the 
short term, the relationship between problem loans and cost efficiency can become 
misleadingly positive when banks cut expenses on credit assessment and control. The 
current US mortgage crisis and the associated global credit crunch is a prime example 
of such case. This reasserts the need for incorporating risk more comprehensively in 
analyzing bank performance as this research attempts to achieve.   
 
Berger and De Young (1997) conclude that each of these effects (i.e. bad luck, bad 
management, skimping, and moral hazard) has relatively small impact on banks at an 
industry level, however their effect is more substantial at a bank-specific level. 
Therefore, Berger and De Young (1997) assert that the effects of these factors have 
to correctly be accounted for in profit and cost functions.   
 
For instance, controlling for ‘bad luck’ – which increases the level of nonperforming 
loans (hence increase costs or reduce profits) for external, not managerial inefficiency, 
causes – in the frontier function as a control variable is vital as this would statistically 
avoid counting these extra costs as inefficiency. This is because the function’s 
residual, which technical inefficiency is part of, will not incorporate the effects of bad 






On the other hand, given that the effects of bad management and skimping are the 
result of management inefficiencies (internal causes), accounting for these factors in 
the cost or profit function as control variables will artificially increase measured 
efficiency. This is due to erroneously removing the part of cost inefficiencies (or 
revenue deficiencies). Consequently, it is important to realize the exogenous and 
endogenous nature of these different factors and control for exogenous events (bad 
luck) in the frontier function while controlling for endogenous factors (bad 
management, skimping, and moral hazard) as determinants of cost or profit 
inefficiency.   
 
Clark and Siems (2002) examine the impact of accounting for off-balance sheet 
activities (OBS) on profit and cost efficiency estimates using a sample of US banks 
over 6 years period (1992 – 1997). They utilize SFA methodology to estimate Translog 
cost and profit functions. The estimation was conducted with OBS activities specified 
as an output forming the ‘full model’ and without OBS activities forming the ‘restricted 
model’. The study uses the volume of net non-interest income (NII) as a proxy for the 
impact of OBS activities. Under the full model, the study finds mean cost efficiency at 
0.8716 suggesting that an average bank incurs about 14% more costs than those of 
the best-practice banks. On the other hand, mean profit efficiency was found at 0.6462 
suggesting that profits of an average bank are approximately 35% below the profits 
achieved by best-practice banks.   
 
Furthermore, when comparing cost efficiency estimates under the two models, the 
study finds that cost efficiency becomes higher once OBS activities are accounted for, 
suggesting that cost efficiency estimates could be biased downwards if OBS activities 
are not specified. On the other hand, profit efficiency estimates experienced no 
significant change when OBS items are specified in the profit function. However, the 
study contrasts these results with earlier efficiency studies, which use 1980s data and 
ignore OBS activities, and finds that profit efficiency estimates were around 20% to 
30% higher once OBS items are included.   
 





(or mix) of off- to on- balance-sheet items, and four OBS variables: derivatives, and 
loan commitments, lines of credit, and credit commitment activities. Results suggest 
that neither the relative size of off- to on-balance-sheet activities nor the bank size has 
any statistically significant correlation with either cost or profit efficiencies. 
Nonetheless, findings indicate that loan guarantees, credit commitments, and lines of 
credit have a positive relationship with both cost and profit efficiencies. Derivatives 
activities, however, show a negative relationship with both profit and cost efficiencies. 
The study further notes that the correlation of these OBS activities with cost efficiency 
seem to be much stronger compared with profit efficiency.   
 
To sum up, Clark and Siems (2002) conclude that OBS activities should be accounted 
for in measuring cost and profit efficiencies of banking organizations as estimates can 
found to become biased otherwise. Specifically, there is strong evidence showing that 
cost efficiency tends to be underestimated if OBS activities are not specified in the 
cost function.   
 
Akhigbe and McNulty (2003) investigate profit efficiency of US banks by mainly 
focusing on small banks with total assets under $500 mil over 1990 – 1996. To 
establish comparisons between large and small banks, the study assumes a single 
frontier (i.e. both types of banks are assumed to use the same production technology) 
that is estimated under SFA approach (were deviations from the frontier are attributed 
to inefficiencies and random effects). The study uses the concept of the alternative 
profit function and applies a Fourier Flexible functional form, where Fourier terms 
include rescaled output quantities only and truncated at the 3rd level. Estimated profit 
inefficiency is regressed against a set of potential correlates in a second stage. The 
study defines banks’ outputs according to the production approach where deposits are 
considered as a third output besides loans and fee-based financial services.   
 
As in Berger and Mester (1997), the authors find that small banks are more profit 
efficient than large banks. Specifically, profit efficiency was found to improve over the 
study period which was mainly attributed to improving loan quality. Also, average profit 
efficiency scores for small and large banks were around 0.75 and 0.72 respectively. 





market concentration, and bank size.   
 
Akhigbe and McNulty (2003) observe that small banks seem to have better access to 
retail deposits which gives them a funding cost advantage over large banks since large 
deposits are more expensive than retail deposits (Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003, p 322). 
This is besides the fact that demand deposits are a source of fee-based income. 
Furthermore, given the study’s time frame, small banks were found to enjoy higher 
quality in their loan portfolios compared to larger banks (that is lower non-performing 
loans ratio to total loans). Also, profit efficiency was found to positively correlate with 
market concentration, and smaller banks are usually found to operate in rather 
concentrated markets (as suggested by the Herfindahl index), according to the study. 
Finally, the study finds that, for banks under $500 mil, profit efficiency improves as 
size increases. 
 
In a later study by Akhigbe and McNulty (2005), the authors investigate profit efficiency 
for small (under $100 million in assets), medium (above $100 million and less than $1 
billion), and large US commercial banks (with assets above $1 billion) over the period 
of 1995 – 2001. The main aim is to explore potential profit efficiency correlates for 
each of these asset group banks.   
 
To this end, the study estimates three different frontiers for each of the asset group 
banks. The reason for this procedure, according to the authors, is that banks are of 
considerably different sizes hence they are likely to use different business models 
(production technologies). Accordingly, the resulting profit efficiency estimates are 
believed to have maximum flexibility (by avoiding biased estimates which could be 
implied by the common frontier in this case). The authors apply the alternative profit 
function specified under the Fourier Flexible form that is truncated at the 3rd order 
terms as in Berger and Mester (1997). In terms of risk, the study accounts for the 
bank’s financial risk by including the level of equity capital as a control variable in the 
profit functional form. This is to control for the potential impact on cost of funds, and 
hence on profits, due to different levels of equity capital held.  
 





further steps in this regard. Further, the study applies the two-stage estimation 
approach whereby the efficient frontier is firstly estimated and profit efficiency 
estimates are regressed against a set of determinants in a second stage (using Tobit 
regression in this case). Some of these determinants included were: capital ratio 
(equity/assets), nonperforming loan ratio (included on a country- and bank-specific 
levels), deposit market concentration index (Herfindahl index), and an income 
structure proxy represented by the size of fee revenues. 
 
As for-profit efficiency scores, results reveal a positive size-efficiency relationship as 
large banks are, overall, found to be the most profit efficient compared to small and 
medium size banks. Specifically, average profit efficiency scores for small, medium, 
and large banks were found at 0.752, 0.823, and 0.856 respectively.   
 
As for-profit efficiency correlates, results indicate that profit efficiency is significantly 
and negatively correlated with capital ratio for medium and large size banks. This 
implies that the more profit efficient banks within these size groups use less equity 
(more leverage) than other banks in the same size group. A negative correlation is 
also found between bank-specific nonperforming loans level and profit efficiency. This 
relationship was found to most significantly impact small bank’s efficiency.   
 
Differences in fee revenues are found with significant and positive impact on profit 
efficiency for small and medium size banks, but not for large banks, suggesting that it 
is a significant source of profitability for banks in these two size groups. Because 
differences in fee revenues showed no significant impact on large bank’s profitability, 
this does not mean that fee revenue is an unimportant source of profitability for large 
banks; rather, it suggests that all large banks in the sample seem to considerably 
depend on fee revenue to the extent that differences in fee revenues showed no 
significant impact on profit efficiency as the authors explain. Deposit market 
concentration index showed, as in Berger and Mester (1997) and many other studies, 
a positive and significant correlation with profit efficiency of US banks indicating that, 
banks can be more profit efficient (i.e. claim more profitable) in concentrated deposit 






Lastly, the study found that small US banks can significantly enhance their profit 
efficiency by maintaining high asset quality (low default rates), depend more on fee 
income, and operate in a concentrated deposit market. On the other hand, large banks 
can significantly enhance their profit efficiency by primarily using more leverage 
(depend less on equity).   
 
2.3.2 Rest of the World Studies  
 
Allen and Rai (1996) use a sample of 194 international banks operating in 15 different 
countries (including the US) to investigate cost efficiency using SFA approach to 
estimate a Translog cost function. Banks were divided into two groups: universal 
banks (those offering a variety of financial services such as loans, deposits, insurance, 
securities investment, real states…etc) and non-universal banks (those with 
functionally-separated traditional and non-traditional banking activities). The study 
found that universal banks are more efficient than non-universal banks, which offer 
selected financial services. This could be attributed to the diversification effect, which 
reduces the overall risk of the bank’s balance sheet and translates into less equity 
capital to be held. This in turn reduces costs and enhances cost efficiency accordingly. 
Large banks were found with more substantial cost inefficiency of 27.5% compared to 
small banks, which their input-mix inefficiency averaged around 15% only. At a country 
level, the authors found that France, Italy, the UK, and the US seemed to host the 
least cost-efficient banks, whereas banks in Japan, Australia, Austria, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Canada are, on average, the most efficient in the world. 
 
On the other hand, the work of Berger and Humphrey (1997) takes an international 
perspective and surveys 130 efficiency studies applying different parametric and non-
parametric estimation approaches that were conducted in 21 countries. Berger and 
Humphrey mainly found that both types of approaches yield almost similar estimates 
but produce different rankings for individual banks, and that non-parametric methods 
generally yield slightly lower mean efficiency estimates but with larger dispersion 
relative to parametric estimates. More specifically, the study mainly concluded that the 
overall average level of efficiency (inefficiency) in banking is around 77% (23%) of 






Altunbas et al (2000) examine X-inefficiencies for 139 Japanese banks (with 533 
observations) over 1993 – 1996. A Fourier-flexible cost function is specified and 
estimated using SFA approach. Three outputs are considered: total loans, total 
securities, and total off-balance sheet items (in nominal values). The authors account 
for the impact of output quality and risk factors on costs. Output quality (credit risk) is 
accounted for by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Concerning risk 
factors, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (to proxy for liquidity risk) and the level 
of financial capital (to proxy for insolvency risk) were incorporated as in Hughes and 
Mester (1993) and Mester (1996). These risk factors were considered as endogenous 
or bank-specific variables. The authors’ endogeneity argument stems from that of 
Berger and De Young’s (1997) in that the ratio of non-performing loans is a function 
of the bank’s efficiency and effectiveness in underwriting and monitoring loans. 
Likewise, liquidity risk is also considered as an endogenous variable since efficient 
managers would tend to hold low but sufficient levels of liquid assets, whereas 
inefficient managers would tend to hold excessive levels of liquid assets.   
 
Findings indicate that mean level of X-inefficiency is between 5% and 7%. This is 
distinguishable from US evidence in Berger and Humphrey (1997) where X-
inefficiencies were found about 23% (within the range of 20 – 25%) of total costs. 
Altunbas et al also observe that X-inefficiencies are quite sensitive to risk and quality 
factors as estimates were quite different when these factors were discounted. The 
authors also find evidence of declining costs due to technical change over 1993 – 
1996. 
 
Sathye (2001) investigates X-efficiencies (or overall efficiency) in Australian banking 
system using a cross-sectional data for 29 domestic and foreign banks in 1996 using 
DEA methodology. The study finds the overall efficiency7 of Australian banks to be 
considerably low in comparison with European and US banks. Specifically, technical 
inefficiency – that is waste in inputs incurred in producing outputs– was found as the 
main component driving the overall efficiency results relative to allocative inefficiencies 
                                               
7 Overall technical efficiency = Pure technical efficiency * Scale efficiency. Drake and Hall (2003, p. 899) explains 
that scale efficiency arises “because the firm is at an input-output combination that differs from the equivalent 
constant returns to scale situation”, whereas “pure technical efficiency represents the failure of the firm to extract 
the maximum output from it adopt input levels, and hence it may be thought of as measuring the unproductive use 





– that is related to choosing input mix given input prices. Furthermore, overall 
efficiency score for domestic banks was found to be around 83% which is the product 
of allocative efficiency of 92% and technical efficiency of 90%.  
 
On the other hand, foreign banks were shown to be significantly less efficient with an 
overall score of 62% that breaks down into 82% for allocative efficiency and 71% for 
technical efficiency (Sathye, 2001, p 625). 
 
The authors draw some policy implications from these results in that further financial 
deregulation to facilitate mergers between Australian banks is required. They argue 
that the implications of efficiency improvements are substantial: for a 10% increase in 
overall banking efficiency, the Australian economy would be able to save costs in 
excess of $4bn per annum. 
 
Weill (2003) investigates banking efficiency in two countries Czech Republic and 
Poland in the aim of comparing the efficiency of 47 foreign-owned and domestically-
owned banks. The study uses the Stochastic Frontier Analysis approach to compute 
cost efficiency scores. It follows Mester (1996) in including financial capital to 
accommodate for risk preferences. Methodologically, the analysis follows the two-step 
approach: firstly, efficiency estimates are found, and secondly, efficiency scores are 
regressed against a set of variables to investigate the sources of inefficiency. In the 
specification of the cost model, the study accounts for capital and country (dummy) 
variables only. Accordingly, the research of Weill (2003) suffers the same gap that 
most of past literature and that is ignoring risk variables. As for explaining the variation 
of efficiency results, the study regresses efficiency scores against a set of variables 
including: ownership, the ratio of loans to investment assets, the share of deposits in 
the total balance sheet, and the scale of operations as proxied by the size of bank 
assets. The study finds that foreign-owned banks are more efficient in both countries 
which was attributed to the type of ownership. The other factors: scale of operations 
and the structure of activities were found to have little significance in explaining the 
variation of efficiency estimates. The latter result may be questionable due to the fact 
that the study ignores accounting for risk comparatively, a significant gap in the 






Drake and Hall (2003) explore technical efficiencies using non-parametric frontier 
estimation technique, DEA, in 149 Japanese banks using a cross-sectional data for 
the financial year ending in 1997. Findings indicate that controlling for risk – 
represented by the ratio of problem loans – has a significant impact on results. Drake 
and Hall (2003) conclude that the inclusion of risk seems to have a significant 
contribution in obtaining considerably different results from those of previous research 
as in Fukuyama (1993). That is, after controlling for problem loans mean technical 
efficiency rose from 72% to 86%. This indicates that X-efficiencies can be 
underestimated if risk is ignored. These findings are in line with Altunbas et al (2000) 
who find that efficiency estimates are quite sensitive to quality and risk factors in 
Japanese banking. Finally, on the size-efficiency relationship, technical efficiency was 
found to increase with bank size.   
 
Drake et al (2006) examine technical efficiency of Hong Kong banking system by 
incorporating the effects of environmental and market factors –such as the Asian Crisis 
of 1997/98, and the regulatory reforms and increasing competition. To this end, a two-
stage non-parametric estimation approach is utilized. The efficient frontier is therefore 
estimated using DEA followed by a second stag Tobit regression which allows for 
determining the effects of external factors on the estimated efficiency scores. The 
study obtains input and output data from Bankscope for the period 1995 – 2001 
yielding 413 bank observations.   
 
Drake et al (2006, p 1451) confirm the vitality of incorporating risk factors into the cost 
function as “failure to adequately account for risk can have a significant impact on 
relative efficiency scores”. In this context, risk is accounted for in terms of including 
loan loss provisions and equity capital. Overall, the study finds that Hong Kong 
banking system was affected by external factors with banks of different sizes and 
sectors being differently affected. Specifically, although the change in financial 
regulatory environment and the Asian crisis of 97/98 were found to have little impact 
on banks’ efficiency, the development in the macroeconomic cycle (declining GDP due 
to World economy slowdown in 2000) and the deterioration of house prices had a 
profound impact on banks’ efficiency, with smallest banks’ efficiency being least 






Moreover, the study reports a strong size-efficiency relationship so that after adjusting 
for external factors, smaller banks seemed to be more efficient with a score of around 
92% compared to an average score of 88% for larger banks (Drake et al, 2006, p 
1462). This is in contrast to previous US findings in that larger banks are found to be 
more efficient than smaller peers. Drake et al (2004) conclude with an important 
observation in that: failure to account for the impact of macroeconomic factors yields 
misleading efficiency scores over time for banks with different sizes and sectors. 
 
Allen and Liu (2007) investigated cost efficiency of the six largest Canadian banks 
using a 20 years panel set from 1983 – 2003. The study specifies a Translog cost 
function. Average cost inefficiency was found to be around 10%, with largest banks 
enjoying the highest level of cost efficiency compared to relatively large banks. Allen 
and Liu (2007) attribute this result to management skills, higher loan quality, and most 
importantly, higher productivity. Moreover, a clear evidence of technological advances 
over time was found – technological progress was detected using linear and nonlinear 
(squared) time dummies. Banks seem to have taken advantage of technological 
advances to cut their costs hence improve their cost efficiency. This may have led to 
narrowing the dispersion of cost inefficiency between Canadian banks over time.   
 
Ariff and Can (2008) investigate cost and profit efficiencies in Chinese banks using 
data on 28 banks with 230 observations over 1995 – 2004 and applying DEA. In line 
with earlier findings, the study finds profit inefficiency levels being significantly greater 
than cost inefficiency levels. A second-stage Tobit regression is employed to 
investigate potential drivers of inefficiency. Overall cost efficiency estimate was found 
around 0.8 suggesting that a typical bank wastes about 20% of its costs in producing 
a given output level relative to a frontier bank. On the other hand, overall profit 
efficiency level is found to average around 0.5 implying that an average bank seems 
to earn half of the profits that a frontier bank can make under similar conditions.   
 
Furthermore, Chinese banks were stratified into 3 main asset groups: small (with 
assets less than $10 bn.), medium (with assets more than $10 bn. and less than $30 





the study reveals a positive and significant relationship for medium size banks, 
whereas the relationship is negative but not significant for small and large banks. This 
suggests, according to the authors, that medium-sized banks are more cost and profit 
efficient than small banks, however large banks are found to carry the lowest profit 
and cost efficiencies relatively.   
 
Ariff and Can (2008) account for asset quality using the ratio of loan loss 
provisions/total loans, and credit risk by the ratio of loans/total assets. Both ratios were 
found to negatively and significantly correlate with efficiency, suggesting that banks 
with better asset quality (lower provisions to loans ratio) and lower credit risk (less 
loans in the asset portfolio) tend to operate with greater cost and profit efficiencies. 
However, their study found negative, but not significant, correlation between bank 
capital ratio (equity/assets) and efficiency. Non-interest income was also found to 
correlate significantly and positively with profit efficiency, suggesting that Chinese 
banks tend to make more profits (hence operate more profit efficiently) if they earn a 
higher proportion of fee and commission income. Cost-to-income ratio was found to 
significantly and negatively correlate with cost efficiency, confirming the expected 
result in that banks with greater control over cost which equally seek to enhance their 
revenues (i.e. lowering cost-to-income ratio as a result) can operate more cost 
efficiently.   
 
Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2008) examine profit efficiency for 55 large commercial 
banks (total assets > 1$ billion) operating in 4 different countries: Canada, the UK, 
Ireland and Australia over the period between 1996 and 2002. The study estimates 
the alternative profit function as specified by Berger and Mester (1997). Consolidated 
accounting data was drawn from Bankscope. The study focuses on large commercial 
banks in particular so as to avoid biasness in profit efficiency estimates due to 
differences in production technologies or other effects from being non-commercial 
banks. Banks were classified into 3 asset groups: small, medium, and large banks. 
The alternative profit function and the time-flexible technical inefficiency model 
suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) were simultaneously estimated in a single-
stage estimation approach, where inefficiency effects (determinants) are specified with 





that the frontier function in their study follows the Translog specification.   
 
Findings indicate that overall profit inefficiency for all sample banks operating in the 
four countries is at 31%, suggesting that the average bank in these four countries 
wastes about one-third of its attainable profits due to inefficiency. It should be noted 
though that the study finds evidence of the ‘bad luck’ influence besides the influence 
of ‘bad management’. Hence these inefficiencies should not be fully attributed to 
managerial deficiencies in achieving the maximum profits possible, although the ‘bad 
management’ factors were found to dominate.   
 
In terms of size-efficiency relationship, large banks were found to have the lowest 
average profit inefficiency score of 0.2 (most profit efficient), while medium size banks 
were found to be the most profit inefficient (least profit efficient) at 0.39 of profits. 
Finally, small banks were found with a profit inefficiency score of 0.33. County-wise, 
banks operating in Canada seem to be less profit efficient than those operating in 
Australia. Furthermore, UK banks seem to be less profit efficient than their Australian 
counterparts possibly due to the fact that the UK has the highest average price of 
labour in the sample (the study reports that the UK has, on average, 58%, 20%, and 
2% higher labour prices than those of Ireland, Australia, and Canada). Furthermore, 
within the UK banking sector, medium size banks seem to be the least profit efficient, 
while for non-UK banking systems, small size banks were found as least profit efficient. 
In general, the authors find that profit efficiency in the UK is, on average, lower than 
that of banks in Australia, Canada, or Ireland.    
 
Berger et al (2008) investigate profit and cost efficiencies of the ‘Big Four’ state-owned 
Chinese banks using data on 38 Chinese banks (including the Big Four, foreign and 
other domestic banks) over 1994 – 2003 yielding 266 observations. The data covers 
95% of the commercial banking assets in China (Berger et al, 2008, p 16). The Big 
Four constitute for nearly three-fourths of Chinese banking industry’s assets. 
Specifically, they controlled 72% of the total market share in 2003. A Translog 
functional form with time effects (i.e. including time dummies) is applied and estimated 
according to the two-stage approach. The study is motivated by recent reforms which 





banks (IPOs) and allowing foreign investment to take minority ownerships in these 
banks. Therefore, the study aims is at examining the potential effects of such 
transformation on the Big Four’s operational efficiency and compares it with foreign 
banks’ efficiency.   
 
Results show that mean profit and cost efficiency scores for the entire sample are 
0.476 and 0.897 respectively suggesting more profit than cost inefficiencies. This is in 
line with earlier US-based findings (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). As for found the 
state-owned Big Four banks, the study found that they are the least cost efficient 
(scoring 0.892) and the least profit efficient (scoring 0.234 only) in the Chinese banking 
system.   
 
The study attributes this considerable profit inefficiency to the high level of non-
performing loans and weak revenues. On the contrary, the majority of foreign banks 
seem to rank among the most profit and cost efficient. Foreign ownership was found 
to significantly improve the efficiency of the Big Four over time. This is suggestive of 
the fact that ownership reforms seem to be strongly related with improving efficiency 
in Chinese banking system. The authors expect that these efficiency gains will be 
further extended by virtue of continued economic growth for the Chinese economy, 
and the increased flexibility of banking environment which does not only mean greater 
provision of credit, but also better and more efficient allocation of credit. Improved 
efficiency of the banking system in China seems to be another positive driver for 
economic growth for China, the study concludes. 
 
Vu and Turnell (2010) investigate cost efficiencies of Vietnamese banking. The 
advantage of this study over past research is that it applies the monotonicity and 
concavity constraints in the estimation of the cost frontier. The study finds cost 
efficacies of these banks to be around 87%. The study uses the SFA approach in 
producing efficiency scores which has the advantage of reducing specification errors. 
The study subjects the cost functional form to many regulatory conditions such as 
linear homogeneity, monotonicity and curvature. The study develops the functional 
form such that it meets all regularity conditions at all sample data points. The latter 





developed and pre-developed functional forms. The paper confirms that ignoring the 
incorporation of regulatory conditions produces misleading and biased efficiency 
results. To this end, this research adapts the practice of checking the functional forms 
that will be specified for these regulatory conditions. However, the paper misses on 
the comprehensive incorporation of the risk variables which this research has the 
advantage of. It is therefore worth investigating how the incorporation of the market 
and credit risk variables, having checked for the regulatory conditions, would impact 
the profit and cost efficiency scores. It is therefore believed that such contribution 
would have an added value to the efficiency literature.    
 
Lensink and Meesters (2012) investigated cost efficiency for around 8000 banks using 
panel data in 136 countries over 10 years. Efficiency scores were estimated using the 
SFA approach. The functional form specification of this study accounts for 
macroeconomics variables including real interest rates, GDP per capital and GDP 
growth as well as other risk variables. On the risk side, the study incorporates Equity 
over Total Assets measure and the Return on Assets. As it seems, the study ignores 
accounting for credit and market risks comprehensively as this research 
comprehensively does. The paper also misses on checking for the very important 
regulatory factors that many past papers have shown the key impact of which on the 
accuracy of efficiency estimates. The other disadvantage of this paper is that it ignores 
estimating profit inefficiencies for the dataset used. This research estimates profit as 
well as cost efficiencies.  
 
Das and Kumbhakar (2012) analysed the banking efficiency of Indian banks between 
1996 and 2005 using the total productivity factor approach TFP. In terms of variable 
specification, the study considers factors including deposits, loans, number of 
accounts, classes of employees, and location of branches, however, it accounts for 
risk using capital adequacy ratio only. The functional form specified in this paper 
ignores accounting for risk comprehensively as well as ignoring testing the functional 
form for regulatory conditions. Such two aspects are fully considered and tested for in 
this research. This leads us to the conclusion that Das and Kumbhakar (2012) results 






Shyu et al (2014) investigated the efficiency of the banking system in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Mainland China using the 3-stage DEA model to estimate inefficiencies. 
The study accounts for a set of environmental conditions and other typical factors used 
in efficiency studies. It found some significant impact of the environmental factors on 
efficiencies, these included economic growth rate, annual growth rate of consumer 
prices, economic freedom and total population. In terms of risk, the study only 
accounts for capital adequacy ratio. All in all, this paper misses out on the very 
important factors of risks which this research comprehensively accounts for. In 
addition, the study ignores investigating the regulatory conditions which many 
previous studies have found a very important determining factor of the accuracy of the 
efficiency scores once these conditions have been checked for. Therefore, this 
research has a significant advantage over Shyu (2014). 
 
2.5 An Extended Summary 
 
The summary below gives a snapshot on the efficiency studies reviewed above which 
are most relevant to this research in terms of methodology and main findings. The 
summary is classified in three main subsections to deal with the reviewed European, 
Non-European and the rest of the world efficiency studies.  
 
2.5.1 European Studies 
 
Altunbas et al (2001) apply SFA to estimate a Fourier Flexible cost function describing 
a sample of EU-15 banks over 1989 – 1997 and find cost inefficiencies between 20 – 
25%. Technical progress was also found to contribute in reducing cost by about 3%.   
 
Cavallo and Rossi (2001) apply the two-stage estimation technique and specify a 
Translog cost function and the time-inflexible inefficiency model, Battese and Coelli 
(1992), to estimate cost efficiency for a sample of 442 banks in 6 major EU countries 
over 1992 – 1997. Overall cost inefficiency was found at an average of 15.64%. 
Findings also suggest that smaller banks are more cost efficient than larger banks. As 
for country-level efficiencies, banking system in Germany and the UK were found to 






Vennet (2002) estimates Translog cost and profit functions over 1995 – 1996 using a 
sample with 2375 observations on banks from 17 European countries. Financial 
capital was used to proxy for default risk but other types of risk were ignored. Average 
cost and profit inefficiencies were found at about 20% and 30% respectively. Little 
evidence was found on the size-efficiency relationship (except for smallest banks 
which were found as the most profit efficient).   
 
Maudos et al (2002) apply the two-stage approach to estimate Translog cost and profit 
functions for large banks in 10 EU countries over 1993 – 1996 using the DFA. Findings 
suggest more profit than cost inefficiencies. Country-wise, Belgium ranks as the least 
profit efficient, whereas banking systems of Luxembourg and Portugal are the most 
profit efficient. The UK banking system ranks as the 5th most profit and cost efficient 
in the EU-10, Austria ranks as the 1st, while Finland ranks as the 10th (last). Findings 
also show a non-linear relationship between bank size and profit efficiency, as only 
medium size banks (up to $10bn) were found with a negative and significant 
correlation with profit efficiency. In terms of risk (proxied by the standard deviation of 
ROA), evidence suggests positive (negative) correlation with profit (cost) efficiency.   
 
Girardone et al (2004) estimate a Fourier Flexible cost function for Italian banks over 
1993 – 1996. Overall cost inefficiency levels were found at about 13 – 15%, with 
declining inefficiency over time that is attributed to the impact of the SMP. No 
significant correlation between size and cost efficiency was found. Findings indicate 
that cost efficient banks seem to have higher interest income (in terms of net interest 
revenue or margin to total assets ratio), better control staff expenses (but no 
advantage in funding costs), more securities, more equity capital, and better asset 
quality. In terms of efficiency correlates, cost inefficiency was found to negatively 
correlate with capital strength but positively correlate with the level of none performing 
loans (NPLs). 
 
Weill (2004) investigates cost efficiency of European banks over 1992 – 1998 using 
different parametric approaches. Under SFA, the study found no clear correlation 
between size and efficiency. Further, the study found significant and negative 





efficiency is associated with lower value of the cost-to-income ratio and vice-a-versa. 
 
Casu & Girardone (2004) investigate profit and cost efficiencies of large banks 
operating in the EU-5 countries using a sample of around 2363 observations over 
1993 – 1997. Average cost and profit inefficiencies were found at about 14% and 13% 
respectively. 
 
Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2004) estimate a Translog cost function for large 
banks in EU-5 countries using a panel of 2000 observations over 1994 – 2000. Results 
mainly indicate a general decline in total costs for the largest Italian and Spanish banks 
due to technological change. Results for Germany, France and UK were inconclusive. 
Bos and Kolari (2005) estimate a Translog profit and cost functions for large European 
and US banks using SFA over 1995 – 1999. Results show that European banks seem 
to have lower and more dispersed cost and profit efficiencies than US banks. Evidence 
from the US and Europe suggests that small banks are less cost and profit efficient 
than large banks. For European banks, average cost and profit efficiencies were found 
at about 0.95 and 0.721 respectively. For US banks, cost and profit efficiencies were 
higher at 0.976 and 0.749 respectively. This suggests more profit than cost 
inefficiencies in both contexts. 
 
Kasman and Yildirim (2006) use SFA in a single-stage estimation approach to 
estimate Fourier Flexible cost and profit functions (truncated at the 2nd order terms) for 
commercial banks in 8 new member states of the EU in 2004. Average cost and profit 
inefficiencies were about 0.20 and 0.36 respectively. Cost efficiency was found to 
correlate positively with capital ratio, GDP growth, and the level of financial 
development (M2/GDP), whilst negatively correlated with deposit market 
concentration (HERF index) and inflation rate. On the other hand, profit efficiency was 
found to correlate positively with market concentration and the level of financial 
development but negatively with inflation and GDP growth. On the size-efficiency 
relationship, the study found no significant correlation between bank size and profit or 
cost efficiencies.   
 





estimate a Translog cost function to investigate the relationship between capital, risk 
and efficiency in European banks operating in 15 European countries over 1992 – 
2000. The study specifies OBS as a third output in addition to loans and securities. 
Findings indicate that cost efficiency is negatively related to risk and capital ratio, but 
there seems to be mixed evidence on the relationship between liquidity and cost 
efficiency. As for country-specific indicators, results show a positive relationship 
between banking system liquidity, net lending (net loans to total assets ratio) and cost 
inefficiency. Lastly, cost inefficiency was found to negatively correlate with system-
specific cost-to-income ratio. 
 
Barros et al (2007) use the two-stage approach to estimate a Fourier Flexible cost and 
profit functions for a sample of European commercial banks (1384 observations) over 
1993 – 2001. A logit regression is then applied to examine efficiency correlates. 
Results indicate that it is less likely for a bank to be worst performer (least cost and 
profit efficient) if it operates in Denmark, Germany, Portugal or Sweden. However, this 
probability increases if the bank operates in Finland, Luxembourg or the Netherlands. 
It is more likely for a bank to become among the best performers if it operates in 
competitive market, the study concludes. In terms of size-efficiency relationship, 
results indicate that smaller, loan-intensive banks are unlikely to be among the worst 
performers compared to bigger and more diversified banks. 
 
Yildirim et al (2007) estimate Translog cost and ‘alternative’ profit functions for banks 
in 12 transition economies in Europe between 1993 and 2000 using SFA and the two-
stage approach. Consistent with earlier evidence, they found more profit than cost 
inefficiencies. Average cost and profit efficiencies were found at 77% and 68% 
respectively. In terms of efficiency correlates, higher efficiency levels seemed to be 
associated with well-capitalized banks. The degree of competition was found to 
negatively impact profit efficiency whilst positively impact cost efficiency. 
 
2.5.2 International Studies 
 
2.5.2.1 US Studies 
 





1989 using the DFA estimation approach. X-inefficiencies were found to account for 
20% of banking costs. Risk (proxied by standard deviation of ROA) seems to 
negatively correlate with profit efficiency. Strong and positive correlation is found 
between profit efficiency and size.   
 
Spong et al (1995) use the two-stage approach to estimate a Translog cost model 
which incorporates proxies for credit, insolvency risk, and output quality. Results 
indicate that higher cost efficiency is associated with taking on more credit risk and 
holding higher levels of capital.   
 
Clark (1996) estimates a Translog cost function for US banks over 1988 – 1991. 
Findings indicate that inefficiency estimates tend to be overestimated if risk (proxied 
by the standard deviation of ROA) is not accounted for (estimates dropped from 9% 
to 3% as a result). 
 
Berger and Mester (1997) estimate Fourier Flexible cost and ‘alternative’ profit 
functions using a sample of about 6000 US commercial banks over 1990 – 1995 using 
SFA and the two-stage estimation approach. Average cost and profit inefficiencies 
were found at about 14% and 50% respectively, with tighter dispersion for cost 
efficiency estimates. No significantly positive correlation between profit and cost 
efficiencies was found. As for the size-effect, the study found that larger banks are 
more cost efficient but less profit efficient compared to smaller banks. Profit efficiency 
is negatively correlated with the ratio of purchased funds to total assets and the level 
of market concentration, whilst cost efficiency is negatively correlated to the latter 
factor. As for risk, the study found that riskier banks (i.e. those with higher SD-ROA or 
more volatile returns) tend to be less profit and cost efficient, an evidence of ‘bad 
management’. 
 
Despite including 25 efficiency correlates in the second stage estimation, the model 
was able to explain about 7% of cost efficiency scores’ variance and about 35% of 
profit efficiency scores only.   
 





using SFA over 1989 – 1994. The frontier function was estimated year-wise. Average 
cost inefficiency was found at about 8%. Cost inefficiency estimates were reproduced 
under a Translog specification and were found to significantly increase as much as 
twice the estimates under the Fourier Flexible. At the bank level, findings seem to 
favor the skimping hypothesis, suggesting that increases in cost inefficiency are 
associated with decreases in loan quality. The study also finds support for the moral 
hazard hypothesis as suggested by the negative relationship between capital strength 
and the level of nonperforming loans. At the industry level, evidence suggests that the 
bad management hypothesis seems to dominate the skimping hypothesis.   
 
Clark and Siems (2002) apply the SFA and the two-stage estimation approach to 
estimate Translog cost and profit functions to examine the impact of accounting for 
off-balance sheet activities (OBS) on efficiency estimates using a sample of US banks 
over 1992 – 1997. Mean cost and profit inefficiencies were found at 14% and 35% 
respectively with OBS items specified. Cost efficiency estimates tend to be 
underestimated if OBS items are not specified. Results suggest that neither the 
relative size of off- to on-balance-sheet activities nor the bank size has any statistically 
significant correlation with either cost or profit efficiencies. The correlation of OBS 
activities with cost efficiency seems to be much stronger compared with profit 
efficiency.   
 
Akhigbe and McNulty (2003) use SFA and the two-stage to approach estimate a 
Fourier Flexible profit function for US banks over 1990 – 1996. An overall negative 
size-profit efficiency correlation is found. Average profit efficiency for small and large 
banks was around 0.75 and 0.72 respectively. Profit efficiency seems to positively 
correlate with market concentration. Small banks seem to operate in concentrated 
markets, have higher loan quality, and have better access to retail deposits which 
gives them a funding cost advantage over large banks since large deposits are more 
expensive than retail deposits, besides, demand deposits are a source of fee-based 
income. 
 
Akhigbe and McNulty (2005) also use SFA and the two-stage approach to estimate 





positive size-efficiency relationship is found. Profit efficiency is negatively correlated 
with capital ratio for medium (above $100 million and less than $1 billion) and large 
banks (assets above $1 billion), and with the level of nonperforming loan ratio. Profit 
efficiency, however, is positively correlated with deposit market concentration. Small 
US banks can significantly enhance their profit efficiency by maintaining high asset 
quality (low default rates), depend more on fee income, and operate in a concentrated 
deposit market. On the other hand, large banks can significantly enhance their profit 
efficiency by primarily using more leverage (depend less on equity).     
 
2.5.2.2 Rest of the World Studies 
 
Altunbas et al (2000) estimate a Fourier Flexible cost function using SFA approach for 
139 Japanese banks over 1993 – 1996. OBS items are accounted for. Cost 
inefficiency was found to range between 5% and 7% and that these results are quite 
sensitive to risk and output quality factors. 
 
Allen and Liu (2007) estimate a Translog cost function for largest Canadian banks over 
1983 – 2003. Average cost inefficiency was found at about 10%. Technological 
advances were found to have a significant impact in reducing costs over time. 
 
Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2008) estimate a Translog ‘alternative’ profit function for 
large commercial banks in Canada, the UK, Ireland and Australia over 1996 – 2002. 
They apply SFA and the single-stage estimation approaches were used and the time-
flexible technical inefficiency model suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) was 
specified too. Average profit inefficiency was found at 31%. Evidence on the impact of 
‘bad luck’ and ‘bad management’ was found with the latter’s effect dominating the 
former. A positive size-profit efficiency relationship was found. The UK banking system 
was found amongst the least profit efficient which the study attributes to its relatively 
higher labour costs. 
 
Berger et al (2008) estimate Translog cost and profit functions for 38 Chinese banks 
over 1994 – 2003 using SFA and the two-stage approach. Average profit and cost 
efficiency scores are 0.476 and 0.897. The study found that state-owned banks are 






2.6 Brief Summary 
 
This brief summary provides the gist of the reviewed European and Non-European 
efficiency studies in a compact presentation.   
 
European studies seem to mainly rely on 1990s data – except for Kasman and 
Yildirim (2006) who use 2004 data, estimate both Translog and Fourier Flexible 
functions, and predominantly use SFA and the two-stage approach. Cost and profit 
inefficiencies seem to range between 13 – 25% and 28 – 36% respectively. All 
European studies, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, seem to imply more profit 
than cost inefficiencies. There is some evidence of cost reduction due to technical 
progress (of about 3%). Many studies found no evidence on the size-efficiency 
relationship (in terms of profit or cost efficiencies), however, some studies found non-
linear and negative relationships. In terms of risk, there is some evidence on positive 
(negative) correlation with profit (cost) efficiency.   
 
As for efficiency correlates, evidence suggests that cost efficiency positively correlates 
with interest income, GDP growth, the level of financial development and asset quality, 
whilst being negatively correlated with the level of non-performing loans, deposit 
market concentration and inflation rate. With respect to the correlation with capital 
strength, there is evidence on a positive correlation with cost efficiency despite that 
few studies suggest a negative one. On the other hand, profit efficiency was found to 
correlate positively with market concentration and the level of financial development 
but negatively with inflation and GDP growth, nonetheless, the degree of competition 
was found to negatively impact profit efficiency.   
 
Country-wise, banking systems in Germany and the UK were found to be the most 
and least cost efficient respectively. Other studies found that Belgium ranks as the 
least profit efficient, whereas banking systems of Luxembourg and Portugal are the 
most profit efficient. The UK banking system ranks as the 5th most profit and cost 
efficient in the EU-10, Austria ranks as the 1st, while Finland ranks as the 10th (last). 
Furthermore, some evidence suggests that it is less likely for a bank to be worst 





or Sweden. However, this probability increases if the bank operates in Finland, 
Luxembourg or the Netherlands.   
 
As for the US evidence, the vast majority of US studies seem to follow SFA and the 
two-stage approach to estimate a Translog or Fourier Flexible functions using 1990s 
data. Average cost inefficiency for US banks is found to range between 8 – 25% whilst 
profit inefficiency is found to range between 32 – 50%. Again, US evidence suggests 
more profit than cost inefficiencies. Cost efficiency estimates tend to be 
underestimated if OBS items are not specified. No significantly positive correlation 
between profit and cost efficiencies was found. There is mixed evidence on the size-
profit efficiency correlation as some studies have found a strong and positive 
correlation while others have found a negative correlation. As for the functional form 
specification, cost inefficiency estimates under the Translog specification were found 
to significantly increase as much as twice the estimates under the Fourier Flexible 
specification.   
 
Cost efficiency is found to negatively correlate with deposit market concentration, 
while profit efficiency seems to positively correlate with loan quality, the level of fee 
income, the size of retail deposits, and the degree of leverage.  Profit efficiency is 
negatively correlated with the level of nonperforming loan ratio, capital ratio, and the 
ratio of purchased funds to total assets. There is mixed evidence on the correlation 
between profit efficiency and deposit market concentration.   
 
In terms of correlation with risk, there is some evidence of a negative correlation with 
profit efficiency. More importantly, findings indicate that inefficiency estimates tend to 
be overestimated if risk is not accounted for. Also, riskier banks (i.e. those with higher 
SD-ROA or more volatile returns) tend to be both less profit and cost efficient, which 
is probably an evidence of the ‘bad management’ hypothesis.   
 
Lastly, rest of the world evidence, mainly covering Australia, Canada, China, and 
Japan, seem to follow SFA and the two-stage approach to estimate a Translog or 
Fourier Flexible functions and mainly using 1990s and more recent data (up to 2003). 





of this research by estimating an alternative profit function using SFA and the single-
stage estimation approaches besides specifying the time-flexible technical inefficiency 
model suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995). 
 
Cost inefficiency was found to range between 5% and 11%, whilst profit inefficiency 
was found to range between 13% and 53%. As in the US and European studies, 
international evidence confirms the fact that there is more profit than cost inefficiencies 
in banking. Cost efficiency estimates were also found sensitive to risk and output 
quality factors. Evidence on ‘bad luck’ and ‘bad management’ hypotheses was found 
with the latter’s effect dominating the former.   
 
There is some evidence that technological advances have a significant impact in 
reducing costs over time. Generally, there seems to be a positive size-profit efficiency 
relationship. In terms of country-wise efficiencies, the UK banking system was found 
amongst the least profit efficient which the study attributes to its relatively higher labour 
costs. Also, state-owned banks are found to be the least cost and profit efficient in the 



























































This chapter explores the different methodological issues underpinning the empirical 
analysis. The chapter is split into two main sections.  
 
With regard to the methodology related to efficiency analysis, the section starts by 
defining the main concepts and bank cost function. The discussion then follows on to 
examine the different frontier estimation techniques, with a particular focus on the 
stochastic frontier analysis approach (SFA) that is applied in this research. This is 
followed by specifying the modified profit and cost models to be estimated.   
 
3.2 Efficiency Analysis 
 
This section starts by introducing the concept of efficiency from a production frontier 
perspective followed by a reflection on the profit and cost frontiers and the related 
efficiency concepts (technical and allocative efficacies). The discussion then turns to 
examining bank production and cost functions in more details. The profit function is 
then specified from two perspectives (standard and alternative), followed by a detailed 
discussion on modelling and estimating technical efficiency term. The specification of 
banking inputs and outputs is also dealt with. The focus then shifts towards issues 
related to the specification of the functional forms (Translog and Fourier) with a 
detailed reflection on the regulatory conditions of the cost function. Parametric and 
non-parametric frontier estimation techniques are subsequently discussed. 
 
3.2.1. Production Frontier 
 
For a single-input and single-output production process, efficiency is simply calculated 
as the ratio of outputs to input levels given their prices. However, such simplicity 
cannot offer a comprehensive efficiency analysis in a multi-input multi-output setting. 
Thus, a mechanism of aggregating inputs and outputs to obtain efficiency indices 
needs to be applied which gave the origination of the frontier analysis framework 






Frontier analysis is a benchmarking technique, which compares the performance of 
best-practicing banks in the sample, given inputs and outputs quantities and prices, 
according to a defined criterion – i.e. production, cost or profit concept – with the 
performance of the rest of the sample banks. The technique accordingly labels banks 
on the frontier as ‘efficient’, whereas observed banks that are off the frontier are 
labelled as ‘inefficient’. Thus, the efficient frontier contains all production subsets (i.e. 
feasible input-output combinations) of efficient banks. 
 
It is essential in this context to differentiate between the concept of productivity and 
efficiency as they refer to different aspects. Productivity = outputs/inputs for one input 
one output production technology. But as banks operate with multi-input and -output 
production technology, measuring productivity is therefore referred to as total factor 
productivity, or shortly TP. Isolating production factors means considering the 
productivity of individual inputs such as labour or funds, in insolation yielding partial 
productivity measures (Coelli and Battese, 1998). Therefore, productivity reflects 
input/output relationship, whereas efficiency represents the relationship between total 
costs and input prices and outputs in the case of cost efficiency, and the relationship 
between profits and input prices and outputs for profit efficiency. However, these 
concepts are connected to one another as the cost function can be derived from the 
production function and vice-a-versa given the duality property of the cost function as 
we illustrate later. 
 
It follows that banking production frontier reflects the maximum level of outputs 
obtainable given input levels. Therefore, a technically efficient bank would be 
positioned on the frontier, meaning that any observation lying below the production 
frontier is technically inefficient. Graphically, this is represented by a complicated 
multi- dimensional figure in which the frontier is depicted as a surface, however for 
simplicity reasons, this relationship is graphed in terms of one-input and one-output 









Figure 1: Productivity, Technical Efficiency, and frontier shift over time (Coelli 




Banks on the efficient production frontier exhibit, compared with other sample banks, 
the ability to produce the maximum possible amount of outputs given inputs, or 
produce a given level of outputs using the least possible inputs under similar 
conditions. As it can be seen from the production frontier above, producing at point C 
is inefficient as it entails lower level of output (y) for the same level of input utilized (x) 
compared to the efficient point B on the frontier. The slope of the production frontier 
(y/x) at a given point, represented by the tangent, yields the productivity achieved at 
that point. Hence any efficient observation beyond the optimal scale at point A will 
have a marginally decreasing productivity as inputs will be increasing more 
proportionately than outputs. 
 
Point A on the production frontier corresponds to the trough or minimum stationary 
point on the corresponding long-run average cost curve LRAC (that is where marginal 
cost curve crosses LRAC – not shown here). It also corresponds to the maximum point 





point A corresponds to the optimal scale (minimum average cost and maximum 
average profit). Production at an efficient point B is technically efficient because it lies 
on the frontier, but suffers scale diseconomies because it will be corresponding to a 
higher LRAC compared to that of point A. Production point C will have the same 
characteristics of B but with less output being produced for the same level of inputs 
used, hence it is technically inefficient and is also associated with scale diseconomies. 
Producing at any scale below A on the frontier means that the bank implies that the 
bank will be incurring higher average costs. Therefore, producing at point A is 
technically efficient. 
 
Productivity could improve or decline over time which is reflected in upward or 
downward frontier shift respectively (Coelli and Battese, 1998). Figure 1 demonstrates 
an improved productivity causing the production frontier to shift upwards. At point A`, 
it becomes possible to produce the same level of (y) with less inputs used due to 
higher productivity (the slope of the frontier’s tangent at A` becomes relatively greater). 
Point A` is technically efficient and corresponds to the new optimal scale of production. 
 
Factors contributing to an upward shift in the production frontier mainly include 
technical development over time which entitles the bank to utilize inputs more 
efficiently, hence producing similar level of outputs but with lower level of inputs used. 
This can materialize, for instance, by exploiting its IT infrastructure to provide 
insurance products along with retail banking products, or by investing in new 
technologies that can reduce average costs in the long run as in inducing customers 
to utilize internet banking instead of branch-banking for instance. As can be seen, the 
production frontier represents an input-output relationship. On the other hand, profit 
and cost frontiers depict different relationship. The cost frontier represents relationship 
between costs and outputs, input prices, and other factors; while the profit frontier 
represents the relationship between profits and outputs, input prices, and other 
factors. Cost frontier banks are distinguished from other banks in the sample by their 
ability to produce the given level and mix of outputs under given input prices and other 
factors but with relatively lower costs. Banks off the cost frontier are technically less 
efficient because of the less effective use of their inputs or resources. Likewise profit 





level and mix of outputs under given input prices and other factors. Banks off the profit 
frontier are technically inefficient because of their excess costs or deficient revenues 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
 
3.2.2 Technical and Allocative Efficiencies 
 
Bank efficiency comprises of two main elements: technical and allocative efficiencies. 
Farrell (1957) explains that technical efficiency stands for the bank’s ability to achieve 
maximum output by utilizing a given set of inputs at given input prices, or the ability to 
produce the observed output at minimal cost given input prices. On the other hand, 
allocative efficiency represents the bank’s ability to use (allocate) inputs in optimal 
proportions under their given prevailing prices to produce a given level of output. The 
total effect of both efficiencies amounts to the so-called economic (overall) efficiency 
or X-inefficiency which was first introduced by Leibenstein (1966). According to 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000): X-inefficiency= technical inefficiency + allocative 
inefficiency.   
 
Production technical efficiency measures the bank’s ability to maximise outputs given 
input levels, reflecting the effectiveness in avoiding waste by producing maximum level 
of outputs given a set of inputs. From a profit maximization perspective, technical 
efficiency indicates the bank’s ability to maximize revenues given output levels, input 
mixes, and inputs prices; hence advocating more effective utilization of inputs to 
increase profits. For a cost-minimizing bank, technical efficiency refers to the bank’s 
ability to produce a given level of outputs using the minimal level of inputs given their 
prevailing prices. 
 
Allocative efficiency, on the other hand, reflects the bank’s ability to combine inputs 
and outputs optimally given their prices. In other words, allocative efficiency involves 
selecting the most cost-efficient inputs combination given their prevailing prices to 







Figure 2: Technical and Allocative Efficiencies 
  
 
The figure above illustrates the concepts of technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency (Fried et al, 1993, p91):  The curve  represents the efficient isoquant 
specifying the production of a given output level  using different inputs mixes. Any 
input mix situated on the efficient isoquant delivers similar level of output  in a 
technically and allocatively efficient manner. The line  is the isocost (budget 
constraint) which represents the different compensations of inputs  given their 
prevailing prices. Point  is the actual (observed) choice of inputs by a given bank. 
The technically efficient point that corresponds to the observed inputs choice, , is 
the isoquant point .  is a benchmark point employed to segregate total cost 
efficiency into technical and allocative efficiencies. The most technically and 
allocatively efficient point to produce  given the observed input combination prices 
is .  
 
















same isocost , however, the input mix at point is allocatively sub-optimal to 
 as it is not possible to obtain the output level  that  can deliver for the same 
cost at the prevailing input prices (Fried et al, 1993). Allocative efficiency ( ) can 
therefore be measured by the ratio of inputs mix to the optimal mix on the isoquant 
 such that: . This is referred to in the literature as Farrell measure 
of technical inefficiency (Farrell, 1957).  is bounded between 0 and 1. 
 
Technical efficiency ( ), on the other hand, can also be measured as: 
, suggesting that producing at is technically inefficient given input 
mixes and prices. Input choices  and  correspond to similar input mixes as the 
relative proportion of to – which stands for the slope of the line  crossing the 
two choices – is the same for  and . However, in absolute terms,  utilizes 
more inputs than the efficient choice does to produce the given output quantity 
. This implies that the observed inputs choice at  is sub-optimal to that of , which 
results in that producing at  is technically inefficient compared to producing at of 
 (Fried et al, 1993). is bounded between 0 and 1. Consequently, total efficiency 
or economic efficiency effect  is the product of the two efficiencies such that (Coelli 
and Battese, 1998):  , 
Where  is bounded between 0 and 1.  
 
It is worth noting that this research conducts profit and cost efficiency estimations 
under the assumption that all deviations from the frontier are attributed to technical 
inefficiency and the random error component following Coelli (1996). This is because 
allocative efficiency is difficult to disentangle from overall X-efficiencies since 
information on input mixes (combinations) is not available, therefore technical 
inefficiencies are assumed to account for all X-inefficiencies. That is why in the 
literature X-efficiency and technical efficiency are used interchangeably (Altunbas et 
al 2000)8.  
                                               
8 The application of Shephard’s Lemma to check for cost function monotonicity (by deriving factor share equations) 





























3.2.3 Bank Production and Cost Functions 
 
The production function is a microeconomic concept representing the relationship 
between the bank’s outputs and inputs. Banks transform inputs – labour, real capital 
and fixed assets – using their production technologies to generate outputs (different 
on- and off-balance sheet assets). These inputs can be utilized and transformed to 
produce the bank’s outputs, and the effectiveness of doing so is conditional on the 
degree of allocative and technical efficiencies achieved (Shepherd, 1985).  
 
Production technology can be expressed – in its basic form – by a setting of a single 
output and two inputs. This is illustrated by the Cobb-Douglas functional form which 






Early banking efficiency literature predominantly employed the Cobb-Douglas 
specification which treated banks as a single-output producing firm, but Cobb-Douglas 
handles a multi-product firm by estimating a separate cost function for each output 
(Mester, 1987). In this context, Cobb-Douglas clearly fails to establish a more realistic 
banking cost function that is capable of simultaneously accommodating for a vector of 
outputs produced. 
 
Berger and Humphrey (1994) criticized the Cobb-Douglas specification since that it 
lacks the capability to allow for a U-shaped average cost curve as it can only estimate 
a decreasing, constant, or increasing average cost curve. Hence it is not suitable for 
detecting the existence of for a set of banks that are heterogeneous in scale. Another 
drawback is that Cobb-Douglas assumes unit elasticity of substitution between inputs, 
ignoring the fact that some inputs may have elastic or inelastic rate of substitution 
given their relative prices. They further highlight a serious weakness of this model in 
that it denies the all-important property of duality of the cost function and the 
                                               







production function9.   
 
Advances in the production economics literature have led to the departure from Cobb-
Douglas model and the development of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
production function CES (Kim, 1985). The latter overcomes the shortfalls of Cobb-
Douglas in that it permits for any degree of substitution between inputs rather than 
restricting it to unit elasticity and provides more general specification for modelling 
firms’ production functions. Nonetheless, it only accommodates a production function 
with one output which makes the CES significantly constraining when using it to model 
a multi-output setting as is the case for banking production technology.   
 
Molyneux (1996) stresses this by indicating that the CES offers a highly restrictive 
functional model and that it does not impose a homogenous elasticity of substitution 
between each input pair. Moreover, the CES, as does the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form, suffers from an additional limitation in that it does not allow for estimating a U-
shaped average cost curve – a property that hinders the reliability of analysis (Gilbert, 
1984). Such serious drawbacks of Cobb-Douglas and CES functional forms have 
prompted further research in the area of exploring more suitable and flexible functional 
forms. 
 
This has materialized in the work of Christensen et al (1973) in developing the so-
called Translog cost function. The Translog function is a flexible functional form hence 
it is superior to Cobb-Douglas and CES models as it overcomes their restrictiveness 
related to limiting the elasticities of substitution of the various factors of production 
(inputs) (Kim, 1985, p 1).  According to Mitchell and Onvural (1996, p 178) “Translog 
represents a second-order Taylor series approximation of an arbitrary function at a 
point”.  
 
The Translog cost function is obtained by applying Taylor series expansion in input 
prices and output quantities around a specific point of a log-linear quadratic 
                                               
9 To analyse efficiency, the object of interest is the production function, i.e. how inputs are combined to produce 
outputs. However, the data required for its direct estimation is generally not available; moreover, there are 
methodological issues related to how to deal with differences in product quality. Therefore, cost and profit functions 
are alternatively estimated that basically contain all the relevant information involved in the production function, i.e. 





approximation of a multi-product arbitrary ‘unknown’ cost function that is defined as: 
. Translog is a linear combination of input and output terms, but 
is superior to Cobb-Douglas in that it allows for estimating U-shaped cost function as 
it contains squared output terms – hence a trough is mathematically possible 
(Humphrey, 1990). It is worth noting that Cobb-Douglas allows for a U-shaped cost 
function as it could involve quadratic terms, however the Translog is more flexible as 
it does not only accommodate for quadratic terms, but it also contains second-order 
interactive input prices and output quantities terms which permits Translog to be more 
flexible than Cobb-Douglas (Humphrey, 1987 and 1990). It also accommodates for 
multi-output multi-input production technology where each input and output is treated 
as a separate variable, and permits for any degree of substitution elasticities between 
inputs. Most importantly, Translog specification allows for marginal costs (i.e. 
derivative of cost function w.r.t. outputs) to vary with output levels (Humphrey, 1990).   
 
For any production function, there is a unique cost function that can be derived from it 
using the economic objective of cost-minimization. There are two properties that are 
related to the cost functions in this respect: Shepherd’s Lemma and Duality. The 
Shepherd’s Lemma10 enables the derivation of input demand functions from the cost 
function. Cost function duality, on the other hand, is a microeconomic property that 
establishes the link between production and cost functions, hence making the cost 
function dual to the production function. Duality is important because modelling the 
production function in banking is difficult, therefore the cost function is modelled 
instead and certain restrictions are imposed on it to make it dual to the production 
function so inference can be made about the production technology of banks.   
 
Diewert and Kopp (1982) illustrate that any cost function can be derived with no prior 
knowledge of the underlying production function. As data on input prices and output 
quantities is normally more readily available than that on input quantities, banking 
production functions are therefore difficult to estimate. For this reason, the cost 
function is constructed and analysed instead (Diewert and Kopp, 1982). Christensen 
                                               
10 Shepherds’ Lemma is a microeconomics property which utilizes the concept of cost minimization to establish 
the link between the cost function and input demand functions. That is, input demand functions can be generated 
by taking the rate of change of (or the derivative of) the cost function with respect to input prices ( ) 







and Green (1976) explain the rationale for this in that the estimation of the production 
function is preferred when output quantity is determined endogenously, however, 
estimating the cost function is far more attractive if output quantity is determined 
exogenously as it is mostly the case for banking.   
 
Thus, total costs are defined as the sum of inputs expenditures and modelled as a 
function of output quantities and all input prices. This can be illustrated by the following 





Where  are prices of labour and capital . Also, total costs can be expressed 











This formula indicates that total costs are a function of input quantities , input 
prices ( ) and output quantity .  
 
  
























Production theory describes the methodology by which an arbitrary production 
function for banking institutions can be approximated, yet it does not precisely specify 
an algebraic functional form for the bank cost function. Rather, it states certain 
requirements that a well-behaved cost function should satisfy.   
 
A ‘proper’ cost function has to conform to five main regulatory conditions as suggested 
by production theory. These are: positive cost elasticities (outputs’ marginal costs), 
monotonicity in input prices, concavity in input prices, linear homogeneity in input 
prices, and symmetry in input prices and output levels. These requirements, according 
to Shepherd (1970), Caves et al (1980), Gilbert (1984), Kim (1985), Jorgenson (1986), 
Diewert and Wales (1987), Mester (1987) and Le Compte and Smith (1990), involve 
the following:   
 
(1) The cost function needs to be nonnegative (i.e. positive marginal costs of outputs 
for each observation), monotonic or non-decreasing in inputs (i.e. total costs should 
be monotonically be factor shares: labour, capital, and funds shares), non-positive 
own-price elasticities11 to satisfy concavity in factor (input) prices for different output 
levels, and linearly homogenous in input prices to achieve duality to the production 
function, 
 
(2) The cost function should comprise a reasonable number of unknown parameters 
to be estimated, and 
 
(3) The cost function has to be flexible such that it provides approximation to an 
unknown arbitrary function. To achieve this, the cost function should be characterized 
to allow for a second order local approximation parameter (so that it can be 
differentiated twice to explore possible stationary points. 
 
These conditions will carefully be tested and accommodated for in the specification of 
the preferred cost function prior to conducting the estimation and producing efficiency 
and results. 
                                               
11 A necessary and sufficient condition to test for concavity is to check if the symmetric matrix of the second-order 
factor price term to be negative semi-definite as demonstrated by Diewert and Wales (1987). This is thoroughly 





3.2.4 Model Specification 
 
In this section, the general form of production function is specified then the cost and 
the alternative profit functions are discussed. This is followed by a discussion on the 
specification of the inefficiency term and the associated necessary tests. To begin 
with, the production function is specified according to Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). This model implies regressing output 
quantity against input levels with an error term that comprises two components: a 
random error component and a technical inefficiency component. This model is shown 
as follows: 
 






 is the output for the bank.  
 is a vector of input quantities for the bank.   
 is a set of coefficients to be estimated. 
 is the random variable assumed to be  and is independent of the 
inefficiency component .  
 is the nonnegative random component that is assumed to ascribe technical 
inefficiency where . 
 
This model can be extended to accommodate for different distributional assumptions 
of , a panel data set, and for cost and profit function specifications (Coelli, 1996). 
The discussion now turns to focus on the cost function and the alternative profit 
functions which will be estimated in the corresponding empirical chapters. 
 























3.2.5 The Cost Function 
 
Berger and Mester (1997) indicate that banking efficiency analysis is best approached 
through three main economic concepts, these are: cost, standard profit, and 
alternative profit efficiencies. Their argument stems from the concept of ‘economic 
optimization’ as it accommodates for the state of the bank’s production technology as 
well as market’s conditions (competition and prices). According to Berger and 
Humphrey (1997), Berger and Mester (1997), and Mester (1996), the cost function is 
specified to derive cost efficiency which measures the ability to produce the observed 
output level at minimum cost given input prices.   
 
Berger and Mester (1997, p 898) illustrate that the cost function implies specifying total 
costs as a function of: variable outputs, variable input prices, fixed netputs12 (inputs or 







 are the variable costs. 
 is a vector of variable input prices. 
 is a vector of variable output quantities. 
 is the quantity of any fixed netputs. 
 is a set of environmental or market variables that can affect performance. 
denotes the inefficiency term that could cause the bank-specific costs to rise above 
the efficient frontier. 
represents the composite random error that may temporarily increase or decrease 
bank-specific costs. It is assumed to incorporate the effect of variables’ measurement 
error, good or bad luck...etc.  
 
                                               
12 Netputs are basically inputs or outputs which are taken to be fixed and/or where the prices of inputs are difficult 
to measure, such as equity capital as in Berger and Mester (1997). Netputs in this research include: Off-Balance 













The composite random error term is assumed to consist of two components: a random 
component  and the inefficiency component . The inefficiency term and the 
random term  are assumed to have different distributional assumptions so they can 
be separated. The two components therefore are multiplicatively separable form the 
rest of the independent variables in the cost function.  
 
The idea behind separating the composite error term is to attribute the portion of the 
dependent variable’ variation (be it cost or profit) that could not be explained by the 
model’s independent variables (output quantities, input prices, macroeconomic 
variables…etc) to a random error component capturing the effects of luck, 
measurement error…. etc., and another one-sided (positive) component capturing 
inefficiency effects. So, in the case of the cost function, a bank’s cost inefficiency is 
attributed to using more input quantities (not specified in the cost function) to produce 
a given level of outputs under given input prices and other variables (which are 
specified in the cost function). 
 
Thus, once the cost function is specified, the functional form of the frontier in equation 
(7) can be specified assuming the two components of the composite error term. 
Accordingly, taking the natural logarithms of both sides of equation (6) yields the 





Subsequently, each bank’s cost efficiency indicator can be defined as the 
ratio of the minimum predicted costs in the sample to the actual predicted costs of the 
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Cost efficiency score denoted as  represents bank ’s cost of producing 
the output vector  with no cost inefficiency (  or ) under similar conditions 
in terms of: input prices , environmental variables ( ) and fixed netputs ( ).
 ranges between 1 and infinity. 
 
Put simply, a bank-specific cost efficiency score provides the percentage of 
costs which the observed bank ( ) can reduce by using its resources more effectively, 
relative to the best-practicing bank in the sample operating under similar conditions, 
to produce its given level of outputs. For instance, a  of 110% suggests an 
excess in the costs or waste in the resources utilized of 10% relative to the best-
practicing bank on the cost frontier in the sample. 
 
3.2.6 Standard and Alternative Profit Functions 
 
Berger and Mester (1997) illustrate that the concept of profit efficiency examines how 
close a bank is to the maximum Possible profit achieved by the best-practicing bank 
in the sample, given certain conditions (input prices, output prices, environmental 
variables…etc). There are two competing concepts in this respect: the standard profit 
and the alternative profit functions. 
 
The standard profit function assumes perfectly competitive output markets hence 






































the other hand, the alternative profit function assumes that banks can have some 
power in determining output prices. That said, the standard profit function specifies 
profits as a function of input prices and output prices, while alternative profit function 
specifies profits as a function of input prices and output quantities. Therefore, the 
specification of the standard profit efficiency function considers input and output prices 
as exogenous (outside the control of banks and defined by the market), whereas 
output quantities are assumed to be endogenous (can be influenced by banks).   
 
Berger and Mester (1997) point out that it is necessary to analyse profit efficiencies 
alongside with cost efficiencies. This is because the cost function specifies output 
levels in the model as given, or as a control (independent) variable, and therefore 
having no impact on the inefficiency term in the cost function. This is despite that these 
output quantities may be at inefficient levels in the first place. Accordingly, the cost 
function allows for capturing inefficiencies in the choice of inputs only. On the other 
hand, as the standard profit function specifies output prices as a control variable, it 
therefore leaves output level and mix as well as inputs level and mix to influence 
revenues and therefore influence the inefficiency term in the profit function. This 
effectively allows for capturing inefficiencies in the choice of outputs and inputs in 
response to output prices and other control variables specified in the cost function. 
However, if output quantities are specified in the profit function, yielding the alternative 
profit function as will be shown, this allows for capturing inefficiencies in the choice of 
output prices in response to changes in output quantities and the other control 
variables in the profit function. 
 
With regard to the specification of the standard profit function, Berger and Mester 






13  stands for the variable profits of the bank. 
                                               
13 Variable profits incorporate all interest, fee, commission income earned on the variable outputs minus variable 






    is an added constant so the logarithm is taken of a positive number. 
    is the vector of variable output prices. 
 is the random error. 
 stands for inefficiency which reduces profits. 
 
Standard profit efficiency index is then calculated as the ratio of a bank ’s predicted14 
actual profits to the predicted maximum profits of the best-practicing bank in the 
sample. Hence: 
 
Std EFF =   
      =  
(10) 
 
As such, Std can range between 0 and 1. So for instance if a bank’s Std  was 
80%, this implies it is losing 20% of the profits due to excessive costs, deficient 
revenues, or both. 
 
The standard profit function has a disadvantage given the inherent assumption of the 
exogenous nature of the output prices vector  implying the absence of the bank’s 
control over . Such assumption is relaxed by the concept of alternative profit 
function which permits for the assumption that banks can operate under imperfectly 
competitive market structure, hence banks can exercise control over output price 
vector . Accordingly, output quantities vector  are specified instead of output 
prices in the profit function. Consequently, the profit function becomes defined as: 
 
                                               
costs. 
14 These are predicted because the model’s parameters describing the dependent variable (actual profits) are 







































The alternative profit function considers output levels  as exogenous or given, i.e. 
determined by market equilibrium between supply and demand, whereas output prices 
are accounted for as an endogenous variable that is determined by the bank. 
Therefore, under the alternative profit concept, the economic objective of maximizing 
profits  is achieved by controlling output quantities and input prices . Profit 
inefficiency therefore arises from deficient revenues (output prices and mixes) or 
excessive costs (resulting from excessive use of input levels or deficient input mixes), 
or both. This is because both factors are not specified in the profit function but left to 
be captured by the inefficiency term in the function. 
 
Following Berger and Mester (1997, p 899), the specification of the Alternative Profit 






15  stands for the variable profits of the bank. 
    an added constant so the logarithm is taken of a positive number. 
  is a vector of variable output quantities. 
 is the random error component. 
 stands for inefficiency which reduces profits. 
 
It is probably worth noting that the cost and alternative profit functions have the same 
independent variables specifications, with different dependent variables. Also,  is 
subtracted from profit inefficiency  so that profit efficiency score becomes bounded 
between 0 and 1. Each of the bank-specific alternative profit efficiency score is 
                                               

















calculated by taking the ratio of a given bank’s predicted actual profits to the predicted 
maximum profits of the best practicing banks. This is given by the following (Berger 
and Mester, 1997, p 901): 
 
Alt EFF =     
       =  
(13) 
 
This research specifies the alternative profit function instead of the standard profit 
function to analyze technical efficiency. Opting for the alternative profit function 
specification stems from the arguments of Berger and Mester (1997).   
 
The authors list a set of assumptions that when one or more hold, the alternative profit 
function should be specified instead of the standard profit function if: 
 
I -  There are considerable unmeasured differences in the quality of bank 
products and services. This is because the alternative profit function concept 
accommodates the additional revenues generated by higher quality output. Higher 
output quality is associated with higher costs which are normally associated with 
higher prices. The specification of the alternative profit function can accommodate for 
this since it specifies variable output quantities  as given but leaves output prices 
 to freely fluctuate reflecting the different levels of output quality and affect the level 
of profit inefficiency (since inefficiency is part of the model’s residual). This is relevant 
especially when discrepancies in output quality amongst sample banks are evident.  
One aspect of output quality can be represented by the level of nonperforming loans 
for instance. As far as the sample of European banks used in this research, these 
differences in loans quality are evident as the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
ranges between [0.27%, 6.36%] for the sub-sample of 541 banks that are the subject 
of profit efficiency estimation. This relatively wide dispersion in output quality 

































almost 23-fold as the range indicates. 
 
II -  Scale of production is not completely variable. This assumption 
accommodates for the fact, given the strong heterogeneity in banks’ asset size, that it 
takes a considerable amount of time for smaller banks to grow and ‘catch up’ with 
mega-banks through growth and mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, it is significant 
to allow the profit function to level the playground for banks with substantial scale 
differences. The Standard profit function overlooks this issue as it does not control for 
output scale whereas alternative profit function specifies output levels as a factor 
determining profits, hence reducing scale bias in efficiency results when the sample 
has considerably heterogeneous bank sizes. Although this analysis is confined to big 
European banks only, sample scale heterogeneity is very evident. Bank sizes involved 
in the sample range over [985 - 1,125,500] million euros in assets. This further justifies 
the application the concept of alternative profit to analysis profit efficiency. 
 
III -  Banks can exercise a degree of market power implying imperfect 
competition. The concept of standard profit function ignores that banks may not 
operate in a perfectly competitive market as it specifies output prices as given, i.e. 
banks can sell variable levels of output without changing prices, whereas in fact some 
banks can exert some market power hence affecting prevailing market prices. Such 
perfect completion assumption is economically unsound as banks that are producing 
below the efficient scale cannot – under the standard profit function – lower their prices 
to increase output and exploit cost savings, therefore their standard profit efficiencies 
can be underestimated. This is overcome by the concept of alternative profit function 
as prices are free to vary. Berger and Mester (1997) find strong evidence of banks 
exerting market power and suggest that banks with larger market shares have some 
influence over prices, and therefore they can lower rates they pay to depositors 
(Berger and Hannan 1989, and Hannan, 1991). 
 
The data used in this research shows strong evidence of imperfectly competitive 
markets for many of the European countries involved. This is demonstrated using 
Herfindahl index for loans which refers to the size of loan market share controlled by 





over 2008 - 2018 for Denmark was 47% which represented the market share of 5 big 
commercial banks out of 26 commercial banks operating in Denmark over that period 
in total. Also, for Switzerland, 2 big commercial banks out of 41 controlled 56% of the 
loan market over the specified period. However, the UK market is found as competitive 
where 34 big commercial banks out of 96 controlled only 12% of the loan market. In 
light of this, the application of alternative profit function instead of standard profit 
function is necessary so as to accommodate for the considerable degree of market 
concentration in a number of European banking markets. 
 
IV -  Output prices are measured inaccurately. Standard profit function relies on 
obtaining accurate output prices to be specified in the function so as not to produce 
biased profit efficiencies (Pastor and Serrano, 2005). Berger and Mester (1997) argue 
that banking output prices are very likely to be inaccurately measured which gives the 
specification of profit function according to alternative profit function an edge over the 
standard profit function, not to mention the fact that it is quite difficult to obtain these 
prices. Because the alternative profit function addresses the difficulty in measuring 
output prices, it allows for output quantities (rather than output prices) to explain the 
variation in bank profitability (Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003). 
 
Further, raw data on banking output prices has weak explanatory power in relation to 
profits. In fact, using US data Humphrey and Pulley (1997), modelled both output 
prices and quantities to explain the variations of the dependent variable, profits, and 
tested the null hypothesis that all output price and quantity parameters are zero. The 
null for output prices variable was not rejected, while that of output quantities was 
strongly rejected.   
 
Alternative profit function assumes that output prices are endogenous to the bank’s 
profits (chosen by the bank) and therefore should not be modelled as an independent 
variable to explain variations in profits. On the other hand, output quantities are 
assumed to be exogenous to profits since they are determined by market equilibrium, 
therefore output quantities are specified in the profit equation as a control variable. 
Accordingly, banks are assumed to operate under imperfect output markets and 





to be more consistent with the nature of output markets that large banks operate in 
where exercising some market power is possible (Bos and Kolari, 2005).  
 
3.2.7 Estimating Technical Inefficiency 
 
Efficiency is measured as the deviation from the frontier where best-practice banks 
operate. The frontier is established by estimating the cost or profit function using data 
on the observed banks. Inefficiencies are subsequently estimated as deviations from 
the frontier after isolating the random error effect. Evaluating the performance of banks 
as such requires using two different optimization concepts: cost minimization and profit 
maximization (Berger and Mester, 1997). A bank is labelled inefficient if its profits 
(costs) are lower (higher) than the best-practice bank after removing the effect of the 
random error (Vennet, 2002).   
 
Under the alternative profit model, profit inefficiency arises from deficiencies in 
revenues or excess costs given output quantities and input prices. It follows that 
technical inefficiency ( ) is bounded between 0 and 1 because all inefficient banks 
operate below the efficient profit frontier. Profit efficiency simply measures how close 
a bank is to generating the maximum obtainable profits given the prevailing input 
prices, output levels, and other factors. A profit efficiency score of 0.9 means that the 
bank is effectively earning 90% of best-practice profits, that is, the bank is losing 10% 
of possible attainable profits due to excessive costs, deficient revenues, or both 
(Vennet, 2002).  
 
Under the cost model, cost inefficiency arises from sub-optimal choices of input 
quantities given input prices and output quantities. It follows that the inefficiency term 
is bounded between 1 and infinity since all inefficient banks operate above the efficient 
cost frontier (Bos and Kolari, 2005). A cost efficiency score of 1.10 for instance means 
that the bank is wasting 10% of its resources to produce a given level of outputs 
relative to a best-practice (frontier) bank.   
 
The profit and cost models are estimated using SFA (stochastic frontier analysis) 






the required estimates. The stochastic frontier approach SFA has been widely applied 
in the literature as in Allen and Rai (1996), Mester (1996), Berger and Mester (1997), 
and Altunbas et al (2000). SFA labels a bank as cost/profit inefficient if its observed 
costs/profits are higher/lower than the predicted costs/profits for an efficient (frontier) 
bank producing comparable input-output combination and that the difference cannot 
be explained by statistical noise (Altunbas et al, 2000).    
 
To produce bank-specific efficiency scores, the cost/profit efficient frontier is obtained 
by estimating the corresponding cost/profit function according to SFA. The cost/profit 
function will have a composite error term that comprises of a two-sided random 
component and a one-sided inefficiency component.  
 
The reason why inefficiency effects are estimated conditional on the error term’s 
distribution is that the former is unobserved, while the latter is observed. As shown in 
equation (14), data point technical efficiency is defined as . Given that 
the vector of parameters in the frontier function are estimated using MLE, the only 
effect that can be observed is that of the composite error term , yet the bank-specific 
inefficiency effect is unobserved. That is why  is predicted conditional on the value 
of . 
 
Accordingly, Jondrow et al (1982) calculates observation-specific technical inefficiency 
using the distribution of the inefficiency term conditional on the estimated distribution 





























 is the density function of a standard normal random variable.  
 
By substituting the estimated parameters in (14), technical inefficiency can then be 
evaluated.  is alternatively expressed as , as in Battese and 
Coelli (1998). This is because the frontier functional form is expressed in logs so 
obtaining estimates for the inefficiency term requires exponentiating (de-logging) it. 
This implies that estimating , rather than , conditional on . In this context, 





Once the log-likelihood function (that is unique to the frontier specified) is estimated, 
the distribution of the composite error term can be identified, and estimates of the 
model’s parameters can be used in equation (15) to predict banks-specific technical 
efficiency estimates. Bank-specific cost efficiency can therefore be produced by 
dividing the estimated technical efficiency of the given bank by the predicted technical 
cost efficiency of the frontier bank. Similarly, bank-specific profit efficiency can be 
produced by dividing the estimated technical efficiency of the frontier bank by the 
predicted profit technical efficiency of a specific bank.  
 
The literature postulates a number of distributional assumptions for the technical 
inefficiency term including: truncated-normal, half-normal, exponential, and gamma. 
The technical inefficiency model suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) assumes a 
truncated-normal distribution for the inefficiency term. Nevertheless, there has been a 
considerable body of efficiency studies that assume the half-normal, rather than the 
truncated normal, distribution for  (e.g. Altunbas et al 2000, Vennet 2002, and 
Girardone et al 2004).  
 
                                               
16 FRONTIER and STATA apply the technical efficiency predictor defined in equation Error! Reference source n
ot found. by replacing MLE estimates for the unknown parameters. 
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Vennet (2002) for instance uses the half-normal assumption  after 
testing both the half-normal and exponential distributions. The author found no 
statistically significant difference between the two sets of efficiency scores under the 
different distributional assumptions. Furthermore, the study by Altunbas and Molyneux 
(1996) tested the half-normal, truncated normal, exponential and gamma distributions 
and found that efficiency estimates derived via SFA methodology are, to a large 
degree, insensitive to the assumption of the inefficiency term’s distributional 
specification.   
 
Ritter and Simar (1997) support employing the relatively simple one-parameter 
densities, namely, half-normal and exponential distributions, as opposed to more 
flexible distributors, such as gamma and truncated normal. Their argument for this 
relies on the existence of a relatively strong correlation between mean efficiency 
scores under different distributional choice, suggesting that mean efficiencies are 
found to be relatively insensitive to  distributional specification. The correlation is 
even stronger between mean efficiencies under half-normal and exponential 
distributional assumptions, leading to the conclusion that the choice between the latter 
two distributions is principally irrelevant.  It is also established that the case of half-
normal distribution for technical efficiency is most frequently used in empirical 
research as Coelli et al (1998) state. 
 
This research tests for truncated-normal, exponential and gamma distributions for the 
inefficiency term and found that none of these specifications would enable the 
stochastic cost or profit function to converge under the MLE technique even after 
16000 iterations. The models converged and the corresponding log-likelihood 
functions displayed concavity (i.e. they were possible to evaluate) under the half-
normal specification only. Therefore, and given the above-mentioned reasons, the 
half-normal distribution for the inefficiency term is specified. 
 
3.2.8 Modelling Inefficiency Effects 
 









and Coelli (1992) and Battese and Coelli (1995). The two models basically differ in the 
time-variances assumption of the inefficiency term, and the estimation procedure 
according to which each model is evaluated (two- or single-stage procedures). 
 
Under Battese and Coelli (1992) model, the stochastic production frontier requires a  
panel set and assumes that bank-specific inefficiency effects  as non-negative 
random variables which vary systematically over time (i.e.  have a specific time 
trend that is imposed by the model), and follow half-normal (truncated at zero) 
distribution. The model is estimated following the two-stage procedure whereby the 
efficient frontier is first estimated, and then the predicted bank-specific inefficiencies 
(with a specific time-trend for the predicted bank inefficiency effects being imposed) 
are regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a second stage regression.  
 
Battese and Coelli (1992) model is expressed as follows (Coelli, 1996): 
 




•  is the output for the bank in the period. 
•  is a vector of input quantities for the bank in the period.   
•  is a set of coefficients to be estimated. 
•  are random variables assumed to be  and independent of the 
inefficiency component .  
•  are nonnegative random variables that are assumed to ascribe technical 






























•  is the time variable representing the panel’s last period, and  is a specific time 
period in the panel.  
•  eta is an unknown parameter to be estimated which determines the direction of 
the inefficiency term’s progression over time. If >0 (<0), the exponential 
expression in equation (17) can be raised to positive (negative) power causing 
bank-specific inefficiencies to have an upward (downward) sloping time trend 
which indicates larger (smaller) inefficiencies as time progresses. 
 
The maximum likelihood estimation procedure MLE applied to the model considers 
the parameterization of Battese and Corra (1977) where  and  are re-
parameterized to be expressed in terms of the variance of the composite error term: 
, and a new parameter gamma  which represents inefficiency 
variance as proportion of the composite error’s variance, making  ranges between 
[0, 1]. This parameterization is useful as the range of  becomes the basis for a grid 
searched across the parameter space of  to provide starting value for iterative 
maximization process in the MLE estimation (Coelli, 1996). 
 
It is worth noting here that allocative inefficiency in  is suppressed (assumed away) 
following Coelli (1996) so that the interpretation of the inefficiency term would reflect 
the degree of technical inefficiency involved, otherwise understanding deviations from 
the frontier become blurred as both technical and allocative inefficiencies can account 
for deviations from the frontier.   
 
Specifying the inefficiency term under Battese and Coelli (1992) model is discarded 
for the fact that it does not allow for the single-stage estimation procedure that is more 
consistent than the two-stage procedure, and because it forces the time progression 
of the inefficiency term to be systematic and therefore allows little time-flexibility in the 
specification of the inefficiency term. For these two reasons, this research applies the 
time-flexible Battese and Coelli (1995) inefficiency model (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). Battese and Coelli (1995) model has similar specifications to that of the Battese 



















 are directly influenced by – or is simultaneously estimated with – the efficient 
frontier and modelled on a set of explanatory variables  that are believed to explain 
the variation of .  
 
Following Aigner et al (1977), the cost (or profit) frontier’s composite error term is 
specified as:  (or ) as discussed earlier, where the inefficiency 
component  and random error component  are assumed to be independently 
distributed.  is assumed to follow a one-sided positive distribution usually half-
normal17:  capturing the inefficiency effects in the model, and  is 
assumed to follow a two-sided normal distribution where  capturing the 
effects of statistical noise in the data (Altunbas et al, 2000, p 1608).  
 
Because the values of the inefficiency term  are unobservable whereas the values 
of  are,  is therefore predicted conditional on  estimates. This is achieved by 
applying the conditional expatiation of  conditional on the observed value of  
(Coelli, 1996). Accordingly, observation-specific predicted inefficiencies are obtained 
as . Once predicted inefficiencies  are obtained, bank-specific inefficiency 





Equation (18) produces cost efficiency scores which can take values between 1 and 
infinity, where  is the actual or observed total cost for a bank  at time . The 
                                               
17 The literature postulates different distributional assumptions for the inefficiency term including half normal, 
truncated normal, exponential, and gamma. Altunbas and Molyneux (1994) tested the different distributions 
including the half normal, truncated normal, normal-exponential and gamma distributions and found that all 
distributions yield similar efficiency levels using German banking data. This research tests many of thesis different 
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denominator represents the observed costs of the cost-efficient banks (frontier banks) 
featuring no deviation from the frontier due to technical inefficiency.  are the cost 
frontier variables. If the frontier equation is expressed in logs, then  will effectively 
be equal to  and  will be equal to .   
 
On the other hand, producing profit efficiency scores follows similar methodology to 
that of equation (18) with profits  being specified instead of total costs . Profit 
efficiency scores will accordingly take the values up to unity.  
 
Once the predicted inefficiency values  are produced,  can then be regressed 
against a set of explanatories ( ) variables in order to understand the drivers of 
technical inefficiency. Furthermore, to allow for time-variances, this research specifies 
both linear and non-linear forms of the time dummy as variables as shown in the 
equation below. Following Battese and Coelli (1995, p 327), the inefficiency term  







 is the number of banks in the panel.  
 represents time periods in the panel.  
 represents a set of explanatory variables introduced to explain the variation in  
A full description of these bank-specific variables is presented in Table 3 (page 199). 
 represent a linear and a non-linear form of time. 
 , ,  are a set of coefficients to be estimated. 
 
The time-flexible inefficiency model specified in (19) will be estimated simultaneously 




























SFA methodology. Further details on this will be presented in each of the respective 
empirical chapters. 
 
3.2.9 Technical Inefficiency Test 
 
This test investigates whether the frontier model has inefficiency effects or not. Coelli 
(1998) suggests this test which involves examining whether the variance of the 
inefficiency term is significantly different from zero. Hence  is tested against 
the alternative  since inefficiencies can only be nonnegative. Findings in 
both empirical chapters indicate that the profit and cost frontiers specified have 
significant inefficiency effects. 
 
3.2.10 Testing for Stochasticity 
 
A stochasticity test is conducted to find out whether the frontier model should be 
considered as stochastic in the first place. Coelli (1996) suggests testing the model to 
be estimated for stochasticity prior to estimating the model as a stochastic frontier. 
This is empirically achieved by estimating the frontier only, excluding the inefficiency 
term’s explanatory variables. In this research, the test is applied to the profit and cost 
frontiers. Stochasticity test involves testing the significance of the parameter 
 which implies testing whether the variance of the inefficiency term 
constitute a statistically significant proportion of the variation of the composite (or 
aggregate) error term. 
 
Accordingly, the null states that the technical inefficiency is not stochastic, that is 
, which effectively suggests testing whether  is statistically different from 
zero in relation to . This is tested against  (as technical inefficiency is 
always assumed as being nonnegative) which implies that the frontier is stochastic. 
Not rejecting the null suggests that the frontier’s parameters can consistently be 
estimated using ordinary least squares OLS where the inefficiency term can be 
removed from the model (Coelli, 1996, p 5). To empirically perform this according to 
Gutierrez et al (2001), the frontier model is estimated by maximizing the likelihood 
0:0 2 =uH s








function and subsequently using the log-likelihood ratio test. Results in both empirical 
analyses show that the null hypothesis that = 0 is comfortably rejected at 1% critical 
level, suggesting that the frontiers are stochastic because the inefficiency term has a 
significant variation in relation to the variation of the composite error term hence the 
models should be estimated using SFA.  
 
3.2.11 The Two-Stage and Single-Stage Frontier Estimation 
 
The two-stage approach involves estimating the efficient frontier in the first stage, 
yielding the predicted efficiency scores, followed by a second stage regression where 
the predicted inefficiency is modelled against a set of possible exogenous 
determinants (Coelli, 1996, p 5). The two-stage approach carries an inherent 
contradiction: the first stage involves the specification and estimation of the frontier 
functional form and the prediction of the inefficiency effects. The estimation of the 
frontier in this first stage assumes that these inefficiency effects are identically 
distributed as one-sided error terms. Nonetheless, the second stage of this process 
involves regressing the predicted inefficiency effects on a set of potential determinants 
(hence assuming that inefficiencies come from a two-sided error distribution) which 
basically contradicts the assumption of an identically distributed one-sided error term 
assumed in the stochastic frontier’s specification (Iyer et al, 2005 and Fitzpatrick and 
McQuinn, 2008).   
 
On the other hand, the single-stage estimation procedure overcomes the 
inconsistency of the two-stage’s distributional assumptions. It estimates the efficient 
frontier and regresses the explanatory variables against the inefficiency term 
simultaneously (Coelli, 1996), therefore maintaining the same distributional 
assumption for the inefficiency effects throughout the estimation process.  Therefore, 
Battese and Coelli (1995) and Coelli (1996), conclude that the two-stage estimation 
procedure is likely to produce efficiency estimates that are less efficient to those of the 
single-stage. It is worth noting that testing for the preferred frontier specification under 
the single-stage against the two-stage procedures is impossible since the models are 
non-nested (Coelli 1996). Consequently, the choice of this research of applying the 
single-stage estimation approach is based on avoiding the contradicting assumptions 






estimates.   
 
3.2.12 Analysing Profit and Cost Efficiencies 
 
As discussed earlier, cost is defined as a function of input prices, output levels, cost 
inefficiency term, and a random error. Cost efficiency is the ratio of a bank’s true cost 
to the cost of best-practicing bank producing the same bundle of outputs. Profit is also 
defined as a function of input prices, output levels, profit inefficiency term, and a 
random error. Profit efficiency is the ratio of the bank’s true profits to those of the best 
practicing bank producing the same bundle of outputs.    
 
Therefore, the economic objective of profit maximization embodies the objective of 
cost minimization. This is because maximizing profits requires maximizing the vector 
(mix) of production levels – which maximizes revenues – and minimizing costs as well 
such that profits (revenues – costs) can be maximized. However, the argument 
underpinning the rationale for analysing both profit as well as cost efficiencies stems 
from the findings of Berger and Mester (1997) and Rogers (1998) in that there is no 
positive correlation between profit efficiency and cost efficiency. This suggests that a 
bank being profit efficient does not implicitly suggest that it is cost efficient as well, but 
on the contrary, the bank could be cost inefficient (i.e. incurring higher costs) despite 
it being profit efficient. Moreover, Berger et al (2008) indicate that it is important to 
estimate profit efficiency besides cost efficiency since the latter neglects operating 
revenues and loan losses, whereas profit efficiency clearly accommodates for these 
elements.   
 
Furthermore, Berger and Mester (2003) also assert the significance of investigating 
both profit and cost efficiency concepts as this would provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the different aspects affecting operational efficiency. Berger and 
Mester (2003, p 29 – 30) indicate that “banks tried to maximize profits by raising 
revenues and well as reducing costs. Over time, banks have offered wider varieties of 
financial services and provided additional convenience. These additional services or 
higher service quality … may have raised costs but also raised revenues by more than 





This clearly implies that a bank being labelled cost inefficient does not necessarily 
mean that it is profit inefficient, as it may have managed to raise revenues more 
proportionately than costs to make up for the additional expenses involved in providing 
higher quality products and services for instance.   
 
On the other hand, a cost-efficient bank may be profit inefficient since it is not 
maximizing its profits when there are unexploited opportunities to increase output in 
quality or quality, hence to generate greater revenues. Profit efficiency is enhanced by 
maximizing revenues and minimizing costs (operational costs, financial costs, and the 
level of loan loss reserves). Therefore, if costs are minimized but revenues are kept 
constant when it is possible to maximize them more proportionately than cost 
increases – as in the case of exploiting potential – this leads to lower profit efficiency 
as a result, accordingly, a cost-efficient bank is not necessarily a profit efficient one. 
The best-case scenario is to minimize costs and to maximize revenues. 
 
Rogers (1998) explains that estimating both profit and cost efficiencies rather than 
considering profit efficiency only is useful because profit efficient banks may effectively 
be cost inefficient by offsetting higher expenses with higher revenues. This is possible 
by exploiting market power to impose higher prices, or by altering the mix of its output 
so as to generate higher revenues than competitors. This is probably further exposed 
when the risk-return paradigm is considered: some banks might take excessive risks 
to boost short-term profits at the expense of investing less in risk management process 
to cut costs. This is referred to as risk management ‘skimping’ according to Berger 
and De Young (1996). Consequently, it seems that to obtain the full picture, efficiency 
needs to be assessed from the two perspectives, and therefore examine the factors 
driving each in an attempt to investigate any possible correlation between profit and 
cost efficiencies as far as this sample banks are concerned.  
 
3.2.13 Bank Inputs and Outputs Specification 
 
3.2.13.1 Intermediation and Production approaches 
 
The literature defines two prominent methodologies related to the specification of the 





approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). A brief introduction of both approaches is 
presented and followed by a stream of arguments for employing the intermediation 
approach in this research. 
 
To start with, the production approach entails that a bank uses labour and capital to 
generate deposits, loans, and securities accounts. Therefore, deposits are treated as 
an output of the production process. Outputs are proxied by the number – rather than 
the currency value – of deposits and loans. This is because the production approach 
regards banking production as an account-servicing process that involves processing 
payment transactions, loans documentation, insurance applications etc. It follows that 
the application of such approach would require an in-house type of detailed service 
flow data, which is normally difficult to access. Therefore, this hurdle is overcome by 
using the number, rather than the value, of deposits and loans accounts, insurance 
policies and so forth as a proxy for the bank’s outputs (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
 
Studies adopting the production approach argue that the bulk of banks’ operating costs 
are associated with the number – rather than the monetary value – of loans, securities, 
and deposit accounts processed (Benston, 1965 and Humphrey, 1985). However, 
Humphrey (1990) demonstrates that specifying costs as operating costs versus total 
costs would largely produce biased estimates. Technological advances have made it 
significantly less costly to process large number of accounts hence operating costs 
associated with these operations have been reduced significantly. Humphrey and Vale 
(2004, p 1691) have found, based on a panel of 120 Norwegian banks over 1987 – 
1998, that average reduction in operating costs associated with the shift from paper-
based to electronic payments has been around 40%. Thus, accounting for operating 
costs only can seriously underestimate the bank’s costs.   
 
On the other hand, the intermediation approach considers labour, capital, and deposits 
as inputs to produce loans, investments and securities (Sealy and Lindley, 1977). 
Accordingly, banks are viewed as intermediaries between fund-holders and fund-
seekers, implying that total costs should accommodate not only operating costs, but 
also interest expenses paid on deposits. Earlier empirical studies tested the 





squared errors was lower by specifying deposits as inputs to bank production as 
opposed to dropping deposits as inputs (Gilligan and Smirlock, 1984). 
 
Furthermore, deciding on which approach to measure bank outputs according to also 
hinges on the type of cost (operational or total cost) that is going to be modelled as a 
left-hand side variable in the cost function. In this context, the production approach 
focuses on using operational costs18, while the intermediation approach uses total 
costs instead. The rationale for this different treatment of cost is that, since the 
production approach assumes deposits as outputs not inputs, deposit-related interest 
expenses are accordingly excluded from the aggregate pool of input expenses. 
Conversely, since the intermediation approach assumes deposits as an input to the 
bank production process, cost of input factors will have to accommodate for interest 
expenses borne on deposits hence total costs as modelled as a function of inputs 
process and output quantities.   
 
Sealy and Lindley (1977) indicate that accounting for deposits as inputs is consistent 
with the economics of banking production. The production process, in economic terms, 
involves creating a product that has an added value to the value of original inputs 
utilized. Consequently, deposits can have an “added value” for the bank only if they 
undergo a maturity transformation that turns deposits into loans, investment and other 
types of outputs. In line with this logic, deposits can only be introduced as inputs to 
the bank’s production process. Drake and Simper (2002) follow the intermediation 
approach because they see that deposits are intermediated into different categories 
of earning assets using the inputs of capital and labour. Berger et al (1987), Noulas et 
al (1990), and Humphrey (1990) illustrate that applying the production approach would 
result in rather inflated estimates for small banks as they rely heavily on deposits as a 
source of funding, given their limited access wholesale funds. Consequently, this 
would put large banks at an inherent disadvantage as they have limited core deposit 
base compared to their smaller peers. What is more, employing the intermediation 
approach and considering bank’s total cost perspective is consistent with the 
fundamental economic objective of cost-minimization in that banks seek to minimize 
their total costs, rather than their operating costs only (Dietsch, 1993). 
                                               







Equivalent to the Intermediation Approach is the Assets Approach methodology. 
Likewise, the Asset Approach treats banks as intermediaries of financial services 
between savers (liability holders) and borrowers (fund users), rather than just 
producers of deposits and loan accounts as in the production approach. Under the 
Assets Approach, the bank earning assets, such as loans and other investments, are 
classified as outputs, whereas labour, deposits and capital are considered as inputs 
(Favero and Papi, 1995). It should be noted that the assets and intermediation 
approach are generally referred to interchangeably in the literature. 
 
Another approach suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Bauer et al (1993) 
is the Dual Approach which combines the production and introduction approaches in 
treating deposits. The Dual approach specifies interest paid on deposits as an input 
while considering the quantities of deposits as an output assuming that account 
services provided to customers can be approximated by the quantity of deposit 
accounts, rather than their monetary value.   
 
The dual approach has very narrowly been applied in the literature. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, the only study that has applied the dual approach was by 
Cavallo and Rossi (2001). Considering deposits as outputs can produce biased results 
as explained earlier and found by Humphrey (1990). Furthermore, the argument 
against this approach is that deposits are used, especially by commercial banks, as 
an important source of funding to their assets and investments – probably the Northern 
Rock crisis is a chief example of how significant deposits can be as part of the bank’s 
capital. Therefore, it is questionable whether deposits should be accounted for as 
outputs at all.  
 
This crosses with the arguments of Shaffer and David (1991) and Jagtiani et al (1995) 
discussed earlier who demonstrate that deposits should be included as inputs, not 
outputs.   
 
Efficiency literature recognizes two more approaches concerning the specification of 
commercial banking inputs and outputs, these are: The User Cost Approach ‘UCA’, 





in specifying bank’s inputs, however, both agree on classifying loans as outputs 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). A brief explanation followed by a reflection on the 
inappropriateness of each in relation to this research will be presented, thereby 
supporting the argument of using the intermediation approach. 
 
In principle, the VAA and UCA are distinguished from the other approaches in that 
they are not related to the bank’s macroeconomic functions (Favero and Papi, 1995). 
To be more specific, the UCA categorizes bank’s assets and liabilities groups as inputs 
and outputs depending on their net contribution to the bank’s revenues (Hancock 1991 
and Ausina, 2002). For this, the UCA approach is impractical from an outside research 
perspective. The impracticality associated with the UCA rests on the fact that it 
requires relatively detailed income and cost data on the value of cash flows generated 
by or paid on each asset and liability category in order to classify these items as 
outputs and inputs respectively.    
 
With regards to the Value-Added Approach ‘VAA’, balance sheet items are classified 
as inputs or outputs according to the ‘importance’ of the value each item adds. 
However, deciding whether a balance sheet item adds an ‘important’ or ‘unimportant’ 
value hence classifying it as an output or otherwise is a fairly subjective matter, which 
is probably the main weakness of the VAA (Favero and Papi, 1995).   
 
Some studies argue (Favero and Papi, 1995, p 388) that the intermediation or assets 
approaches fall short of comprehensively accounting for most of the services provided 
by banks such as securities underwriting. Nevertheless, this research overcomes this 
by including the credit equivalent of off-balance sheet items (OBS), along with the 
traditional banking outputs (loans and other earning assets).   
 
3.2.13.2 The importance of accounting for OBS items 
 
This research recognizes the significance of accounting for OBS items as a third 
output in the cost and profit functions as ignoring them can underestimate banking 
outputs and bias estimates accordingly. OBS items are introduced in the frontier 





This way, OBS items are perceived to have the equivalent impact as the different 
classes of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet in terms of their revenue-
generating or cost-bearing characteristics, therefore implying that OBS items have 
approximately the same origination, monitoring, and control costs as loans19 (Berger 
and Mester, 1997, p 913). 
 
Moreover, several European studies (Vennet, 2002, Maudos et al 2002, and Casu and 
Girardone, 2004) appear to ignore accounting for Off-Balance Sheet items OBS as an 
output20. It is argued that unless off-balance sheet activities are accounted for as an 
output, the bank’s total output will significantly be underestimated especially in the 
case of large banks (Altunbas et al, 2001). Clark and Siems (2002) assert that “given 
the growth of OBS activities, estimating bank cost and profit efficiency without 
incorporating these activities may not be accurate or meaningful. Omitting OBS 
activities could seriously understate actual bank output and seriously bias empirical 
estimates of the relationships between bank size and both cost and profit efficiency” 
(p 988)21. For these reasons, OBS items are accounted for in this research as a third 
output. The recent Subprime financial crisis is clear evidence of the extent to which 
banks are relying on OBS activities to further diverse their earnings, including 
securitization and credit derivatives which effectively allows them to take debt off their 
balance sheets (FT, 2007a). 
 
3.3 Functional Form Specification 
 
This section is concerned with illustrating the concepts of the functional forms utilized 
in the two empirical chapters. Banking efficiency and literature predominantly applies 
                                               
19 It is recognized, as pointed out by Clark and Seims (2002), that accounting for the credit equivalent of OBS 
activities does not capture the volume of OBS activities or their ability to generate income or costs. Clark and Seims 
(2002) use an aggregate measure of OBS activates to this end. They apply the volume of net noninterest income 
as a proxy for the aggregate impact of OBS activities. Non-interest income is accounted for in this research under 
the ‘other earning assets’ output.   
20 Although Casu and Girardone (2004) argue that due to possible variations in cross-country accounting practices 
which could result in scale bias, efficiency estimations are very likely to be misleading for the considerable 
significance of income generated via OBS activities.   
21 Clark and Siems (2002, p 988) also explain that “between 1990 and 1999, commercial banks increased the 
notional value of their financial derivative activities by more than 600 percent. Noninterest income, which is heavily 
influenced by OBS activities, has increased as a percentage of total income from 19 percent in the late 1970s to 
nearly 46 percent by 1999. Thus, it is increasingly important to include these activities in any evaluation of the 





two main functional forms22: the Translog form 23(Translog) and the Fourier Flexible24 
form (Fourier). 
 
3.3.1 The Translog Form 
 
Briefly, the Translog function is based on a second-order Taylor expansion of an 
unknown true cost function around an unspecified data point (White, 1980). Translog 
is a generalization of the single-input single-output Cobb-Douglas production function 
resulting from Taylor series expansion. McAllister and McManus (1993, p 391) further 
explain that “the Translog cost function was originally developed as a local 
approximation to some unknown ‘true’ underlying cost function. The interest in the 
approximation was motivated by the fact that it does not impose restrictions on 
elasticities at the point of approximation”. This is in comparison to the more restrictive 
Cobb-Douglas form. Translog and Cobb-Douglas can both estimate a U-shaped cost 
function given that they basically are quadratic functions, however, Translog is more 
flexible because of the introduction of the interactive inputs-outputs terms in addition 
to the second-order own-interactive input and output terms. The weakness of the 
Translog specification stems from the fact that it provides a poor global approximation 
when the data is spread away from the mean. This can cause misspecification error 
which can directly affect the accuracy of estimates.  To elaborate, in spite of the 
flexibility of Translog, White (1980) explains that the least squares estimates of 
Translog do not generally correspond to Taylor series expansion of the underlying 
function at an expansion point, hence the least squares estimates are biased. This is 
because the second-order Taylor expansion of the unknown true cost function around 
an unspecified point produces an expansion around that point that is far away from 
the actual data upon which the least squares estimates are produced. This led White 
(1980) to the conclusion that estimating the Translog cost function generally produces 
                                               
22 There are other functional forms: Cobb-Douglas, Box-Cox, Quadratic, and Leontief. However, these are quite 
narrowly applied in the literature due to the superiority of the Translog, and the semi-parametric (Fourier) forms. 
Semi-parametric refers to the Translog form nested in a Fourier form (Fenn et al, 2008). 
23 Studies used Translog form to estimate include: Benston, Hanweck, and Humphrey 1982; Gilligan, Smirlock, 
and Marshall 1984; Gilligan and Smirlock 1984; Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey 1987; Cebenoyan 1988; Hunter, 
Timme, and Yang 1990; Noulas, Ray, and Miller 1990, Kolari and Zardkoohi 1991, Berger and Humphrey 1991, 
Gropper 1991, Humphrey (1993), Berger et al (1993), Mckillop et al (1996), and Allen and Liu (2007). 
24 Studies applied the Fourier Flexible include: McAllister and McManus (1993), Mitchell and Onvural (1996), 






biased estimates.  
 
To confirm the biasness of Translog estimates, McAllister and McManus (1993) 
demonstrate that studies estimating bank efficiency using Translog cost functions 
usually find that economics of scale exist for relatively small banks, whereas larger 
banks are found to display diseconomies of scale. These results were found to be 
biased (i.e. the mean of estimator distribution is not the true parameter – that is, on 
average, the estimated values do not converge to the true values). McAllister and 
McManus (1993) find that big banks were found with constant returns to scale once 
Fourier terms are considered in the cost function. They conclude that Translog gives 
a poor approximation when applied to all bank sizes. Moreover, Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) also argue that Translog normally gives a poor approximation to banking data 
when the data is not close to the mean scale (widely spread), and that Translog 
imposes a symmetric U-shaped average cost curve in logs. 
 
In line with this, Berndt and Khaled (1979), Jorgensen and Fraumeni (1981), and 
Jorgenson (1986) state that estimated Translog cost functions normally do not satisfy 
concavity in prices. This is confirmed by the findings of the first empirical chapter 
where the Translog function specified to estimate cost and alternative profit 
efficiencies failed the concavity test, which has led to the consideration of the 1st order 
Fourier terms to provide a better fit to the data so that the cost function eventually 
becomes concave. The concavity condition is verified and achieved for all functional 
forms utilized in both empirical analyses as will be shown later. 
 
Consequently, Mitchell and Onvural (1996) observe that this has serious policy 
implications as the inadequacy of the Translog does not only cast doubt on the 
conclusions of previous studies that used this form, it also challenges policymakers 
who have been guided by these studies in making antitrust and bank merger decisions 
to revise their policy rules. 
 
3.2.2 The Fourier Flexible Form 
 





sum of trigonometric terms of sine and cosine terms (Rudin, 1976 and Gallant, 1981). 
The Fourier form “is a globally flexible approximation since the respective sine and 
cosine terms attached to the Translog from are mutually orthogonal over the [0, 2 ] 
interval” (Humphrey and Vale, 2004, p 1678). This implies transforming or rescaling 
input prices and output quantities such that they become expressed in trigonometric 
expressions that will span in [0, 2 ] interval. The linear combination of the resulting 
sine and cosine terms has the mathematical property of being orthogonal (i.e. 
independent from one another). The flexibility of the Fourier stems from the 
orthogonality property of the sine and cosine terms, which implies that the sines and 
cosines are mutually independent or exogenous when specified in the Fourier function 
as they span in [0, ] space with no overlapping. Thus, because of the mutually 
orthogonality of the Fourier terms, it is established that the impact of each term assists 
in fitting the specified function closer to the scatter of the data, and therefore more 
closely approximate the underlying unknown function.  
 
The Fourier offers a global approximation as it can exactly approximate any well-
behaving unknown function when a linear combination of an infinite number of 
trigonometric terms is added, this way, the error in specifying the functional form – 
specification error – is reduced or even eliminated. However, adding an infinite number 
of Fourier terms is impractical as the coefficients of these terms will have to be 
estimated using an infinite sample (Mitchell and Onvural, 1996). That is why Gallant 
(1981) suggests truncating the Fourier series and accepting a given level of 
approximation error. Nonetheless, the potential approximation error of the Fourier form 
is further mitigated if the functional specification includes Fourier terms along with a 
second-order polynomial explanatory variable as represented by the Translog terms 
(Gallant, 1982). This results in the Translog being nested in the Fourier form. This 
combination will be referred to as the Fourier Flexible functional form. 
 
The Fourier Flexible form Fourier is widely applied due to its capacity to approximate 
the underlying function over the whole range of the data (Gallant, 1982). The greater 
the number of parameters in a functional form to estimate, the more flexibility it has to 
approach the true unknown function as close as possible (Gallant 1982, Mitchell and 









The Fourier form is found to better fit banking data as opposed to the Translog given 
its considerable flexibility to approximate unknown functions as demonstrated by 
Mitchell and Onvural (1996), and Berger et al (1997), and Humphrey and Vale (2004). 
The latter studies all stress the need for using a more flexible cost functional form than 
Translog. For instance, using US and Norwegian banking data, McAllister and 
McManus (1993) and Humphrey and Vale (2004) observe misleading estimates when 
using Translog form, since it imposes a symmetric U-shaped average cost curve on 
the data, whereas the Fourier form permits for more curvature hence allowing for the 
possibility for an M-shaped curve as found by the two studies. 
 
Girardone, Molyneux and Gardener (2004) confirm earlier studies such as Mitchell 
and Onvural (1996), Berger and De Young 1997, and Berger and Mester (1997) in 
that the standard U-shaped Translog specification is significantly restrictive and should 
be combined with the Fourier series. The authors explain that adding Fourier terms to 
the Translog combines the stability of Translog for data near the sample average, and 
takes advantage of the Fourier’s flexibility which can accommodate for data that is 
scattered far from the mean. The result is a cost function that fits the entire rang of the 
data more flexibly. Altunbas et al (2000) argue that using the Fourier functional form – 
which is semi-parametric specification – avoids the inherent assumption of parametric 
specifications such as Translog in that the bank industry’s true cost function has the 
Translog form.   
 
The greater the number of Fourier terms the more flexible the function becomes, i.e. 
the closer it is to the true scatter of the data. The trigonometric transformation assists 
in accommodating for heterogeneity in bank sizes as Fenn et al (2008) explain, simply 
because this can increase the scatter of the data. McAllister and McManus (1993) and 
Mitchell and Onvural (1996) indicate that adding the Fourier terms to the Translog 
function is capable of correcting the bias of the Translog as it will be nested in the 
Fourier function.   
 
As for truncating the Fourier series, White (1980) indicates that although an infinite 





informed truncation of the Fourier series can still provide a good approximation to the 
function over the whole data range. 
 
This research follows White’s argument and truncates the Fourier series for the profit 
and cost frontiers estimated in the first empirical chapter at the 1st order terms as tests 
revealed that truncating the series at the 2nd order terms will violate the concavity 
condition of the cost function. As for estimating, the Fourier series are truncated at the 
3rd order terms following Berger and Mester (1997), Girardone, Molyneux and Gardner 
(2004), and Fenn et al (2008). A fourth-order Fourier terms has not been considered 
in the literature to date, however this is not necessarily suggestive of the incapability 
of higher order Fourier terms to improve the functional form fit. However, in relation to 
this research, the number of observations available was the main reason why a 4th 
order Fourier terms was not incorporated. 
 
The appropriateness of applying this semi-parametric functional form is tested for 
using the log-likelihood tests as will be shown in both empirical chapters. Findings 
reinforce the view of Gallant (1982), McAllister and McManus (1993) and Mitchell and 
Onvural (1996) in that the Fourier provides a considerably better functional form fit. 
Testing the models’ fit to the data by examining different specifications is believed to 
considerably reduce biasness in estimates because of reducing the possibility of 
specification error, and because the flexibility of the Fourier allows the data under 
study to reveal how close the specification is to the true unknown functional form. 
Mitchell and Onvural (1996) emphasize that increasing the number of parameters 
increases the variance of the test statistics when testing the null hypotheses25, hence 
enhances the test power as the probability of making Type II error26 becomes less. 
However, the number of Fourier terms included certainly needs to be sample-tailored 
as the problem of degrees of freedom should be in mind. This will extensively be 
discussed in the following empirical chapters. 
 
3.2.3 Regulatory Conditions 
 
                                               
25 The null in a Wald or Log-likelihood Ratio tests states that the introduced terms are mutually insignificant. 
26 Type II error occurs when the null is accepted where in fact it is false. Reducing the probability of Type II error 





Verifying the regulatory conditions of the cost function ensures a well-behaving cost 
function which is significant to enhancing the reliability of the cost function estimation 
results. Therefore, consistent with production theory, the cost function should meet 
certain regulatory conditions so that its duality to production function (i.e. the 
transformation to production function) is maintained. Following Kim (1985) and 
Diewert and Wales (1987), these are: homogeneity, symmetry, positivity, 
monotonicity, and concavity. 
 
1. Homogeneity implies that the cost function should be restricted to being 
homogenous of degree one in all input prices (that is achieving first order or 
linear homogeneity). Put simply, if all input prices increase by a factor , the 
level of total costs should increase by a factor of . This implies that a change 
in all input prices yields a proportionate change in Total Cost TC (unit elastic) 
which explains why the cost function is homogenous of degree 1 in all input 
prices as suggested by microeconomic theory. 
 
2. Symmetry implies that second-order inputs and output own-interactive 
parameters should be symmetric as it is a necessary condition to achieve 
duality. Cost function symmetry is a result of applying the linear homogeneity 
property.  
 
Linear Homogeneity and Symmetry are imposed on the Translog cost function, 
whereas other reminder three conditions are checked for. 
 
3. Positivity implies that the cost function has to be positive in output quantities 
(that is marginal cost of outputs being positive ), meaning that 
producing 1 extra unit bears a positive incremental cost or marginal cost 
regardless whether the marginal cost has an increasing or decreasing pattern. 
 
4. Monotonicity implies that the cost function should be monotonic (increasing) 
in input prices, that is, costs are supposed to increase as input prices do. This 
is verified using Shephard’s Lemma under which input demand functions are 








share labour and share capital) that are then checked for being non-negative. 
 
5. Concavity – cost function should be concave in input prices, implying that if an 
input price increases, ceteris paribus, total costs will increase less 
proportionately at a given marginal rate of substitution – i.e., the expensive input 
is assumed to be substituted by the cheaper input at a given degree of 
substitution. Diewert and Wales (1987, p 47) suggest that a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the cost function’s concavity is that the logarithmic 
second order derivatives of the Translog cost function w.r.t input prices should 





Where:  stands for the ordinary first order partial derivative of the 
Translog cost function, and is the second order partial 
derivative, and  if  and  otherwise, and . The left-hand 
side of the equality above is equal to the symmetric matrix of the estimated coefficient 
of the second-order input price term , , where the symmetric matrix 
of , , should be negative semi-definite. Therefore, concavity can be 
achieved if  is negative semi-definite.  
 
The regularity conditions are applied to the cost functions utilized in both empirical 
chapters and are thoroughly checked for. Satisfying these conditions is the criterion 
used to determine the choice of the preferred cost functions’ specification that is 
estimated in both empirical chapters. 
 
3.2.4 Structural Test: The Log-likelihood Ratio 
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(decrease) in the sum of squared residuals resulting from dropping (adding) variables 
from (to) a linear model yielding two different regression R-squared for the restricted 
and unrestricted models.   
 
The test compares the values of the log-likelihood functions for the restricted and 
unrestricted models, computes the p-value of the resulting likelihood ratio test statistic, 
and therefore assesses whether the difference between the log-likelihood functions of 
the unrestricted and restricted models is statistically significant. The test uses the MLE 
estimation to maximize the likelihood function of a given model and produce its 
corresponding log-likelihood value. Adding new variables to the restricted model would 
normally lead to a larger value of the log-likelihood function, yet it remains to observe 
whether this increase in the log-likelihood value is statistically significant to decide 
whether the introduced variables have any statistically significant impact. The test 
statistic of the log-likelihood ratio is computed as twice the difference between the two 





Where  and  are the log-likelihood values for the unrestricted (general) and 
restricted (nested) model respectively. Assuming  the LR ratio is therefore 
nonnegative. The test statistics LR has an approximate chi-square distribution under 
the null hypothesis such that  with degrees of freedom df equal to the number 
of incorporated variables (restrictions or constraints) into the restricted model to be 
tested. The LR equation in (21) can be expressed differently as in Girardone, 





The resulting LR in equation (21) and equation (22) is identical as both deliver 
nonnegative LR.  and  stand for the values of the log-likelihood functions 
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under the null and alternative hypotheses. The  postulates that the total impact of 
the added variables to the model is statistically insignificant, specifically, LR = 0 at 
. The alternative hypothesis  states that LR > 0, implying that the 
application of a one-sided chi-square test  for the LR ratio.  
 
Wald Chi2 test is also used along with LR test. Wald Chi2 can assess the goodness 
of fit of a given model by comparing its fit to the data including specific predictors to 
the fit of the same model excluding all predictors. Rejecting the null in this case 
suggests that regressors are statistically significant in explaining the independent 
variable’s variations. It can also be employed to examine a constrained from of a given 
model against an unconstrained form of which. The null in this case states that there 
is no significant difference between the estimated parameters of the constrained and 
unconstrained models. Wald statistics and the corresponding p-value are calculated 
to assess the null hypothesis on the basis of: (1) the difference between the two 
models’ parameter estimates and (2) the curvature of the log-likelihood function as 
measured by the second derivative of the function. This way Wald test evaluates the 
fit of the restricted against the unrestricted models (Greene, 2000).   
 
It is worth noting that Wald chi2 and log-likelihood ratio tests can be used 
interchangeably as both examine the improvement or deterioration in the models fit by 
testing the constrained and unconstrained models. Both of these tests are applied as 
a robustness check for the different functional form specifications used in the two 
empirical chapters. 
 
3.2.5 Frontier Estimation Techniques 
 
Production theory suggests that the estimation of inefficiencies demands a full 
knowledge of the underlying function for an output-maximizing bank. This production 
function is unknown (Kim, 1985). Therefore, cost and profit functions are estimated 
instead since banks also have the economic objective of profit-maximization and cost-
minimization. This advocates the estimation of the bank profit and cost functions, 
rather than the production function. Farrell (1957) therefore suggests the estimation of 









techniques.   
 
The efficiency literature suggests two main estimation methodologies: Parametric and 
Non-Parametric approaches. Briefly, parametric approaches specify a functional form 
to be estimated and attribute deviations from the efficient frontier to both inefficiency 
effect and random noise, while non-paramedic approaches avoid specifying a 
functional form and attribute deviations from the frontier entirely to inefficiency. The 
following paragraphs provide a brief introduction into efficient frontier estimation. This 
is followed by an extensive review of the estimation techniques.   
 
Efficiency measurement assumes that producers seek the economic objective of 
production maximization, cost minimization, and profit maximization. Econometric 
techniques applied to gauge firms’ efficiencies build on this notion of optimization to 
estimate production, cost, and profit function parameters using regression techniques. 
Deviations of the observed sub-optimal choices of some producers in the sample are 
caused by producing less output, incurring more costs, or making less profits than their 
efficient peers that are operating under similar conditions. Further, econometric 
estimation techniques should allow deviations from the efficient frontier to 
accommodate for the effects of: (1) the failure to optimize under similar conditions i.e. 
inefficiency, and (2) the influence of random effects (Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 1993).   
 
Frontier estimation is conducted according to different frameworks that can be 
distinguished on the basis of their underlying assumptions. Briefly speaking, the aim 
of these estimation methodologies is the identification of a given institution’s areas of 
operational deficiencies by separating the latter from the random effects affecting its 
attainable profits or incurred costs according to parametric technique, while ascribing 
these deficiencies entirely to operational inefficiency according to non-parametric 
techniques which assume away any impact of possible random effects. 
 
Calculating bank-specific efficiency scores requires comparing the observed 
performance of sample banks (i.e. banks off the frontier) with that of best performing 
sample banks, i.e. those situated on the efficient frontier that are operating under 
similar production technologies (i.e. inputs and outputs combinations given input 






It is argued that such an econometric approach to efficiency analysis is more effective 
than traditional benchmarking techniques such as financial ratio analysis, as the latter 
lacks the powerful optimizing methodology of the former. A number of studies have 
shown that the traditional financial ratio analysis to efficiency assessment is inferior to 
the econometric analysis of efficiency. Berger et al (1993) for instance argue that 
merely relying on financial ratios may produce misleading results as they either ignore 
the bank’s product mix or input prices that are accounted for by frontier analysis, not 
to mention that they largely overlook incorporating elements of the economic 
environment that banks operate in.   
 
At a macroeconomic level, the results of efficiency analysis help in identifying efficient 
banks in the banking system and highlight the factors that are driving the sub-optimal 
performance of other banks (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Thus, investigating bank-
level inefficiencies is important because it highlights areas of underperformance (i.e. 
spots waste in resources, excess costs, or deficiencies in revenues). Efficiency 
analysis also has important policy implications at a macroeconomic level as it assists 
policy makers is taking necessary steps to improve the operational efficiency of a given 
banking system.   
 
Turning to the techniques used in estimating the efficient frontier, banking efficiency 
literature (such as Mester 1996, Berger and Humphrey 1997, and Berger and Mester 
1997) postulates the following non-parametric approaches, including (1) DEA – Data 
Envelopment Analysis and (2) FDH – Free Disposal Hull, and three main parametric 
approaches, including: (1) SFA – Stochastic Frontier Analysis, (2) DFA –   Distribution 
Free Approach, and (3) TFA – Thick Frontier Analysis. The following sections will 
elaborate on these approaches and will conclude by reflecting on the arguments 
supporting this research’s choice of applying SFA. 
 
3.2.6 Non-Parametric Techniques 
 
The literature acknowledges two main non-parametric approaches: Data Envelopment 





property distinguishing these estimation methodologies from parametric approaches 
is that they do not specify a functional form for the efficient frontier. In essence, 
nonparametric approaches apply linear programming to local points to generate a 
benchmark (efficient frontier) that embodies the optimal cost incurred (for a cost-
minimizing bank) or optimal profits achieved (for a profit-maximizing bank). The entire 
deviation of each bank from this optimal benchmark is attributed to operational 
inefficiency as the effects of random noise are assumed away. 
 
3.2.6.1 Data Envelopment Analysis DEA 
 
Pioneered by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), DEA distinguishes the best-
practice observations or frontier banks according to their ability to produce highest 
possible level of outputs given inputs, or utilize the least inputs to produce a given 
level of outputs, under similar conditions. Technically speaking, DEA forms the 
efficient frontier by connecting the set of best-practicing banks in a piece-wise linear 
combination fashion that results in convex input/output possibilities which envelops 
data points.   
 
All sample observations are enveloped by the piece-wise linear convex isoquant as 
shown in Figure 3 below such that observations could only lie on the frontier or to the 
right of which. Such technical property enables DEA to estimate the underlying 
function through the specification of the observed set of possibilities without being 
















Figure 3: Piece-wise linear efficient frontier 
 
 
The piece-wise efficient frontier envelopes all sample data such that no observation 
lies to the left of the frontier. The above depicted frontier represents a production 
frontier. It could similarly represent a profit frontier for instance by altering notations 
on the axes from output and input quantities to revenues and inputs prices 
respectively. The slope of the production frontier (y/x) at a given point yields the 
productivity achieved at that point, hence any efficient observation beyond the optimal 
scale (A) will have a marginally decreasing productivity as input increases.  
 
Figure 4 shows how DEA is can provide individual efficiency scores. Bank-specific 
efficiencies are measured relative to the constructed frontier or surface (Coelli et al, 
1998). The graph depicts a DEA piece-wise linear isocost ( ) that is associated with 
output level  and input prices  and . Producers or sample observations (or DMUs 
- decision making units in DEA terminology) located at points C and D define the 
efficient frontier. As was illustrated in section 6.1.2, technical inefficiency at point A is 
defined by the ratio of . The same output level achieved by producing at point 
A` can be realized by producing at point C with less of input  being used, therefore 









the efficient DEA frontier. This issue highlights the problem of input excess or input 
slacks (Battese and Coelli, 1998) which indicates that any non-zero input slacks 
should be reported along with DEA technical efficiency scores.  
 





DEA imposes no functional form on the data but it ignores data noise, and that is why 
it requires no distributional assumptions for inefficiency. Relaxing these constrains 
permits the shape of DEA frontier to be flexible, yet it prevents further statistical 
analysis to be applied on the DEA frontier (Bauer, 1990). Therefore, since DEA is a 
nonparametric technique, statistical hypothesis tests are difficult to conduct. In this 
context, conducting Log-Likelihood ratio tests for instance to observe the potential 
improvement that the introduction of risk measures would have on the efficient frontier 
would be impossible since DEA defines no functional form. Consequently, as the main 
objective of this research is to modify the efficient frontier’s functional form, this has 






Moreover, the dismissal of the random error component hampers the validity of non-
parametric models especially when it comes to dealing with cross-country banking 
data. This is because sources of the random error component are, according to Berger 
and Humphrey (1997); (1) measurement errors, (2) luck that may boost a bank’s 
performance in a given year relative to the next, and (3) the inaccuracies and 
discrepancies of accounting rules. Therefore, should any of these factors exist, 
inefficiency scores will most likely to be biased (inflated or deflated) as they would 
inherently include the random error effect if not isolated according to Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) and Battese and Coelli (1998), this is because the entire deviation 
from the frontier will be ascribed to inefficiency, whereas in fact it is not all attributed 
to inefficiency. For this reason, amongst others, non-parametric approached were not 
used in this research. Moreover, since this research uses accounting data, it is 
therefore important to know if the random error component exists in the first place. In 
fact, the data is tested for stochasticity, and strong evidence of significant stochasticity 
is found in the two-sample data used in this research. Stochasticity simply suggests 
that the random error term in the data exists and is statistically significant. 
 
Attempts to improve DEA model has in one aspect resulted in the development of 
bootstrapped-DEA. Some research, Banker (1993) Grosskopf (1996) and Berger and 
Humphrey (1997), suggest that the deterministic nature of DEA can be relaxed by 
introducing a re-sampling technique such as bootstrapping. Bootstrapping can 
approximate the distributions of estimated efficiencies, and therefore standard errors 
can be obtained accordingly. Such transformation would enable the interpretation of 
DEA estimates as a maximum likelihood estimate. However, very few studies have 
followed this route to DEA estimation (Cummins et al, 2003 for example) due the need 
for careful specification of the data-generating process which can produce arbitrary 
distributions as Simar and Wilson (1995) explain.   
 
Further advances also involved shifting the deterministic nature of DEA to 
accommodate for the data noise. This has resulted in the emergence of the so-called 
Stochastic DEA or SDEA developed by Li (1998). The generic aim is to adjust DEA 
for random errors. This is achieved by allowing a certain probability to violating normal 





decision-making unit (DMU) and the frontier DMU, are made more difficult to satisfy. 
This has the effect of raising the measured technical efficiency of every DMU relative 
to the deterministic model. This shifts the SDEA frontier closer to where the data is 
most concentrated. This entails that, the smaller the probability that a single constraint 
will be satisfied for an observation, the closer to the frontier local point would be, 
implying that the average SDEA efficiency scores will never be lower than those of 
DEA (Sarafidis, 2002, p 20).   
 
The problem with the SDEA model lies in the subjectivity of the process of associating 
random probabilities to the different DEA constraints, which in turn makes the model’s 
results very sensitive to this assumption (Sarafidis, 2002). Brazdik (2005) explains 
that, for this reason, the application of SDEA has been relatively limited. Lastly, the 
application of the bootstrapped-DEA or SDEA approaches to this study is deemed to 
add little value, given that the core purpose of this research is to advance efficiency 
analysis through the incorporation of risk, rather than testing the impact of employing 
different estimation methodologies on efficiency estimations.   
 
3.2.6.2 Free Disposal Hull FDH 
 
FDH was developed by De Prins, Simar & Tulkens (1984). FDH is a special case of 
DEA model as it follows a linear programming methodology to estimating the frontier. 
FDH forms the efficient frontier which envelops the observed data in a step-wise 




















The distinctive shape of the FDH frontier is partly a result of not imposing the convexity 
assumption on the production function as does DEA. Therefore, observations labelled 
as inefficient with FDH will also be under DEA but the reverse is not certain as 
demonstrated by Figure 6. That is because points connecting DEA vertices are not part 
of the FDH frontier as shown below. In this context, the FDH generates the production 
possibilities set in a manner that envelopes DEA vertices with the FDH points being 











DEA allows for the possibility of linear substitution between observed input 
combinations as represented by the different points on the isoquant (which is 
generated from the observations in piecewise linear forms), whereas FDH discards 
this possibility by allowing the isoquant to look as a step function that is constructed 
by intersecting different linear combinations of the local (observed) inputs (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997, p 5). However, this creates a more serious problem of input slacks 
(excess) than in DEA. Moreover, as can be observed in Figure3, FDH frontier 
surrounds the data more tightly than DEA, which results in technical efficiency 
estimates of FDH to be – on average – smaller than those of DEA (Tulkens, 1993), 
since deviations from the frontier will be smaller under the FDH.   
 
All in all, FDH and DEA suffer a major drawback since they assume away the random 
error when estimating the efficient frontier, accordingly, non-parametric techniques 





in estimating the frontier, no luck that may boost the estimated performance of the 
observed unit from one year from the next, and no inaccuracies or discrepancies of 
accounting rules in measuring outputs and inputs. 
 
As the random error is tested for stochasticity, and the results clearly demonstrate that 
the panel’s error term is significantly stochastic hence suppressing the random error 
would yield inefficient (bigger standard errors) and biased estimates (since the mean 
of the estimated coefficient’s distribution is very likely to deviate from the true 
parameter due to the ignored impact of the estimation error term). 
 
To conclude, this research dismisses non-parametric approaches for two reasons: (1) 
because they ignore the possible impact of statistical noise or random error, and (2) 
because they do not allow for specifying a frontier functional form and therefore there 
is no way to assess the potential impact of the risk factors proposed in this research. 
Drake et al (2006, p 1444) sum up the argument against non-parametric methods by 
highlighting their major drawback in that “there is no standard statistical test to 
determine whether the researcher has utilized the correct set of non-controllable 
inputs or outputs”. Hence, without specifying a functional form, this research will be 
deviating from one of its main objectives as it is quite difficult to decide whether a 
certain set of risk factors have improved the fit of the model to the data or not.   
 
3.2.7 Parametric Techniques 
 
Contrary to non-parametric methodologies, parametric approaches specify a 
functional form to be estimated and make clear assumptions about the distributions of 
the inefficiency and random error components. The literature acknowledges three 
main parametric techniques including: Distribution Free Approach DFA, Thicker 
Frontier Approach TFA, and Stochastic Frontier Approach SFA. The discussion begins 
by exploring the DFA and TFA methods and concludes with methodology applied in 








3.2.7.1 Distribution Free Approach DFA 
 
Introduced by Berger (1993), the DFA requires a panel data set and is capable of 
providing bank-specific efficiency estimates. It assumes an estimation composite error 
term that comprises of two components:  a random term and inefficiency term. 
However, DFA makes two strong assumptions upon estimating the efficient frontier. 
 
First, is that the estimated errors or residual ( ) are assumed to average 
out over time, hence bank-specific residual becomes constant such that 
.  Second, is that the random component of the residual is assumed to 
cancel out over time, therefore the entirety of the residuals will constitute for 
inefficiency terms only, i.e. . This implicitly implies that the DFA 
defines inefficiency as time-invariant. 
 
The DFA does not make any distributional assumptions about the inefficiency term, 
but assumes that the inefficiency term ( ) is a random variable distributed 
independently from the model’s regressors. The DFA has an inherent assumption in 
that bank-level efficiency is consistent over time (systematic time progression trend), 
whereas the random error terms are more likely to cancel out one another over time 
(average to zero) given a panel data set specifically (Bauer et al, 1998).   
 
Technically, bank-specific cost inefficiency, for instance, is estimated as the difference 
between the average residual of a given local point (observed bank) and the average 
residual of the efficient bank – that is banks with the smallest residual value  
– assuming that the model’s random error components will cancel out over time. 
























Estimated efficiency is bounded between 0 and 1. A clear disadvantage of the DFA is 
the assumption that efficiency is time-invariant which undermines the credibility of 
DFA’s estimates if the panel involves a long period of time.  On the other hand, if the 
length of the panel is small, the assumption that the random component will average 
out to zero is more likely to be violated hence distorting the inefficiency estimates as 
the model’s residual will not entirely be attributed to inefficiency (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). This particular weakness of DFA prompted research into exploring the 
optimal panel length ( ) for which the two assumptions would hold. De Young (1997) 
investigated this issue and found that the optimal value of  is the first value of  
when the variance of which, , stops decreasing. In any case, this suggests 
sacrificing some of the panel’s observations which may result in incorrect conclusions 
and can create the degrees of freedom problem especially for relatively small samples.  
 
Moreover, given the assumption that the random component cancels out over time, 
DFA accommodates for observations with extreme average residual values by 
truncating the distribution of the random error component at 1%, 5% and 10%. This 
implies that applying the DFA would require accepting a given level of degrees of 
freedom, which is problematic in case of relatively small samples as Berger (1993) 
illustrates. Therefore, the DFA approach mitigates the impact of data outliers because 
it truncates extreme average residuals (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). There are three 
different DFA approaches: DFA-Within, DFA-GLS, and DFA-Truncated. All of these 
approaches have a similar assumption in that inefficiency is fixed over time, however 
they differ in the way the estimation is conducted and by the way they treat the model’s 
residual (Bauer et al, 1998).   
 
To conclude, the application of DFA is discarded for different reasons. First, because 
it ignores the impact of the random error component in the sense that it is assumed to 
cancel out over time. Second, it ensures the ‘cancelling out’ of the random component 
by truncating the data at both ends, which in turn may create the degrees of freedom 
problem and can produce biased results. Third, the stochasticity test applied in this 
research to both data sets shows that the specified cost and profit functions 
demonstrate significant evidence of the model’s error being stochastic, in other words, 








composite error term cancels out as far as this research’s sample data is concerned.   
 
3.2.7.2 Thick Frontier Analysis TFA 
 
Developed by Berger and Humphrey (1991, 1992), the Thick Frontier Analysis TFA is 
a less structured frontier estimation approach compared to the DFA but can be applied 
to cross-section and panel data settings as Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) explain. The 
following discussion illustrates the TFA from a cost efficiency perspective and in a 
cross-sectional framework.  Technically speaking, TFA requires calculating point 
average costs for the sample data and then stratifying the data in a descending 
manner in terms of the average costs calculated. This results in forming average cost 
quartiles. Accordingly, the group of banks situated in the bottom quartile are assumed 
to be the most cost efficient and constitute the thick frontier, and banks located in the 
top quartile are considered as the least cost-efficient (as they have the highest average 
costs) relative to the thick frontier. 
 
Having classified the data as such, a separate cost function for the top and bottom 
quartiles is estimated. TFA relies on the following assumptions: (1) within each 
quartile, residual variations are assumed to represent statistical noise only, and (2) 
variations in predicted average costs between top and bottom quartiles are assumed 
to account for cost inefficiency in the top quartile. In other words, because cost 
functions are estimated separately for top and bottom quartiles ( ), differences 
between the estimated parameters ( ) are assumed to reflect differences in cost 
efficiency between banks in the top and bottom quartiles ( ). Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2000) argue that these two assumptions may not hold as such, meaning that 
the TFA is likely to produce inaccurate estimates, but it is a useful tool that gives an 
idea for the possible magnitude of inefficiencies.  
 
The average cost inefficiency  in cost inefficient quartile  can therefore be 













Where  represents increase in average costs brought about by the inefficient 
producer as a percentage of the average cost of the efficient producer located in 
quartile .  
 
What is more, the TFA does not postulate any distributional assumptions regarding 
the estimated model’s error term or residual. Alternatively, it attributes inefficiency to 
differences between estimated parameters in the top and bottom quartiles as equation 
(24) shows. This in fact could potentially produce biased and inconsistent efficiency 
scores because of ignoring statistical noise, because the impact of exogenous factors 
such as measurement errors and luck and possibly omitted variables are not 
separated from inefficiencies. It follows that the TFA provides no distributional 
assumptions related to the error and inefficiency terms as a way to separate them 
since it ignores the impact of statistical noise in the first place. However, the main 
advantage of TFA is that it mitigates the outliers-effect as a result of sample 
stratification procedure.   
 
More seriously, the TFA does not provide bank-specific efficiency estimates, rather, it 
produces one cost efficiency estimate for a ‘hypothetical’ mean firm in the high-cost 
quartile relative the hypothetical mean firm in low-cost quartile (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997 and Bauer et al., 1998). Therefore, the TFA measures the ‘core’ efficiency for 
the entire sample rather than providing an observation-specific efficiency score.  
Lastly, TFA does not include all the sample data into the analysis, it rather considers 
50% or 40% of data included in the top and bottom quartiles, since inefficiencies are 
determined as the difference between average costs in the top and bottom quintiles. 
This may lead to a serious problem of degrees of freedom and can produce biased 
results since not all observations in the sample data are considered. For these 
reasons, the TFA was discarded in this research and the Stochastic Frontier Approach 



















3.2.7.3 Stochastic Frontier Analysis SFA 
 
First proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van Den 
Broeck (1977), SFA is an econometric modelling method that requires specifying a 
‘stochastic’ functional form such that it incorporates an additional random error 
component  into the model to accommodate for the impact of random factors or 
statistical noise on the dependent variable which can be the result of measurement 
errors, luck, and the effects of unspecified (omitted) variables. 
 
The following discussion gives more insight into the evolution of SFA model given its 
central importance to this research. To start with, Aigner and Chu (1968) suggested 






 is the logged-form of output for the bank ( ), 
( ) is input quantities utilized to produce the output,  
( ) represents a set of parameters to be estimated, 
( ) is the non-negative random variable associated with the bank’s technical 
efficiency. 
 
Aigner and Chu estimate the inefficiency term under this specification as the ratio of 
the observed level of output for the  bank ( ) to the estimated value of the frontier 
output [ ] which is associated with no technical inefficiency.  
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Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974) estimate the non-stochastic production function 
defined in (25) using the Maximum Likelihood MLE assuming that the inefficiency term 
follows the gamma distribution. Coelli et al (1998) state the disadvantage of estimating 
a deterministic (non-stochastic) model specified in (25) in that it ascribes all deviations 
from the frontier to technical inefficiency and ignores the potential impact of exogenous 
factors such as measurement errors, luck, and potentially omitted variables, hence it 
is likely to produce biased inefficiency estimates as a result.   
 
Aiming to overcome this potential weakness of the deterministic model, Aigner et al 
(1977) introduced the stochastic frontier model, which is estimated using the 
stochastic frontier approach SFA, to more accurately accounts for noise in the data by 
disentangling the random error into two components: an inefficiency term and a 
random error term. The production frontier specified in (25) can therefore be 





o ( ) is the deterministic part of the stochastic functional form 
o ( ) is the composite error term  
o ( ) represents the effect on outputs due to exogenous influences.  is a set of 
identically independent and distributed i.i.d. random variables that follow and 
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are independent of the inefficiency terms , hence . Berger and 
Mester (1997) refer to the random error as idiosyncratic error or statistical noise. 
o ( ) represents technical inefficiency. ( ) is a set of inefficiency terms that are 
also assumed to be i.i.d. following exponential distribution, or half-normal 
distribution: . 
o ( ) is the stochastic frontier 
 
The stochastic property of the production model defined in (27) stems from splitting 
the estimated residual into random and inefficiency components (Coelli et al, 1998). 
Therefore, SFA model assumes that the residual (which constitutes the portion of the 
dependent variable’s variation that cannot be explained by the model) represents the 
inefficiency effects after isolating the random effects caused by measurement errors 
and luck. These two components are separated using different distributional 
assumptions, where inefficiency effects are assumed to follow one-sided (usually half-
normal) distribution, whereas the random effects are assumed to follow two-sided 
normal distribution. Bank-specific inefficiency is then calculated as the ratio of its 
predicted output of the observed bank to the predicted output of the best-practicing 


























































Figure 7 explains the main components of the stochastic production frontier where the 
horizontal and vertical axes represent input and output levels for two firms i and j. The 
shape of the frontier’s deterministic component implies the microeconomic law of 





defined by the point ( , ) and ( , ) respectively. As can be seen from the graph, 
deviation from the frontier is attributed to statistical noise and inefficiency. Observed 
outputs may lie below or above its deterministic part conditional on the random error 
being negative or positive since it is assumed to follow a two-sided normal distribution 
according to Coelli et al (1998). 
 
To produce bank-specific estimates, SFA first requires specifying a functional form to 
be estimated, such as Cobb-Douglas, Translog, and Fourier Flexible form…etc. The 
stochastic function is then estimated using the maximum likelihood method (MLE) to 
produce estimates for the model’s parameters. Second, using these MLE estimates, 
bank-specific technical efficiency scores are produced by disentangling the estimated 
residual term into a statistical noise, and a technical inefficiency component 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). So, for instance, estimating a cost function under SFA 
involves labelling “a bank as inefficient if its costs are higher than those predicted for 
an efficient bank producing the same input/output configuration and the difference 
cannot be explained by statistical noise” (Altunbas et al, 2000, p 1607).   
 
The specification in equation (27) expresses a stochastic production frontier. 
Specifying a stochastic cost frontier simply requires changing the dependent variable 
to represent total costs instead of outputs, and the sign of the inefficacy component of 
the error term to become  as suggested by Coelli (1996). Thus, the 





o ( ) is the total cost of production for bank , 
o ( ) is a nonnegative random variable such that  and is assumed 
to account for cost inefficiency.  
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The cost inefficiency term ( ) defines how far a given observation is operating above 
the cost frontier, hence . On the other hand, to express a stochastic (alternative) 
profit frontier, the definition of the random error term for will be similar to that of the 
production frontier such that ), with the independent variable being profits 
instead of outputs.   
  













Profit inefficiency term ( ) defines how far a given observation is operating under the 
profit frontier, hence .  
 
To produce bank-specific inefficiency estimates, SFA takes each observation’s error 
term  in each time period in the panel and estimates the inefficiency score as 
conditional on the observed error. Moreover, efficiency estimates under SFA are 
consistent estimates as shown by Ferrier and Lovell (1990) and later by Fiorentino et 
al (2006) because SFA estimates are insensitive to the sample heterogeneity 
(dispersion around the mean values) or the effect of outliers. This is further illustrated 
in the following section. 
 
3.2.7.4 The Rationale for Choosing SFA 
 
On the rationale for choosing SFA as opposed to DEA, Vennet (2002, p 263) argues 
that nonparametric techniques, compared to SFA, generally produce less reliable 
estimates because they discard statistical noise in the data. Furthermore, The DEA 
has been empirically shown to produce inconsistent efficiency estimates due to its 
sensitivity to sample heterogeneity and to the effects of outliers. Fiorentino et al (2006) 
use a panel data se of 34,192 banking observations over 1993-2004 to test for the 
sensitivity of DEA and SFA efficiency estimates to sample heterogeneity and to the 
effect of outliers. To test the sensitivity to sample heterogeneity, the sample was 
structured (grouped) in three different ways: by year, by asset size, and by both 
criteria. The authors found that mean cost efficiency under DEA changed significantly 
under the different structures, suggesting that DEA estimates are significantly 
sensitive to sample heterogeneity, this is in contrast to SFA estimates which 
experienced no significant change given the different settings. This suggests that DEA 
estimates are inconsistent.   
 
To test the effect of outliers on estimates, Fiorentino et al (2006) excluded for this 
purpose 24 observations (outliers) only out of a total of 34,192 and re-estimated the 
model under DEA and SFA. Results indicated that mean efficiency scores under DEA 
increased dramatically from 13% to 37%, whereas under SFA results were stable and 








Thus, the justification for applying SFA approach as opposed to DEA is threefold: (1) 
the need for specifying a functional form since this best serves this research’s 
purposes, (2) DEA ignores accounting for a random error in the data whereas the data 
used in this research shows strong evidence of existing statistical noise, and (3) SFA 
seems to deliver more consistent and therefore more reliable since SFA is less 
sensitive to sample heterogeneity and the effects of outliers. 
 
In relation to other parametric techniques, SFA is more appropriate than either TFA or 
DFA. It dominates the TFA because the latter is unable to produce individual bank 
efficiency scores which would hinder the fulfilment of this research objective. With 
regards to the DFA, although some research has shown a relatively high correlation 
between SFA and DFA rankings (Bauer et al, 1998), SFA is preferred to the DFA since 
the DFA implies a strong assumption under which the random component of the data 
noise is believed to average to zero. Ruling out the impact of the random component 
as such may inflate/deflate the average profit /cost inefficiencies over the panel period 
if this random component is found significant since average deviations will be totally 
attributed to inefficiencies. Berger (1993) affirms this view by arguing that some noise 
in the data might be persistent over time and therefore should be accounted for.   
 
Moreover, contrary to SFA, Bauer et al (1998) refers to a potential loophole in the DFA 
methodology based on the somewhat an arbitrary assumption that inefficiency is time-
invariant as it assumes that inefficiency tend to average out over time along with the 
random error component. This in fact rules out the influence of any factors that may 
change the level of inefficiencies over time such as technological advances or other 
environmental factors. The other weakness of the DFA stems from providing no 
assumptions on the probability distribution for the inefficiency and the random error 
component, which may be the result of the first assumption in that the random error 
portion of the noise cancels out over time. Therefore, SFA dominates other parametric 
techniques as it permits the decomposition of the model’s residual into technical 
inefficiency and random components based on their different distributional 
specifications (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). This property of SFA perfectly serves the 





3.2.8 Maximum-Likelihood Estimation MLE 
 
The estimation procedure applied in this research (SFA) uses the concept of maximum 
likelihood estimate MLE to produce estimates for the specified in cost and profit frontier 
models. Estimating a set of parameters using the MLE aims at finding their estimates 
that maximize the corresponding likelihood function (Harris and Stoker, 1998). 
Parameters’ estimates that maximize the likelihood function correspond to the lowest 
standard errors possible to these estimates28. A likelihood function is a probability or 
probability density function representing the relationship between a random 
variable’s different outcomes and their corresponding probabilities (Wooldridge, 
2003). In the case of frontier function, the likelihood function represents the probability 
density function of the frontier’s composite error term (the unknown variable) given the 
observed values of the models’ parameters. 
 
MLE is widely applied as it provides asymptotically efficient29 estimator – i.e. MLE 
estimates are efficient for big sample sizes – if the model is correctly specified. As will 
be discussed in the following two empirical chapters, the preferred specification for the 
models applied are carefully tested for prior to performing estimations.   
 
If the model to be estimated is found to be stochastic, Coelli (1996) and Wooldridge 
                                               
28 The lower the standard errors of estimates the closer that these estimates are to their true unknown 
values of the unknown population which the sample was drawn from. 
29 An asymptotically efficient estimator of parameter  suggests that it is efficient, unbiased, and 
consistent estimator.  
- Efficiency implies how far the estimator is away from the true value of the estimated parameter , 
suggesting that, for two estimators, the more efficient one is that with the minimal mean squared error 
MSE. Assuming that is an estimator of , then  is an efficient estimator of   if 
 (Wooldridge, 2003, p 740). 
- Unbiasedness means that if the estimator’s “probability distribution has an expected value equal to 
the parameter it is supposed to be estimating” (Wooldridge, 2003, p 735), that is: , hence 
. The probability distribution of the estimator represents the likelihood of its various 
outcomes resulting from drawing random samples. Obviously, unbiasedness does not imply that the estimate 
generated by a specific sample’s data is equal to , instead, it implies that if an infinite number of random samples 
on  were to be drawn from the population and the estimate for each sample is calculated, then average of these 
estimates should converge to  
- Consistency suggests that the estimator’s probability distribution becomes more and more concentrated around 
the true parameter  as the sample size increases, indicating that the estimator will deviate less from for 
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(2003, p 747) suggest using the MLE estimator as it tends to produce efficient 
(smallest variances), unbiased and consistent estimators (in large samples). To give 





The estimation of the unknown parameters of equation (30) requires the following: 
 
§ Specifying the functional form (Cobb-Douglas, Translog, or Fourier Flexible) for 
the deterministic part of the cost function .  
§ Specifying the distributional assumptions of composite error components: the 
random variable (statistical noise)  and the inefficiency term
. The two components are also assumed to be distributed 
independently from each other, and from the model’s regressors. 
 
Accordingly, the MLE maximizes the likelihood function corresponding to the cost 
function specified in (30) using the underlying data. This implies that the maximum 
likelihood function needs to be specified. The following discussion shows the steps 
with which the log-likelihood function is derived according to Aigner, Lovell, and 
Schmidt (1977) & Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).   
 
The density function of two-sided normally distributed random variable component  




Also, the density function of the non-negative normally distributed  is defined as 
 
(32) 










































As the two components are assumed to be independent, the joint density function of 
both is the product of their individual density function, thus the product of equation 




This joint density function can be then expressed in terms of the composite error term 





To obtain the marginal density function of the composite error term , the joint density 






Where: . The likelihood function for the sample  can then be derived as 
the result of the product of all observation-specific density functions, assuming that 




Taking the log of the likelihood function defined above produces the Log-Likelihood 












































































Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) define the likelihood function in terms of two 
variances: the variance of the composite error term  and lambda                 
( ) which represents the proportion of the inefficiency term’s standard 
deviation  to the random term’s standard deviation  which can take any non-
negative value. Further to this, Battese and Corra (1977) suggest to re-parameterize 
 so that it contains variances instead of standard deviation ( )30 such that 
it becomes bounded between 0 (meaning that all deviations from the frontier are 
ascribed to noise) and 1 (indicating that deviations from the frontier are entirely 
attributed to technical inefficiency). Using the  parameterization, the log-likelihood 
function of the cost frontier31 for the sample size with  banks can then be expressed 







, and  
 is the distribution function of the standard normal random variable . 
 
The parameters and  are estimated by the MLE technique which finds the 
maximum of the log-likelihood function in (37) using the observed values of the 
parameters. This yie/lds estimates of the frontier parameters and the corresponding 
components of the error term (inefficiency and the random component). 
                                               
30 The parameter gamma is not equal to the ratio of the variance of technical inefficiency effects to total residual 
variance, that is because the variance of bank-specific inefficiency is equal to  and not just 
, therefore the actual relative contribution of the inefficiency effect to the variance of the total composite error term 
is equal to  (Coelli et al, 1998, p 188). 
31 Coelli (1996, p7) states that the log-likelihood function of the production function is identical to that of the cost 
frontier with some differences in the sings involved according to Schmidt and Lovell (1979). 
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3.2.8.1 The Maximum Likelihood Estimation Procedure 
 
Parameter estimation according to MLE is conducted using different algorithms, most 
commonly, Davidon-Fletcher-Powell DFP and Newton-Raphson NR. The DFP 
requires the vector of first partial derivatives to be derived only, whereas the NR 
demands the matrix of second partial derivatives to be derived as well, hence it is more 
computationally demanding (Coelli, 1996). The statistical package32 utilized in this 
research to estimate the profit and cost frontiers uses the NR algorithm due to its 
superiority to the DFP algorithm33; that is because the former is more conservative in 
relation to the convergence of the log-likelihood function.   
 
Under the NR algorithm, convergence is declared when the log of tolerance is equal 
to 0.0000001 or  (Gould and Sribney, 1999), whereas the log of tolerance is set 






Where is the log-likelihood function for the set of estimates produced in the 
iteration and  is the log-likelihood function for the set of produced estimates in the 
previous iteration. That is, the iterative procedure ceases if the proportional change in 
the log-likelihood function for estimates is less than ( ). Tolerance specifies the 
cut-off point where iterations cease declaring convergence of the log-likelihood 
function and consequently the maximum estimates for the log-likelihood function are 
produced. More restricted tolerance is believed to deliver more trustworthy estimates 
since the corresponding value of the log-likelihood will be achieved at a higher possible 
maximum.   
                                               
32 The software used is Stata version 9. 
33 DFP or DFP Quasi-Newton is applied in FRONTIER 4.1. It is acknowledged that there are alternative ML 
estimation algorithms such as Bendt-Hall-Hall-Hausman BHHH and Broyden-Fletcher-Godfarb-Shanno BFGS, 
however the statistical package utilized allows for Newton-Raphson algorithm only NR, possibly due to its relative 
superiority in terms of it requiring the second-order partial derivatives to be calculated besides its relatively 






















The maximizing iterative process continues until the log-likelihood function converges 
– i.e. becomes concave or marginally declining as will graphically be shown in the 
corresponding empirical chapters. It is important to achieve concavity as the likelihood 
function may be ill-behaved or convex (i.e. flat) due to having many ridges, flat areas, 
and saddle points which prevent the function from becoming concave. In such case, 
more iterations should be allowed so that convergence is eventually attained. 
 
Technically, the NR algorithm for conducting the MLE estimation requires obtaining 
the first and second partial derivatives of the log-likelihood function (Gould and 
Sribney, 1999). It follows an iterative maximization procedure to find the closest 
estimations for the unknown parameters. To initiate this procedure, NR algorithm 
needs an initial guess – or a starting value – for the parameter estimates to begin the 
iteration. A gird search is conducted across the space of parameter  – where 
 – to provide starting values which are then used to initiate the 
iterative procedure. 
 
Further, if the produced starting values enable the log-likelihood function to be 
evaluated, the iterative process starts, but if the log-likelihood function is not 
successfully evaluated using the given stating values, the grid search uses a random 
number generator to provide a new direction vector until the log-likelihood function can 
be evaluated, which then triggers the maximizing iterative process. Iterations continue 
until the log-likelihood function for the set of estimates reaches the maximum value 
possible. As iterations progress, change in the value of the log-likelihood function – 
i.e. log of tolerance – becomes smaller and smaller until the process terminates when 
the difference between the log-likelihoods becomes equal to or less than the logged 
tolerance as specified in (38).  
 
The procedure that the Newton-Raphson algorithm NR follows to find the maximum 
likelihood estimates which has a number of steps, as illustrated by Gould and Sribney 
(1999, p 11). To find the estimate of a parameter  such that the log-likelihood function 
of which  is maximized, the following steps are taken: 
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1. The process starts with a guess (starting value) . If the log-likelihood function 
can be evaluated at , then the maximizing iterative process initiates. 
Otherwise, the grid search is conducted again to reach an appropriate starting 
value. A new guess is calculated . This step is repeated 
and new guesses continue to be generated until the log-likelihood function can 
be evaluated. The gradient of the likelihood function  should not be 
constant (i.e. flat gradient) because this causes the first derivative  = 0 
hence making it impossible to produce new guess according to step 2. This 
means that the likelihood cannot be increasing or decreasing, suggesting that 
 is a poor guess then a different starting value is produces.  
 
2. Finding a starting value triggers the iterative maximization process which 
continues until the log-likelihood function achieves a maximum. 
 
This process of finding the maximum log-likelihood estimate of one parameter can 
be extended to accommodate a vector . Thus, to find vector such that is 
maximized, 
 
1- The NR process starts with guess . 
2- A new guess is calculated  where is the gradient vector,  
is the matrix of second derivatives, and  is the direction vector. The 
second step is repeated until the function can be evaluated. 
3- The iterative process starts until the log-likelihood function reaches the 
maximum possible. 
 
Having discussed the technicalities of the log-likelihood function and the maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure along with the specification of the cost and profit 
functions that will be used to estimate technical efficiency, the focus now shifts towards 




















































This chapter explores banking risks including credit, market, liquidity, and insolvency 
risks from industry, regulatory, and research perspectives. The aim is to provide a 
background on the underpinning concepts of these risks from different perspectives 
as they will be used in the following empirical chapters to modify the profit and cost 
functions. This risk-modification process constitutes the main contribution of this 
research to efficiency and analyses.   
 
Risk is crucial to the banking business which is centred on taking and managing risk. 
Risk is “an essential ingredient in bank production” (Hughes et al, 2001, p 2171), and 
as “the world of banking has changed, risk management must keep pace and research 
in the area of risk analysis is becoming increasingly important” (The Banker, Sept. 
2007, p 17). The global credit crunch which was triggered by problems in the US 
subprime mortgage market in August of 2007 is a prime example of how important 
and far-reaching the implications of banking risks can be.   
 
As a result of the credit crunch, which began with the drying up of wholesale credit 
markets, financial institutions have experienced periods of major falls in the value of 
assets combined with shrinking market liquidity due to vanishing investor confidence. 
The spread of the crisis has been the direct consequence of securitization which 
allows banks to pass on their credit exposures to investors by “slicing and dicing” credit 
risk exposures using collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs34) for housing loans, 
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs35) for non-housing loans (Woods et al, 
2009). 
 
Under the current crisis, different business models have caused some banks to fail, 
                                               
34 A CMO is a special purpose entity which is the legal owner of a pool of mortgages. The entity issues tranches of 
bonds which are secured against the mortgage pool. Buyers of the bonds include banks, hedge funds and other 
institutional investors, but the value of the bonds is dependent upon the security provided by the underlying 
mortgage collateral. If there is uncertainty about the mortgage repayments then the bonds are likely to fall in value 
very quickly” (Woods et al, 2009, p 32). 
35 “A CDO, like a CMO is a special purpose entity that issues debt against credit-based collateral, but instead of 
specializing in mortgage debt, CDOs combine various types of debt. A CDO splits the different types of debt into 
tranches which represent different levels of risk ranging from AAA rated through to the lowest grade known as 
‘toxic waste’. The tranches are then used as collateral against a bond issue which pays interest in accordance with 
the level of collateral risk. Higher grade tranches therefore earn lower returns than the junior lower grade tranches” 





whilst others have survived, albeit with seriously damaged profits. Northern Rock, 
which was eventually nationalized by the British government in late 2008, relied on a 
business model that assumed away any major liquidity crunch in wholesale credit 
markets, as the Rock’s model assumed permanently liquid and deep money markets 
to support its operations. Other banks around the globe have incurred huge write-
downs in asset values such as HBOS which reported, after it was taken over by Lloyds 
TSB forming Lloyds TSB Banking Group, a total loss of £10bn losses in bad loans, 
mainly caused by bad loans in the corporate sector (The FT, Feb 13th 2009).   
 
This has forced many big institutions to simply rely on taxpayer funds for survival such 
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the main mortgage providers in the US, and Northern 
Rock and Bradford & Bingley in the UK (Woods et al, 2009). By the end of the financial 
year of 2008, the five largest UK banks (HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, 
Barclays and HBOS) had recorded write downs and asset impairments totaling 
approximately to £22 billion (Smith, 2008 and Woods et al, 2009). HSBC, however, 
reported a 28% fall in profit in the first six months of 2008. HBOS, the UK bank most 
exposed to the crunch, recorded loan write-offs and trading debt write downs around 
£2.4 billion (Woods et al, 2009), which later turned out to be over 4 times these losses 
in Feb of 2009. 
 
In the end, the crisis has shown that increasing credit risk exposure can lead to liquidity 
problems (the dry-up in wholesale market) which in turn are reflected by increasing 
market risk (falling share prices) and ultimately increasing risk of insolvency (resulting 
in forced sales, takeovers and possible bankruptcies). Consequently, this suggests 
that these four banking risks are crucial to the banking industry and therefore have to 
be considered upon analysing the performance of banking institutions. The crisis has 
also shown that banking risks are not only idiosyncratic, but also significantly linked to 
the overall stability of the financial system, i.e. systematic risk. This implies that risks 
at bank- as well as banking system-level should be accommodated for in any bank 
performance assessment process, so as to more comprehensively reflect the nature 
of the banking business and to increase the reliability of bank performance analysis. 
 





into efficiency and analysis. This has been asserted by a number of previous studies.   
 
For efficiency studies, Mester (1996, p 1026) finds that “unless quality and risk are 
accounted for, one might easily miscalculate a bank’s level of inefficiency”. Further, 
Drake et al (2006, p 1451) confirm the vitality of incorporating risk factors into the cost 
function as “failure to adequately account for risk can have a significant impact on 
relative efficiency scores”. What is more, past efficiency studies seem to completely 
overlook the impact of regulatory capital on profit and cost efficiencies. This research 
attempts to bridge this gulf by accounting for Basel I’s criteria for measuring credit risk 
in efficiency analysis. To this end, the credit risk appetite (CRA) measure, calculated 
as the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets, is applied. Although Basel I has 
been implemented for more than two decades, little attention has been paid by 
efficiency research to accommodating for the impact of Basel I regulatory capital 
requirements. 
 
As for analysis, Girardone et al (2004, p 225) confirms that “risk and asset quality 
factors appear to matter in relation to estimation and … these factors should be borne 
in mind in any future evaluation of the efficiency characteristics of European banking 
markets”. Moreover, Altunbas et al (2000, p 1605) assert that “if risk and quality factors 
are not taken into account, optimal bank size tends to be overestimated”. Accordingly, 
the contribution of this research to banking efficiency and literatures lies in more 
comprehensibly accounting for risk by incorporating credit, market, liquidity, and 
insolvency risks at bank- as well as country-level into the analyses, since past 
research seem to ignore the impact of some of these major risks. 
 
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
on the forces that are changing the environment of risks which the banking industry is 
facing. Section 3 discusses the four major banking risks that are later applied in the 
empirical analysis from an industry and regulatory perspectives. Section 4 examines 
these risks in academic research and exposes this research’s envisaged contribution 
to the literature. Section 5 is the chapter’s summary. 
 






“Change in the financial environment will stimulate a search by financial institutions for 
innovations that are likely to be profitable” (Mishkin, 2004, p 232). Such a statement 
simply highlights the fact that banking risks are changing in nature which is a direct 
result of the ever-evolving banking business, and therefore research needs to keep 
pace with these changes, which is what this research endeavours to achieve. It is quite 
evident that over the last few decades, the banking industry has been experiencing 
markedly significant changes that have directly influenced their cost base and 
profitability and has therefore re-shaped the risk-return relationship. As competition 
from banking and non-banking institutions intensifies, the traditional source of banking 
income represented by comfortable interest margins has been under considerable 
pressure.   
 
Banks seem to respond to these challenges in different ways, some of which include: 
(1) increasing the size of their loan portfolio to make up for the reduced margins, hence 
running higher loan-to-deposit ratios in their balance sheets such as Northern Rock 
which had a ratio of over 300%, i.e. for every pound in deposits there are 3 pounds 
invested in lending (The FT, Sept 17th, 2007), compared to an average EU-8 ratio of 
around 111% (ECB, 2008a, p 57), (2) taking on more credit risk by allowing for riskier 
loans to constitute their lending portfolios, an issue which was manifested in the 
increased exposure to the Subprime market in the US such as in the case of the Swiss 
bank UBS. UBS had a total exposure to the US subprime market of $27.6bn reported 
in its 4th quarter statement with half of this exposure turning to real losses which 
totalled to about $13.7bn (The FT, Feb 14th, 2009), (3) expanding in size to diversify 
their income sources and to take advantage of cost cuts form the exploitation of. 
Recent examples include the takeover by RBS of the Dutch bank ABN Amro in Oct 
2007, and the recent formation of the Lloyds TSB Banking Group in which Lloyd TSB 
took over the troubled HBOS in Jan 2009 (The FT, Feb 1st 2009, and the FT, Jan 20th 
2009). Such responses by banks have had profound implications on the risk-return 
trade-off that research needs to account for in some form36. 
 
                                               
36 Although these are recent examples, they are highlighted to reflect on the changes that the banking industry has 
been undergoing, which has direct implications on changing the nature of risks and risk management in banking. 
This will be elaborated on more the coming discussion in this chapter. It is also worth noting that this research does 
not assess the impact of mergers and takeovers as it is merely concerned with the impact of risk on efficiency and 





To elaborate, although higher loan proportions of the banks’ assets should 
theoretically generate higher long-term earnings, this cannot be decoupled from the 
greater potential for loan losses due to bad luck (i.e. negative economic conditions) or 
bad management (i.e. skimping on risk management resources which results in 
mounting loan losses etc.). At the extreme, a rapidly-growing loan portfolio that is not 
supported by a proportionate and adequate capital is a sign that the bank can have 
problems in the long term. This is because counting on positive market movements 
and having, on that basis, a considerable volume of low-quality loans in the bank’s 
loan portfolio can ultimately translate into solvency problems. The excessive exposure 
to credit risk in conjunction with inadequate capital structure to support this expansion 
may push the bank into serious liquidity problems, as has been the case for Northern 
Rock, one of the largest mortgage banks in the UK. Northern Rock adopted a 
vulnerable business model which relied heavily on short-term money market funding 
to support its assets. However, when markets turned sour due to the credit crunch 
which started in the US in August 2007, a big hole emerged in Northern Rocks’ books 
due to sudden liquidity shortage (short-term funding) which eventually forced the 
regulator to nationalize the Rock at the expense of the tax-payers’ funds (The FT, Feb 
17th 2008).   
 
To provide a more detailed view on the forces driving change in the banking business 
that are related to traditional banking and trading books, the following list, which is 
may be inconclusive, provides a greater insight into these factors (Goddard et al, 
2007), including:   
 
1. Globalization and Financial Crises 
2. Technological Advances 
3. Securitization 
4. Interest Rate Volatility 
5. Financial Regulations: the evolution of. Basel II 
 
The following discussion reflects on each of these points and is coupled with real 
examples from the European banking industry. The ultimate aim of this discussion is 





insolvency) introduced in this research should be accounted for upon analysing bank 
performance (that is in terms of efficiency and analyses).   
 
4.2.1 Globalization and Financial Crises 
 
Globalization is one major factor driving change in banking and therefore posing new 
risks for banks. Globalization entails that boundaries between countries become less 
effective leading to greater competition amongst markets and institutions globally. In 
the broadest sense, globalization could mean that the economic policies of one 
country can affect that of another country. Therefore, due to globalization and 
heightened competition, banks found that old ways of doing business are no longer 
efficient and largely not profitable. Banks have realized that to stay in business, access 
funds efficiently, and make profits, products and services has to be tailored to meet 
customers’ evolving needs and to prove profitable after all.   
 
For European banking, globalization is of a dual impact. The first dimension of such 
impact is driven by the integration of the EU economies and the subsequent 
endeavours to achieve fully-integrated financial markets. The second is the 
competition arising internationally. The rapid expansion of banks’ off-balance sheet 
activities (OBS) in terms of expansion in debt securitization and derivative trading – 
mainly due to narrowing margins on the banking book activities – is another profound 
example of the impact that globalization has on banking. Goddard et al (2007, p 1918) 
point out that “deregulation and the integration of the European banking sector are 
likely to have profound implications for the size and concentration of banking markets”. 
 
More recent evidence of how globalization has re-shaped the risk-return relationship 
for European banks is the knock-on effect of the U.S. subprime financial crisis which 
has wiped out substantial volumes of profits for many European banks: UBS for 
instance reported a whopping $18bn Subprime-related write-downs in early 2008 (The 
FT, Feb 31st 2008), BNP Paribas revealed €898m in write-downs in the last quarter 
of 2007 (The FT, Feb 20th 2008a), and Credit Suisse also reported $2.85bn mark-
down (i.e. write-downs) in the value of their assets (The FT, Feb 19th 2008). Many 
banks sought fresh capital injection to mitigate the profound impact of the cross-






On the positive side, however, globalization provides an avenue for banks to spread 
their risks across the globe, hence further exploit the diversification effect to reach 
more preferable risk-return payoff (McLaney, 2006). In this context, investing in 
diversified or low-correlated business sectors – which is better realized in globalized 
banking sector – would create less risky portfolio overall due to reduced returns’ 
volatility, yet with greater expected average returns. This in turn can boost both cost 
efficiency – since lower portfolio risk can lower the cost of funding which ultimately 
entails less capital to be set aside, and profit efficiency as well – because average 
return on a diversified portfolio can be less volatile than a risky portfolio which can 
translate in lower losses overall. 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that globalization is a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, it has opened up new avenues for European banks to diversify and expand their 
business lines, such as HSBC bank in the UK. HSBC has a considerable presence in 
China and other rapidly-growing Asian markets, a strategy that has smoothen the 
impact of the current economic slowdown in the US and Europe to an extent. On the 
other hand, globalization has made one major bank’s problems spill over globally – a 
good example is the increased volatility which global stock markets experienced in 
March of 2008 that was driven by bad news on the fall out of the 5th largest US 
investment bank, Bear Sterns, which a considerable number of banks have invested 
in (The FT, March 17th 2008). The wider implications of such unfolding bad news in 
the banking sector across the Atlantic has been a notable credit squeeze in the UK 
mortgage market for instance, with first-time buyers finding it considerably difficult to 
get a foot on the property ladder due to dramatically fewer mortgage deals being on 
offer (The FT, Feb 27th 2008). The globalization of the banking business therefore 
entails the need for accounting for banking risks not only on a micro- or bank-level, 
but also to account for them on a macro- or banking system-level when analysing 
banks performance. This is therefore what this research attempts to achieve. 
 
4.2.2 Financial Innovation and Technological Advances 
 





impacted the management of banking risks (The Economist, May 2007). First is the 
introduction of credit derivatives (CDs). CDs are used by buyers to pass on credit 
exposure to investors. They are tradable instruments designed by banks and sold to 
risk-seeking investors. Second is the expanding role of rating agencies which in many 
aspects have facilitated the trading of credit risk globally.   
 
Banks increasing reliance on rating agencies in assessing borrowers’ credit 
worthiness has proven to be a risky business. That is because borrowers’ ratings have 
mostly ignored the scenario in that serious liquidity risk can lead to default under the 
assumption that extreme events related to liquidity risk are very unlikely, an issue that 
has proven to be a considerable underestimation of reality (The FT, Oct 27th 2007). 
Despite that banks may have saved costs by outsourcing the task of credit risk 
assessment, yet, the latest subprime mortgage crisis has clearly demonstrated that 
excessive reliance on credit rating agencies can be hazardous and sometimes 
misleading in terms of forecasting wide-scale default events.   
 
The third implication is related to technological advances in risk management. “Thanks 
to technological and financial wizardry, loans are now made with little contact between 
borrower and lender, and are shuffled around the financial system like so many cards 
at a poker table” (The Economist, May 2007, p 42). The ability of taking debt off the 
balance sheet and spread risks across the financial system has made it easier for 
banks to further expand in lending and be more complacent about risky loans since 
they did not have to increase their capital cushions as a result, thanks to securitization.  
This has had significant implications on risk as one major bank’s risky investments can 
create the potential for a systematic risk. The main driver of this trend has been the 
considerable investment in technological advances motivated by cost-reduction in 
information production and management, and the distribution of financial services via 
the use of electronically-based processes to substitute for the more time- and space-
demanding paperwork.   
 
This is evident as banks can nowadays sell on credit risk within few days of generating 
the asset or even hours. Although this may have contributed to cutting operational 





due to less responsible lending decisions made. As a result, credit has become 
available to a wide sector of corporates and individuals, even to those with relatively 
low prospects of success or credit worthiness, since risk could easily and quickly be 
passed on to investors around the world. This has been one major factor driving a 
significant and rapid growth in European economies as in the UK for the last 10 years 
or so. However, this has eventually materialized in mounting billions of risky loans with 
inherently considerable default risk in the run up to the subprime credit crisis lately.   
 
Besides cost savings, financial innovations and technological advances have also 
contributed to creating new sources of income for banks, however this technologically-
oriented banking business model has been coupled with new risks such as: the risk of 
identity theft, internet fraud, money laundering etc. It is worth noting here that this shift 
towards more technology-based banking does not eliminate or reduce typical banking 
risks such as credit or liquidity risks, however it can change the way these risks are 
analysed and assessed (Bank Systems and Technology, 2008). 
 
Some banks have chosen to exploit advances in IT and established the so-called 
‘internet-only’ or ‘virtual’ banks (Mishkin, 2004 and Bank Systems and Technology, 
2008). It is a bank with no physical existence, but rather a completely internet-based 
entity. Egg plc – the UK based virtual bank owned by an insurance company, 
Prudential – is one example (which in turn is part of the panel data used in this 
research). Obviously, the cost base, mainly overheads, is much lower for these banks 
than those of a conventional high-street bank which may give virtual financial 
institutions a cost efficiency advantage. Risk-wise, standard banking risks still exist for 
virtual banks; therefore, it still is essential to account for these risks when analysing 
the performance of these banks. 
 
Looking ahead, Mishkin (2004) argues that in the future, neither the “click” nor “brick” 
banking business model will dominate the other entirely as large section of customers 
would still prefer the convenience of face-to-face contacts, let alone their security 
concerns over obtaining totally internet-based financial products and services. The 
‘brick’ banking has not completely ignored going virtual, but on the contrary, 





business, hence offering customers the convenience of using the internet, yet 
maintaining their branching presence simultaneously.   
 
Advances in technology and financial innovations can increase banks’ operational 
efficiency in providing products and services but albeit with risks remaining present 
(MacDonald and Koch, 2006). Trading in CDs market is one example. UBS, for 
instance, seems to have rushed into structured credit instruments trading in the aim of 
swiftly amplifying profits, but it overlooked rigorous risk management to support the 
large positions UBS has taken in these markets. This is a typical banking problem as, 
in good times, thorough risk management practices tend to be overlooked and it is 
only when problems start emerging banks seem to realize the full scale of these 
problems (The FT, Nov 2007). 
 
Some analysts have concluded –given the substantial losses and write-downs many 
European banks have suffered due to the Subprime crisis– that banks need to “go 
back to basics” and focus more on what they do best, that is, facilitating the payment 
system and mediating funds between lenders and borrowers, as this shift towards 
taking excessive risks and being heavily involved in trading seems to becoming 
problematic (The FT, Nov. 2007). However, banks would still need to take risks to 
create opportunities and stimulate economic activities. Yet the associated risk should 
be comprehensively approached and adequately managed in the sense of setting 
clear risk limits in accordance with the bank’s capital make-up.   
 
All the same, it seems that the motivation for banks for investing in IT developments 
and financial innovations is to enhance their operational efficiency (via cutting costs 
and boosting profits) has not eliminated typical banking risks, but it has changed the 
way in which these risks are assessed and managed. This consequently necessitates 
taking banking risks (credit, liquidity, trading, and insolvency) into account upon 
analysing banks performance. Part of the impact of financial innovation is accounted 
for by including Off-balance Sheet items (OBS) as a third output in the analysis given 
the importance of these items to the bank’s income and their impact on the structure 
of the bank’s balance sheet. Technological advances are also assessed by using a 









Banks have been innovative in responding to the increasing cost of running higher 
loan-to-deposit ratios in two ways: first, by broadening their fee-based services, and 
second, by taking these capital-intensive assets off their balance sheets giving 
securitization a world-wide scale (MacDonald and Koch, 2006). Securitization 
generically involves bundling a group of homogenous assets and float securities 
(bonds) on the back of these assets (The Economist, Mar 6th, 2008). In essence, any 
cash flow-generating asset can be securitized.   
 
Such advances have allowed some European banks – such as Deutsche Bank for 
instance – to become a financial-liquidity factory through which loans are transformed 
into marketable securities with considerable profits being made in the process. This 
has had substantial implications on banks’ lending portfolios in terms of greater risk 
diversification and liquidity. Spreading credit risk globally via securitization takes debt 
owned by the bank off its balance sheet and therefore releases more funds to be used 
in other investments, yet, the total risk exposure – although largely spread out – 
remains systematically present. 
 
In this sense, ignoring the bank’s involvement in securitization in analysing bank 
performance can be undermining. Therefore, this research accounts for off-balance 
sheet items (OBS) as a third output in both and efficiency analyses, and also uses the 
ratio of OBS / Total Assets as a determinant variable explaining profit and cost 
inefficiencies of European banks in an attempt to gauge the impact of the degree of 
involvement in OBS activities on technical efficiency. 
 
4.2.4 Interest Rate Volatility 
 
The considerable increase in interest rate volatility has been a significant force driving 
change in demand for banking products in the last few decades. This has put pressure 
on interest margins which are banks’ traditional source of income. To give an idea on 





from the US, Europe, and the UK. In the US, the Fed funds’ rate dropped from 5.5% 
in the 3rd quarter of 2007 down to 3% by early 2008. This was followed by 17 
consecutive increases of a 0.25 percentage points from 1% by the end of 2004 up to 
5.5% in 2006 and 2007 only to drop again to 3% in January of 2008 after two 
consecutive cuts within the last two weeks of January 2008 (The Federal Reserve 
Bank, 2008). The Fed rates experienced a series of cuts in 2008 as a result of the 
financial crisis reaching a record low of 0.25% in Dec 2008 (The FT, Dec 16th, 2008).  
In the EU, interest rates tend to be less volatile. The Main Refinancing Operations rate 
MRO was 3% in early 1999, peaked at 4.25% in June of 2000 and kept falling to reach 
a trough of 2% in June 2003, only to start to rise again to 4% in 2007 (European 
Central Bank, 2008). Rates have also recently been cut down to 2% in early 2009 (The 
FT, Feb 5th, 2009).   
 
As for the UK, the Bank of England’s rate starting at 5% in Jan 2007 and rising up to 
5.75% until the end of 2007, then rates came back to the 5% level for the most of 2008 
but then experienced consequent falls down to a 315-years record low of 1% in Feb 
2009 (The FT, Feb 5th, 2009). 
 
It is well established that the trend of interest rates volatility has been less dramatic for 
banks operating in the Euro-zone (ECB, 2004a), but the fact that large banks are no 
longer limited to domestic or EU markets remains as banks now have their assets’ 
portfolio spread globally. This makes them prone to be affected by other major 
economies’ interest rates volatility, as that of the US. Under this increased exposure 
to interest rate risk (volatility), banks have responded by innovating financial products 
that would mitigate, spread, and transfer their exposures to interest rate risk. 
Prominent example of this include the adjustable-rate mortgages and financial 
derivatives introduced in the 1970s which in turn have been under substantial re-
engineering ever since – driven by the market’s demand and varying conditions. 
Therefore, accounting for OBS activities – which derivatives trading constitute a 
significant portion of – seems imperative upon analysing banks performance as this 
accommodates, to a significant extent, the evolving structure of the banking business. 
As indicated earlier, this research accounts for OBS items as a third output, and for 





inefficiencies, and it also accounts for the proportion of net-interest income to total 
income to assess the impact of income structure on European banks operational 
efficiency. 
 
4.2.5 Financial Regulation: The Evolution of Basel II 
 
Notwithstanding the merits of Basel I in attempting to set international standards for 
minimum capital requirements aiming to make banks safer financial institutions, Basel 
I largely focuses on addressing credit risk thus overlooking other major and 
quantifiable banking risks as in market, liquidity, and insolvency (BIS, 2003, and Rose 
and Hudgins, 2008). Basel I does not consider the issue of securitization which has 
increasingly been a major vehicle for banks to transfer risk and a source of fee income.  
Another loophole of Basel I is that it applies an exogenous “one-size-fits-all” risk 
weights that have long been criticized for their inflexibility in reflecting banks’ exposure 
to credit risk.    
 
In the 1990s, regulators became aware of the significant impact that market risk 
exposure could have on the banks’ earnings and net worth (capital). This resulted in 
a modification of the original Basel I of 1988 in 1996 by allowing banks to apply more 
internally-oriented market risk measures, namely the value at risk or VaR, and allocate 
capital against the calculated VaRs accordingly.   
 
It is argued that the inflexibility of Basel I’s rules has encouraged banks taking 
advantage of its loopholes and allowed them to run riskier portfolios, which has been 
counterproductive to the original objective of Basel I (BIS, 2003 and Rose and Hudgins 
2008).  Securitization is one global financial development that Basel I fail to adequacy 
assign capital for due to the rather simplistic asset classification it applies in which, for 
instance, corporate loans and credit card loans were grouped in the same risk-
weighted category. As such, banks can shift their portfolios in this particular class to 
constitute riskier and potentially higher-yielding assets yet incurring the same level of 
capital charge for that particular category. 
 





risk quantification approaches to credit as well as market risks. In fact, Basel II 
overcomes the one size fits all risk weighting methodology of Basel I, and more closely 
aligns banks’ risk profile to capital requirements. That is why some banks found that 
in many cases less capital can be set aside to meet the New Accord’s requirements 
(The Economist, May 2007). In 2004, the Basel Committee of the Bank of International 
Settlements BIS agreed on the modified version of the original Accord, Basel II, to be 
applied to the largest banks internationally (BIS, 2008). Basel II is due to take effect 
by 2009 so that to ensure a gradual adjustment of risk management procedures to 
accommodate Basel II’s regulatory requirements.   
 
Basel II constitutes three pillars: Pillar 1 is concerned with the Minimum Capital 
Requirements that are based upon supervised in-house estimation models for 
market, credit and operational risk exposures. Pillar 2 involves the Supervisory 
Review of the banks’ risk assessment producers and capital adequacy to ensure their 
adequacy and reasonableness. Pillar 3 advocates Greater Public Exposure of 
banks’ financial situations in the aim of promoting better market discipline that acts as 
an exogenous disciplinary factor for risky banks; so as to demonstrate that adequate 
risk management practices are in place or otherwise to lower their excessive exposure 
accordingly. 
 
Initially, Basel II will be limited to large banks (over $1bn in total assets), and ultimately 
all banks applying Basel I will be implementing Basel II. Rose and Hudgins (2008) 
explain that big banks would be at an advantage in employing their sophisticated risk-
quantification models to meet Basel II’s requirements which are considerably more 
risk sensitive, which could yield fewer capital requirements than those under Basel I. 
This is brought about by the fact that Basel II is structured to ensure consistency and 
capital-sensitivity to different levels of risk, in the sense that low-risk assets would be 
associated with less required capital compared to that of risky assets. This in effect 
would place banks applying Basel I at a disadvantage due to possibly running higher 
capital ratios. However, reaching a conclusive view on whether Basel II would have 
such impact on different bank sizes requires a dedicated empirical research, an area 






Research-wise, notwithstanding the drawbacks of Basel I in adopting the “one size fits 
all” approach to minimum capital requirements which may have encouraged banks to 
hold riskier portfolios, attempting to account for the impact of capital requirements on 
bank efficiency, i.e. the inclusion of Credit Risk Appetite measure, is necessary, as to 
the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no pervious study has attempted to gauge the 
impact to of Basel I’s credit risk weighting on European banking profit and costs 
efficiencies. It is also worth noting that, from a research perspective, testing the impact 
of regulatory capital assigned to credit risk can only be approached on the basis of 
Basel I. This is simply because Basel II has not been fully applied yet, besides the fact 
that it relies on in-house measures for credit risk, thus it is rather difficult to obtain data 
on such models for the purpose of this research. 
 
The following section focuses on the major banking risks including: credit, trading, 
liquidity, and insolvency risks and discusses each risk from a practical and research 
perspectives. The section concludes by reflecting on how these risks are going to be 
accounted for in the empirical analysis, and also by highlighting the contribution of this 
research to both efficiency and literatures from a risk perspective. 
 
4.3 Major Banking Risks 
 
In this section, the four main risks related to the banking and trading books – liquidity, 
credit, trading, and insolvency risks – are defined and explored from an industry and 
regulatory perspectives. These risks are then explored in Section 9 from a research 
perspective in the sense of how they are accounted for to modify the cost and profit 
models used in efficiency and analyses.   
 
4.3.1 Liquidity Risk 
 
4.3.1.1 Liquidity Risk: Definition 
 
Liquidity risk is associated with the bank’s funding needs and the management of its 
balance sheet’s cash flow position. Liquidity exposure arises when the bank falls short 
of necessary liquidity to fund its due liabilities and its day to day operations. This 
exposure increases when such funds cannot be acquired at the expected terms and 





holding insufficient liquid assets to fully and timely meet liability commitments when 
they fall due, mainly those with short-term maturities, forcing the bank to acquire funds 
more expensively. In principal, banks manage their liquidity positions with the aim of 
maximizing access to liquidity and minimizing funding costs (Rose and Hudgins, 
2008). 
 
4.3.1.2 Liquidity Risk: An Industry Perspective 
 
Banks very rarely run out of cash to meet immediate liabilities such as deposits 
withdrawals because they hold a variety of liquid assets on their balance sheets, e.g. 
government bonds that have deep markets. This is in addition to their ability to access 
money and inter-bank markets – in normal conditions. In practice, banks manage their 
liquidity positions in the aim of fulfilling all current or short-term deposit withdrawals 
and other immediate on- and off- balance sheet funding commitments when they 
mature at the appropriate cost. This also necessitates that access to capital and 
money markets should be available and should also be cost effective.   
 
Moreover, central banks and financial regulators aim for the wider financial stability 
and therefore tend to disallow the spread of a systematic bank run at all costs. Thus, 
in times of crises, the first immediate risk that worries bankers is liquidity and how to 
manage it in a timely and low-cost manner.   
 
In any case, both occasional and persistent liquidity shortages have undeniably 
significant adverse impact on the cost of funding for the bank, let alone the negative 
effect this can have on the bank’s credit rating which directly affects its money markets 
accessibility. Sound liquidity management process involves maintaining a diversified, 
stable, and growing core deposit base that is made up of retail and corporate customer 
deposits. Such basic liquidity tier should also be supported by a second funding tier in 
terms of ensuring access to wholesale money markets, plus a portfolio of liquid assets 
which is better being diversified in currency and maturity (Bank of England, 2005). 
 
Most crucially, banks can make provisions for potential liquidity shortages by 
adequately – but not extensively – investing in liquid assets with deep markets and 





in the sense that turning them into cash can be conducted in a timely and cost-efficient 
fashion. Liquid assets involve: cash in vaults, cash due from deposits held at domestic 
banks and Eurodollar deposits, T-bills, government bonds (such as UK Gilts and US 
Fed funds), Certificates of Deposits CDs, and Commercial Papers CPs. 
 
These lines of defence against liquidity shortages were not in place for Northern Rock, 
a major UK mortgage lending bank. Northern Rock had a vulnerable funding model: it 
relied heavily on wholesale markets to raise funds with a rather small core deposit 
base. When credit dry-up loomed in August 2007, the Rock failed to raise funds even 
from those banks that used to lend it, and also failed to securitize its loans since 
confidence in markets was evaporating due to considerable global uncertainty. 
Eventually the Rock’s funding problems were quickly translated into a liquidity crisis 
that was deepened by the subsequent bank-run on the bank (The Economist, March 
3rd 2008). 
 
To avoid such scenarios, managing liquidity risk can follow different practices, 
including (HSBC plc, 2006): (1) cash flow projections in major currencies which should 
be related to the level of liquid assets needed to meet the net positions over a given 
period, (2) daily assessment of liquidity ratios for the bank’s balance sheet against the 
bank’s internal limits and regulatory requirements, (3) ensuring the diversity, 
accessibility, and cost effectiveness of the back-up funding facilities, (4) monitoring 
the fluctuations of core deposits base and the concentration of which so as to avoid 
excessive dependence on large depositors, and ensuring a weak correlation between 
the different funding sources, (5) stress-testing liquidity positions and establish funding 
contingency plans accordingly, and finally and probably most importantly (6) holding 
adequate and proportionate amount of liquid assets as sub-optimal levels of liquidity 
is cost-ineffective, and excessive liquidity tie-up also causes profit deficiency as it 
reduces revenues. 
 
On the measurement of liquidity risk, every bank may approach liquidity risk differently, 
however the following examples simply provide an idea on how banks do this in 
practice in order to show that the liquidity measure this research applies stems from 





different approaches to this end: The Basic Surplus measure assesses the bank’s 
ability to sustain a 90-days stress event within which no fresh funding can be obtained 
to fulfil obligations as they fall due (JP Morgan Chase & Co., 2006).  Royal Bank of 
Scotland applies, for example, the ratio of Net Surplus of marketable assets to 
Wholesale Liabilities due within one month37 (RBS Group, 2006). Other ratios 
include: Cash and government securities / total assets, Purchased funds / Total assets 
(Rose and Hudgins, 2006, p 215). HSBC plc (2006) gauges its liquidity risk by using 
the ratio of Liquid assets / Customer funding which is very similar to the measure 
of liquidity risk applied in this research, that is: Customer and Short-Term Funding 
/ Liquid Assets. As it can be seen, the liquidity risk measure used in this research is 
similar to that of HSBC’s and perhaps more comprehensive as it considers both types 
of short-term liabilities, customer deposits and money market funding, as sources of 
liquidity risk. 
 
4.3.2 Credit Risk 
 
4.3.2.1 Credit Risk: Definition 
 
Credit risk measures the exposure to losses arising from the failure of borrowers (retail 
and corporate) to meet their debt obligations as they fall due. In other terms, credit risk 
arises as financial claims associated with the bank’s assets may not be paid in full 
(Saunders and Cornett, 2003). Because banks borrow short and lend long, i.e. hold 
little proportion of their capital as liquid assets while transforming the majority of their 
liabilities’ maturities into long-term assets, it only takes a considerable proportion of 
the bank’s loans portfolio to default to “push the bank to the brink of failure” as Rose 
and Hudgins (2008, p 177) put it. Such negative impact of loan defaults is amplified 
should the loan portfolio be less diversified and more concentrated in a given sector 
or region. 
 
Therefore, credit risk is one significant risk to take account of upon analysing bank 
performance. So much so that, in fact, high growth rate driven by rapid expansion in 
                                               
37 Net Marketable Assets are: Debt securities + Treasure and other eligible assets + Reverse Repo agreements 
with banks and customers – [Repos with banks and customers + Short positions “securities to be sold” + Insurance 
companies’ debt securities held + Debt securities charged as security for liabilities]. Net Wholesale liabilities due 
within 1 month include: Deposits by banks (excluding Repos) + Debt securities in issue – loans and advances to 





loans portfolio is normally indicative of potentially forthcoming financial difficulties for 
the bank, this is because rapid growth is normally associated with taking on lower-
quality loans, a trend that has been largely motivated by the spread and ease of debt 
securitization. The massive losses that the Swiss bank UBS had accumulated in early 
2008 as a direct result of excessive exposure to the US Subprime mortgage-linked 
securities, and the rapid growth of Northern Rock from having around 3% up to a third 
of the entire UK mortgage market in the last 8 or so years only are prime examples of 
how serious that mismanaged credit risk exposures could be (The FT, Jan 31st 2008). 
Thus, accounting for lending-related credit risk in the analyses of bank performance is 
vital to reaching more reliable estimates. The following section exposes this research’s 
contribution to the literature in accounting for credit risk from an ex ante perspective. 
 
4.3.2.2 Credit Risk Appetite CRA 
 
Part of this research contribution stems from the incorporation of a credit risk appetite 
measure (CRA) into efficiency analysis. The idea of CRA is drawn from the Bank of 
England’s segmentation of the traditional Return on Equity measure (RoE). This 
segmentation of RoE is guided by the different sources of banks profitability as well 
as financial strength.   
 
The decomposed version of RoE yields the following relationship (Bank of England, 
2003, p 74): 
 
RoE = (Pre-tax Profit38/ Operating Income) x (Operating Income / RWA) x                    
(RWA / Assets) x (Assets / Equity)  
(39) 
 
These four components denote the following measures respectively: Pre-tax Profit 
Margin, Risk-Adjusted Asset turnover, Asset-Risk Ratio, and Financial Leverage. This 
break down assists in identifying which elements of the RoE ratio contribute to 
profitability or financial stability. According to the Bank of England’s Financial Stability 
Review (2003, p 74), the following table demonstrates the main components of a 
typical Return on Equity RoE ratio: 
                                               






Ratio What it measures? 
Effect of rise on 
Financial Stability 
Pre-tax Profit Margin Impact of costs and bad-debts positive 
Risk-Adjusted Asset 
turnover 
Efficiency on a risk adjusted 
basis 
positive 
Asset-Risk ratio Credit risk appetite Negative39 
Financial Leverage40 Gearing Negative 
 
 
It is evident that RoE can be misleading if it is not decomposed to its main components. 
For instance, taking the effect of Leverage ratio as an example, RoE will be higher for 
banks that are highly geared as opposed to their less leveraged peers, suggesting that 
banks’ profitability can improve as the level of its debt increases relative to its total 
assets or for holding lower equity base. From a financial stability perspective, gearing 
up can have a direct and positive impact on bank profits up to a certain level, as 
excessive levels of gearing can threaten the bank’s financial stability which in turn can 
have wider systematic implications. Recent leverage figures in terms of percentage of 
debt to equity for big UK banks for instance is an evidence of this: “Here are two 
frightening statistics: over the past five years, the balance sheets of many of the 
world’s largest banks more than doubled; and, according to the Bank, the median ratio 
of debt to equity in big UK banks is more than 30 to one” which effectively suggests 
about 3.3% equity coverage for the debt held on their balance sheets only (The FT, 
Jan 23rd, 2009). In fact, one of the main reasons of the current financial crisis is that 
banks seem to be undercapitalized given their excessive levels of gearing (The 
Economist Jan 22nd, 2009). The RoE measure in its entirety, however, cannot provide 
this perspective on financial stability in relation to gearing.  Likewise, an increase in 
RoE can be driven by a higher Asset-Risk or Credit Risk Appetite ratio which is the 
result of more credit risk been taken. Although higher RoE in this case suggests higher 
profitability, it can also suggest a weakening financial strength given the increasing 
                                               
39 i.e. higher asset-risk ratio indicates more credit risk taken by the bank. 
40 This can also be referred to as Equity Multiplier (Assets / Equity) which is the inverse of the Capital Ratio 
(Equity / Assets). More accurately, gearing is calculated as the ratio of debt, net of liquid assets, to the market 





exposure to credit risk. Therefore, the suggested decomposition of the RoE ratio is 
important. 
 
4.3.3 Credit Risk: A Regulatory Perspective 
 
4.3.3.1 The Concept of Risk Weighted Assets RWA 
 
The concept of Risk Weighted Assets RWA was introduced by the Bank of 
International Settlements BIS as part of Basel I Accord in 1988 to be applied as an 
international regulatory framework. The aim was to establish a levelled international 
platform for banks to operate according to and to provide greater safety to financial 
systems. Basel I proposes a minimum capital ratio that banks should hold of 8% 41(with 
a Core Capital ratio to be 4% at least)42.   
 
Briefly speaking, the value of RWA is constructed by classifying the bank’s on- and 
off-balance sheet items into risk categories. Certain credit conversion criteria are 
applied to off-balance sheets items so as to obtain the credit equivalent of which, 
hence rearranging them as on-balance sheet elements. Then the appropriate risk 
weight is applied to each category with the aggregate of the resulting risk weights 
becoming the bank’s RWA (Bank of England, 2002). Basel I of 1988 is the first accord 
to set international standards for bank capital requirements related to credit risk 
exposures. Such capital adequacy framework aims at encouraging banks to align 
credit risk exposures more closely with capital levels.   
 
Basle I suggest two main Tiers which constitute the banks’ regulatory capital 
requirements, these are (Frost, 2007 and Rose and Hudgins, 2008): 
 
Tier 1 or Core Capital which mainly includes: Equity and equity reserves and any 
other source of long-term finance that can be characterized as equity finance43. 
                                               
41 The Standard Ratio should be at 8% = [(Core Capital + Supplementary Capital) / Risk Weighted Assets] or 
equally [(Tier 1 + Tier 2 Capital) / Risk Weighted Assets], with Tier 1 Capital standing for: Equity + Reserves 
(cumulated profits), and Tier 2 Capital comprising of: General Provisions, Medium- and Long-Term Subordinated 
debt (Basel Capital Accord, July 1988). 
42 That is; Core Capital Ratio = (Tier1) / RWA. 
43 This also encompasses: undistributed returned earnings, non-cumulative perpetual preferred stocks, and hybrid 
equity – which are dept finance usually perpetual instruments that are contractually convertible to equities in the 






Tier 2 Capital is divided into upper and lower levels. (A) Upper Tier 2 Capital includes: 
(1) Hybrid debt – e.g. accumulative preference shares and convertible bonds, (2) 
Revaluation reserves – comprising of investment and property revaluations44, and (3) 
General provisions – these are allowed towards Tier 2 Capital up to 1.25% of the Risk 
Weighted Assets’ volume. (B) Lower Tier 2 Capital comprises mainly of subordinated 
debt45. 
 
Banks are required to hold a minimum of 4% of core capital ratio, that is, Tier 1 Capital 
/ RWA, and are required to keep 8% of the ratio of (Tier 1 + Tier 2) / RWA, with the 
amount of Tier 2 Capital being limited up to 100% of Tier 1. 
 
To decide on the level of their regulatory capital, bank’s assets need to be classified 
into “categories” or “buckets” and weighted with specific risk factors that eventually 
yield category-specific risk weighted assets. The latter are then summed to provide 
the total of the bank’s risk weighted assets. Basel I Accord accommodates for off-
balance sheet items (OBS) by returning OBS items to their on-balance sheet 
equivalents via applying certain conversion factors.   
 
For on-balance sheet assets, risk weights are assigned as follows: 
 
• Cash, reserve deposits, and government bonds bear 0%. 
• Deposits with banks of the OECD (Organization of Developed Industrial 
Economies) bear 20% risk weight. 
• Housing loans are associated with 50% risk factor. 
• Loans (customer and corporate) and all other assets bear 100%. 
 
As for OBS items, these are mainly characterized as contingent claims that can 
                                               
ownership of the equity bundle. These are normally shown in the consolidated accounts). Basle, I mandate that 
Goodwill is to be subtracted (which is a quantified business reputation regarded as assets when acquired by the 
bank).   
44 These reserves may have the impact of a double-edge sword. Banks benefit from revaluations in good economic 
conditions, that is; when stock markets are bullish for instance, yet bearish markets and declining property prices 
put pressures on banks to allocate additional resources to meet the minimum requirements. Regulators only allow 
for 45% of these reserves to qualify for Tier 2 Capital. 
45 Not all subordinated debt accounts towards Lower Tier 2 level if its maturity falls below 5 years. 20% discount 
rate applies for each year of maturity that is below the 5 years threshold. Hence, 80% of subordinated debt accounts 





materialize as real asset or liability. As such, they are converted into their equivalent 
of on-balance sheet items according to certain conversion criteria where conversion 
factors range from 0% to 100%. For instance, the conversion factor 0% is assigned 
for Standby Letters of Credit of less than 1 year in maturity that are cancellable at the 
bank’s desire before funds can actually be drawn against the credit facility. Moreover, 
Long-term Credit Commitments made to private corporations have 50% credit-
conversion factor; whereas 100% conversion factor applies to forward purchases, 
Reversed REPO46 arrangements, and standard Standby Letters of Credit ‘SLC’ facility 
backing corporate borrowings (Frost, 2007 and Rose and Hudgins 2008). Once OBS 
items are converted into their credit equivalents, bank assets are then categorized into 
different credit risk-weighted classes as shown in the table below. The table below 
lists some of the main items found on the bank’s balance sheet which is by no means 
an exhaustive list (Rose and Hudgins, 2008, p 486):   
 
 
0% Risk-weighted Category 
• Cash 
• Government bonds (e.g. US T-bills, UK Gilts) 
 
20% Risk-weighted Category 
• Cash items in process of collection 
• Deposits at domestic banks 
• ABS ‘asset-backed securities’ 
• Credit equivalent of SLCs 
 
50% Risk-weighted Category 
• Secured mortgages 
 
100% Risk-weighted Category 
• Consumer and commercial loans  
• Credit-equivalent of long-term credit commitments  
 
                                               





Recent developments have been concentrated on aligning Basel I more closely to 
credit risk exposures of derivatives trading including futures, options, interest rates 
caps, floors and swaps, currency swaps and positions in commodities. The exposure 
associated with these contracts mainly stems from the so-called counterparty risk, that 
is, the possibility of a bank’s customer failing to pay or fulfil the contractual obligations 
when it matures – leaving the bank exposed to finding a replacement contract, mostly 
at higher costs (Rose and Hudgins, 2008). This is the case for OTC ‘over the counter’ 
or tailored derivative contracts. However, counterparty risk diminishes if derivatives 
are traded through an Exchange market such as the London International Financial 
Futures Exchange LIFFE, since the latter guaranties the fulfilment of derivative 
contracts should a customer ffailto do so, which entails that banks would not normally 
be required to set capital against such standardized trading arrangement.   
 
Basel I converts OTC contracts to their credit-equivalent amounts and treats them 
consequently as on-balance sheet items, which are then multiplied by the appropriate 
risk weight that will eventually constitute part of the entire balance sheet’s RWA. For 
instance, interest rate derivatives with maturity of 1 year and less have ‘0’ credit-
conversion weight, while a 0.5% factor applies to those contracts with more than 1 
year of maturity. On the other hand, Basel I associate higher credit-equivalent 
weighting to currency-based contracts. For example, currency-related derivatives with 
1 year or less and those with more than 1 year to maturity bear a credit-conversion 
weight of 1% and 5% respectively.  All the same, this research accounts for credit 
equivalent of OBS items as a third output in both efficiency and analyses. 
 
4.3.3.2 The Standardized Approach SA 
 
Basel II offers a regulatory perspective to credit risk measurement via the 
Standardized Approach (SA). The aim of discussing the SA is to shed further light on 
the way credit risk will be approached under Basel II. This approach attempts to 
overcome the “one-size-fits-all” criteria of Basel I and is more risk-sensitive in the 
sense that it more closely aligns risk weights with asset classes. The SA specifies five 
credit grades corresponding to the level of each asset class’s exposure. Credit grades 
are further defined according to Standard & Poor’s S&P ratings which specifies a 





BBB-, BB+ to B-, and below B-. For instance, residential mortgages have 35% risk 
weight, and corporate loans with credit grades 1 and 2 receive 20% and 50% risk 
weights respectively47. 
 
As for securitization, Basel II bridges the regulatory gap of Basel I by allocating capital 
against this activity. Securities created are split into two trenches (Frost, 2007): (1) 
Credit-enhanced securities, the value of which is deducted from the regulatory capital 
requirements (½ from Tier 1 and ½ from Tier 2), and (2) Non-credit enhanced 
securities issues held by the bank as an originator or an investor are assigned risk-
weights on the basis of external ratings. With regard to Off-balance Sheet items OBS, 
they are converted into their risk-weighted asset equivalents according to their 
maturity and recoverability using the following conversion factors (Frost, 2007, p 507 
– 508): unconditional commitments that are cancellable at any time and those up to 1 
year and over 1-year maturities are assigned 0%, 20% and 50% factors respectively. 
Short-term letters of credits have 20%. Securities pledged as collateral and those lent 
by the bank have 100% risk weight. Obviously, the application of SA from a research 
perspective is rather difficult given that it requires detailed knowledge of the asset 
types and credit ratings attached and so forth. 
 
4.3.3.3 Credit risk: A Practical Perspective 
 
The management of credit risk involves managing the exposure both before (ex ante) 
and after (ex post) taking the lending decision. This entails examining borrowers’ credit 
profile or credit worthiness before granting loans in order to minimize the adverse 
selection effect, and to invest in monitoring loans over the life of the credit facility so 
as to minimize the moral hazard effect. This research takes both perspectives to credit 
risk and applies an ex ante as well as an ex post measures of credit risk by employing 
the Credit Risk Appetite and Loan Loss Provisions ratio respectively. 
 
There are few concepts to define before discussing the measurement of lending-
                                               
47 Moreover, assets with grades 3 and 4 are assigned 100%, whereas grade 5 assets have 15%, and all unrated 
corporate loans have 100% risk weight. For unsecured past-due loans, if with NPL cover < 20%, have 150% weight 
assigned for all grades, yet if the NPL cover is between 20% - 50% then a 100% risk weight is applied, and for NPL 
cover > 50%, the risk weight ranges from 50% -100%. NPL cover is the Non-Performing Loans cover = specific 






related credit risk. Loan loss provisions LLP or the so-called “allowance for bad debt 
losses” are reserves set aside to hedge against potential loan losses. The allocation 
of LLPs is a subjective decision that can be used to smooth earnings (Frost, 2004). 
Non-performing loans comprise of loans that are past due for 90-days or more. 
Charge-offs are loans that are acknowledged as worthless hence written off the 
bank’s lending book. Any possible income from these technically written-off loans 
could be generated reduces the level of charge-offs yielding Net Charge-offs (Rose 
and Hudgins, 2008).   
 
It is worth noting that LLP differs from the loan loss reserves in that the former 
represents a given year’s expected credit losses, whereas the latter is the aggregate 
of current and past LLPs. It is also worth noting that the LLP stands for an ex post 
assessment of loans credit risk since LLPs are allocated after lending decisions have 
been made (Frost, 2004, p 78). Therefore, this research applies the LLP ratio that is 
largely applied by commercial banks which is calculated as LLP / Total Loans to 
provide an ex post perspective to the bank’s on-balance sheet lending-related credit 
risk (HSBC plc, 2006). The ex post nature of provisions for loan losses stems from the 
methodology according to which provisions are allocated. It assumes that impairment 
losses have occurred but yet not realized as an actual expense at the balance sheet’s 
date. Therefore, provisions are calculated to reflect the value of non-performing or 
potentially-problematic loans including those that have past-due for 90-days, however, 
there remains the possibility that all or part of these impaired loans could be repaid in 
the future, and thus actual losses on these loans are individually identified at some 
point in the future (HSBC plc, 2006).   
 
4.3.4 Market Risk 
 
4.2.4.1 Market Risk: Definition 
 
Market risk is “the exposure to an adverse change in the market value of portfolios 
and financial instruments caused by a change in market prices or rates” (JPMorgan 
Chase and Co., 2006, p 77). This suggests that market risk comprises of two types of 
risks related to trading and banking (or non-trading) books.  The next sections address 





and Cornett (2003), Allen et al (2004), JP Morgan Chase & Co (2006), and RBS Group 
(2006). Greater emphasis will be put on the market trading risk as it will be 
incorporated in the empirical analysis. 
 
4.2.4.2 Non-trading Risk 
 
Non-trading risks are associated with the banking book which embodies the 
commercial banking business line. The main sources of market non-trading risk are 
interest rate risk, equity risk, currency risk and basis risk. Interest rate risk arises 
fundamentally from asset re-pricing and maturity mismatches between interest-
sensitive assets (ISA) and interest-sensitive liabilities (ISL) over a given period of time. 
This applies to on- and off-balance sheet items.   
 
There are two main sources for maturity mismatches: (1) specific changes in interest 
rates that are related to a specific asset or liability, and (2) systematic changes as 
represented by in the yield curve (or the so-called yield-effect) which embodies 
changes in the outlook of the relationship between long- and short- term interest rates 
(the yield-effect is particularly important for banks as they borrow short and lend long).   
 
Moreover, non-trading equity risk is associated with equity investments the bank holds 
in other institutions that mainly include, for example, a venture capital portfolio and 
other direct equity investments held in other institutions. Other financial instruments 
constituting the non-trading investment portfolios include debt securities, equity 
shares, deposits, certificate of deposits or CDs …etc (RBS Group, 2006).   
 
As for the non-trading currency risk, such exposure stems from any foreign exchange 
(FX) holdings, debt, or foreign investments the bank has. This is related to the so-
called Basis risk, which is the risk associated with narrowing spreads between lending 
and borrowing rates (Saunders and Cornett, 2003). In FX for instance, basis risk arises 
from the difference between forward and actual spot rates on maturity. For government 
bonds for instance, basis risk represents the difference between cash (immediate-
delivery) and future (postponed-delivery) market prices, such as the basis risk 
associated with a 10-years maturity UK Gilt that is worth today £95 for £100 face value 





8% [= (£95 - £87)/100]. This margin would narrow, i.e. basis risk will increase, if 
interest rates were to increase, therefore future prices will discount more heavily down 
to, say, £80. Consequently, this amplifies the basis risk from 8% up to 10%. With 
regard to the banking book, basis risk arises when, say, mortgage rates and rates paid 
on deposits move disproportionately hence exposing the bank’s interest rate spread 
to the potential of downside basis risk, i.e. narrowing spreads.   
 
In the context of this research, non-trading market risks were not integrated into 
empirical models because their measurement requires access to in-house data, 
whereas this research has access to publicly available data only. For instance, for 
non-trading interest rate risk the most common measures of which are GAP analysis 
and Duration analysis techniques. Both models require some detailed in-house data 
on ISAs and ISLs, besides the need for clear assumptions about how these interest-
sensitive items should be classified according to different maturity buckets.   
 
With respect to currency risk exposures related to foreign investments, again, it is a 
challenging task to quantify such risk as banks’ treasuries usually use self-hedging 
techniques such as international netting and the management their net currency 
exposure positions by matching cash inflows and outflows of similar maturities. 
Therefore, most of the non-trading market risks are self-hedged anyway. Another 
obstacle is data accessibility. So, for instance, detailed in-house data on the 
management of non-trading currency risk is a major difficulty. Finally, for non-trading 
basis and equity risks, it is also difficult to quantify both risks given the detailed data 
required on ISA and ISL to gauge the overall magnitude of the basis risk. Likewise, 
detailed information on the net position exposure for each of the banks’ foreign equity 
investment portfolios requires access to internal data.   
 
For all the above-mentioned reasons, the non-trading part of market risk was excluded 
from the risk-modification process of the banking efficiency and models. The focus 
therefore is on trading risk which is the subject of the next section. 
 






Trading risk arises from the potential that adverse market conditions (rates and prices) 
can negatively affect the level of net trading income (Deutsche Bank, 2006). There are 
three main sources constituting the trading-book market risk, including: interest rates 
trading instruments, credit spreads48, and foreign exchange.   
 
Trading essentially involves taking short (to sell) and long (to buy) positions in equity, 
debt securities, foreign exchange, commodities, and derivative (futures, forwards, 
options and swaps) markets. The aim of taking trading positions and assuming trading 
risks is to profit from spreads between bid (buying) and offer (selling) prices of the 
underlying asset. Also, banks can make trading profits from undertaking ‘arbitrage’ – 
that is, taking on offsetting positions in various yet related markets so as to make 
profits by exploiting markets’ imperfections (RBS Group, 2006). The following section 
provides an idea on how trading risk is measured in practice. 
 
4.2.4.4 Trading Risk Measurement: A Practical Perspective 
 
Banks apply various statistical and non-statistical (accounting-based) approaches in 
quantifying trading-related market risks. Statistically-oriented measures mainly 
involve: Stress testing (scenario analysis) and Value at Risk (VaR). The following 
sections will elaborate on these two techniques and then focuses on how trading risk 
is accounted for by this research. 
 
4.2.4.4.1 Stress Testing Model 
 
Stress testing is concerned with examining the ‘what if’ events and their potential 
impact on trading risk using both historical and hypothetical scenarios to this end 
(Société Générale Group, 2007). Under the historical stress testing, past financial and 
stock market crisis are analysed over a given period of time –say starting from the 
Black Monday event of October 17th 1987 up until the ERM crisis in 1992 or through 
to the Latin American crisis of 1995 and the 1997 Asian crisis…etc. Subsequently, 
changes in equity prices, interest rates, exchange rates, and credit spreads are 
analysed during these crises. The ultimate aim is to establish several ‘potential 
                                               
48 Spreads are the risk premiums associated with a given security: that is the difference between risk-free and risky 





scenarios’ that can then be applied to the bank trading positions and ultimately 
estimate the level of possible losses under such stress scenarios. 
 
For hypothetical Stress Tests, the bank designs the so-called ‘what-if’ extreme yet 
plausible hypothetical scenarios involving potential sequence of events that, if 
realized, could result in a financial crisis –as in a fall of 20% or 30% of all stock market 
indices which the bank invests in– due to political unrests, economic downturns in a 
major economy…etc. Combining the two stress testing methodologies would produce 
very useful information upon which loss limits and trading exposure limits can be 
established, hence avoiding any “open-ended” exposures should the assumed 
adverse market conditions materialize. Finally, it is probably worth noting in this 
context that in the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) conducts an 
independent worse-case or stress testing assessments for UK banks which lately 
seemed to be accurate in projecting forthcoming difficulties in the banking sector.   
 
Lord Turner, the head of the FSA commenting on the currently revealed HBOS’s 
losses of around £10bn, said recently that these losses were not unexpected 
according to the FSA’s stress test conducted in Oct 2008, given HBOS’s considerable 
level of ‘potentially’ bad loans on its balance sheet (The FT, Feb 25th, 2009). 
 
4.2.4.4.2 Value at Risk (VaR) 
 
VaR, by definition, is “the minimum likely loss over the next trading day” that a bank 
can incur on its trading position under a given confidence limit (mostly 99% or 95%) 
and a given time-horizon (such as 1 day) (Dow, 2002, p 8). Technically, calculating 
the VaR requires the determination of a time horizon over which the estimates of 
changes in the value of the market portfolio will be conducted. This is coupled with 
choosing the suitable confidence interval that sets the limits to the degree of certainty 
associated with these estimates. Practically, banks normally assume one- or ten-
trading day as time horizon and a confidence level of 95% or 99%.   
 
Methodologies employed for the VaR estimation include: (1) Historical Simulation 
which basically assumes that historical patterns apply to future scenarios in relation to 





Covariance technique imposes normality on the historical returns’ distribution (instead 
of relying on the actual distribution of historical data) and provides estimates of the 
expected value and the variance on the basis of which. It also assumes that the 
change in portfolio value is a linear function of the changes of individual assets 
comprising the portfolio (Allen et al, 2004), and finally (3) the Monte Carlo approach 
which constructs hypothetical future scenarios for a portfolio’s returns using the 
‘Bootstrapping’ technique, where outcomes are randomly-generated using historical 
trading patterns. Bootstrapped values can have a distribution that is closer to normality 
as the number of trials is increased the (Dowd, 2002). 
 
On the attractions of VaR, Dowd (2002) states three main merits of VaR. The first is 
that “it provides a common consistent measure of risk across different positions and 
risk factors” (Dowd, 2002, p 10) suggesting that VaR is a powerful risk measurement 
tool in the sense that it allows for measuring risks across different asset classes, such 
as fixed-income and equity positions. The second advantage is that VaR 
accommodates for the portfolio diversification effect or risk-offsetting effect which 
acknowledges that individual risks are not perfectly correlated such that the overall 
risk of a diversified portfolio would be lower than the sum of the risks for each asset 
comprising the portfolio. Thirdly, as the VaR highlights the maximum possible loss 
over a specific time frame for a given confidence level under normal market conditions, 
it provides a useful basis for allocating capital in line with the level of exposure to 
trading risks.   
 
The following table provides a real example on VaR as produced by JP Morgan bank 
in its 2006 published annual accounts (JP Morgan Chase and Co, 2006, p 78): 
 
   2006      2005    
At 
December 31, 
As of or the year ended 












VAR   2006 2005 
By risk type:            
Fixed income $   56 $   35 $   94  $   67 $   37 $   110  $   44 $   89 
Foreign exchange 22 14 42  23 16 32  27 19 
Equities 31 18 50  34 15 65  49 24 
Commodities and other 45 22 128  21 7 50  41 34 
Less: portfolio 
diversification (70)(c) NM(d) NM(d)   (59)(c) NM(d) NM(d)   (62)(c) (63)(c) 
Trading VAR 84 55 137  86 53 130  99 103 
 
(c) Average and period-end VARs are less than the sum of the VARs of its market risk components, which is due to risk offsets from portfolio diversification. The diversification effect reflects the fact that the risks  





(d) Designated as not meaningful (*NM*) because the minimum and maximum way occur on different days for different risk components, and hence it is not meaningful to compute a portfolio diversification  
effect.  
 
JP Morgan calculates VAR using a one-day time horizon and a 99% confidence level, 
according to its 2006 annual accounts. This implies that the bank expects to incur 
losses greater than that predicted by VAR estimates only once in every 100 trading 
days, or about two to three times a year. In 2006, the table above shows that for fixed 
income, foreign exchange, equities, and commodities and other trading assets, 
average trading VaR was $56m, $31m, $22m, and $45m respectively which sums to 
a total trading VaR of $154m. By taking portfolio diversification into account, which is 
$70m representing around 45% (= 70/154) of the summed VaRs of the individual 
components, average trading VaR for the bank was down to $84m. This suggests that 
the bank is confident that in 99 out of 100 trading days, the maximum expected trading 
loss will not exceed $84m. Compared to 2005 figures, the bank clearly had more 
diversified portfolio in 2006 given the greater impact of the portfolio diversification. This 
was reflected in the larger overall trading VaR for 2005 of $86m. 
 
Having discussed VaR strengths, it is also worth reflecting on its weaknesses. A key 
shortfall of the VaR methodology is its lack of sub-additivity; suggesting that it is not 
always the case that the VaR of a portfolio or combined positions would be less than 
the VaR of the individual components combined: “the risk of the sum could be greater 
than the sum of risks measured by the VaR” (Dowd, 2002, p 12). More of a serious 
loophole is the normality assumption of the VaR, especially if such underlying 
assumption is overlooked by the VaR users or severely violated by real losses. The 
fact that some assets’ returns in the trading book would inevitably have a ‘fat-tail’ 
probability distribution – i.e. severer losses for the less likely 5% or 1% events – is not 
integrated in the VaR system (Dowd, 2002). In fact, the normality assumption of VaR 
can be the single weakness that may have put an end to its life: events unfolding for 
the past 12 months in the banking sector have been anything but normal, an issue that 
has considerably undermined the normality assumption of VaR   
 
Furthermore, there is also the important issue of ‘skewed’ as opposed to 
‘symmetrically-assumed’ distributions by the VaR. Moreover, the accuracy of the VaR 
estimations can be questionable. Taleb (1997, p 37) explains that “you’re worse off 





a pilot an altimeter that is sometimes defective, he will crash the plane. Give him 
nothing and he will look out the window”. To mitigate for such drawback, banks tend 
to back-test VaR estimates. Back-testing effectively serves as a reality-check of the 
original VaR estimates that is conducted using the distribution of the real profits made 
and losses incurred on a given portfolio over the same time period assumed by the 
VaR.   
 
The answer to the VaR’s insensitivity to ‘fat-tail’ events is to measure market trading 
risk using the Expected Tail Loss (ETL) methodology. In essence, ETL is the expected 
value of the tail-losses, i.e. losses exceeding the VaR value, which can be expressed 
as: ETL = E [L | L > VaR] (Dowd, 2002, p 29). The marked advantage of ETL over 
VaR is that ETL is a ‘coherent’49 risk measure, whilst the VaR is not. Consequently, 
ETL suggests more reliable and accurate estimates that those of the VaR. 
 
The VaR was not applied to efficiency and analyses for two main reasons. First is the 
issue of consistency in published VaR data. Banks use different methodologies, 
confidence intervals, and holding periods in calculating their VaRs. Therefore, a 
considerable degree of inconsistency can be embedded in published VaR values for 
the sample banks which may ultimately undermine the reliability of estimates. Second, 
despite that VaR is used in the banking industry as a standard measure for trading 
risk that is wildly relied on in published accounts, VaR itself suffers a major weakness 
related to its normality assumption. Therefore, although it might be an interesting 
research idea to integrate VaRs in the analysis, however it is believed to add little 
value given the extreme abnormality that unfolding events have implied in the banking 
sector since late 2007. 
 
                                               
49 A coherent risk measure satisfies four conditions according to Dowd (2002, p 28). So, If X and Y are two risky 
positions,  is considered being a coherent risk measure if the following properties are met:  
• Sub-additivity:   +    
• Homogeneity:  =  where  
• Monotonicity:    if  
• Risk-free condition:  =  where   
The second and third conditions imply that  is a convex function. The fourth condition means that the addition 
of a sure amount to the position will decrease our risk by the same amount as it will increase the value of the 
portfolio by the end of the period. 
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As far as the ETL is concerned, obtaining detailed historical returns data on each 
trading portfolio in the trading books of each of the sample banks involved was, 
technically, quite implausible given the type of in-house data required. This is in 
addition to the fact that the distribution of returns for each individual bank’s trading 
portfolios in the sample should be established, this is along with the two properties of 
skewness (asymmetry) and the level of kurtosis (fat-tail) for each bank in order to 
reach a creditable ETL estimates. For these reasons, ETL was ignored as a trading 
risk measure, although calculating ETL and integrating estimates into efficiency and 
analyses would be an interesting project should the data become available. 
 
3.4.5 Insolvency Risk 
 
3.4.5.1 Insolvency Risk: Definition 
 
Insolvency risk arises when the bank assets are worth less than its liabilities or what it 
owes (The Economist, Mar 19th 2008). Thus, a bank is considered as technically 
insolvent when the bank’s Net Worth (or equity capital or assets net of liabilities) is 
less than its debts. This can be the direct result of incurring considerable losses in the 
banking book, as it has mostly been the case in the current financial crisis, or trading 
book which can exhaust the bank’s net worth (Allen et al, 2004). Although it is rare for 
banks to go insolvent, however recent bank bail-outs in Europe and the US has shown 
that insolvency is a real risk that has long been assumed away, and therefore research 
needs to take account of. In fact, The Economist (Sept 25th, 2008) concluded that 
banks are no longer immune to the insolvency threat which can only be cured by 
beefing up their equity capital. This actually meets with what this research has found 
in relation to the impact of insolvency risk on European banks’ operational efficiency 
as will be shown in the first empirical chapter. 
 
3.4.5.2 Insolvency Risk: Case Studies 
 
Notwithstanding the rarity in which insolvency risks can materialize as bank failures, 
the aim of this section is to reflect on some real examples on how serious insolvency 
risk can be at a micro level as well as at a systematic level. A good example from the 





1984 (Saunders and Cornett, 2003, p151). Continental was expanding aggressively 
in the energy-based lending market with an annual growth ration of about 20% 
between 1977 and 1981. Such rapid growth is not always a healthy sign as 
Continental’s capital was not structured proportionately to accommodate the fast 
expansion of its loan portfolio. 
 
To be more specific, the bank had a narrow core deposit base and heavily relied on 
wholesale funds, mainly short-term, inter-bank and money markets funds – Fed funds 
via Repo arrangements – and Eurodollar deposits (dollars deposed with the bank 
outside the US). However, as the US economy experienced a significant downturn in 
early 1980s, this contributed to increasing Continental’s credit risk exposure hence 
resulted in substantial defaults on its sizable energy-related loan portfolio. Due to the 
scale of defaults on the bank’s ill-diversified lending portfolio, Continental’s credit 
worthiness and its ability to make full and timely repayments on its short-term liabilities 
became questionable and led to difficulties in renewing or rolling over its wholesale 
funding facilities which eventually was suspended; putting Continental at a significant 
exposure to liquidity shortages. The compounded negative impact of substantial credit 
and liquidity risks besides its fragile funding model inevitably left Continental 
technically insolvent. The Fed ultimately claimed control of the bank in 1984.   
 
For the UK banking system, history seems to repeat itself as there seem to be little 
evidence that lessons have been drown from Continental’s failure. Northern Rock, the 
British bank ranking amongst the top 5 mortgage lenders UK-wide, has experienced 
similar difficulties to that of Continental’s and ended up being nationalized by the UK 
government in February 17th 2008 (The FT, Feb 17th 2008). Northern Rock adopted a 
brittle funding structure to support its assets and the rapid rate of growth in its 
mortgage portfolio. The bank relied excessively on wholesale funds, and took the 
renewal of such market credit facilities for granted. Unfortunately, when the US 
Subprime crisis hit, banks almost stopped lending funds to each other because of lack 
of transparency in terms of the scale of potentially undisclosed losses as a 
consequence of the crisis. Consequently, the Rock was left to dry up of liquidity over 
a very short period of time in August/September of 2007. The Rock’s insolvency 





result of a fundamentally vulnerable funding model.   
 
Dowd (2007a) argues that the liquidity crisis and the subsequent state of insolvency 
the Rock eventually fell in was of its own making, and stresses that banks would 
maintain their own financial health only if they have an incentive to do so. Dowd 
(2007a) further argues that “financial institutions should live or die under the discipline 
of the market”. However, the majority of central banks governors believe that financial 
institutions should not be left to fail, especially big ones, given the systematic 
implications on the wider financial system (The FT, Feb 17th 2008). The arguments on 
wider systematic implications of one bank failing and whether or not the government 
should bail-out tumbling banks using taxes is a different issue. Regardless, the core 
issue here is that the Rock is to blame for not establishing sound risk management 
practices such as stress-testing its exposure to markets dry-up (Dowd, 2007b), let 
alone the fundamental imbalance it had between its fast-growing loan portfolio and its 
fragile capital structure.  
 
The conclusion that can be drawn form the above-discussed examples of well-
established banks falling apart and becoming insolvent is that: although financial 
regulators or central banks cannot afford to allow a bank to fail and become insolvent 
for the far-reaching systematic ramifications, banks can become insolvent and 
therefore accounting for insolvency risk in assessing bank performance would 
certainly deliver more credibility to the analysis results. For that reason, a measure of 
insolvency risk in terms of capital ratio (equity capital / total assets) is incorporated into 
efficiency and analyses at both bank-specific and country-specific levels. 
 
3.4.6 The Integration of Banking Risks in Empirical Analysis 
 
The following sections elaborate on how the four main banking risks discussed are 
integrated into efficiency and analyses of this research. This is followed by a summary 
section which highlights the contribution of this research to the current literature from 






3.4.6.1 Credit risk: A Research Perspective 
 
Credit risk can be associated with banking as well as trading book exposures. In this 
research, the focus – due to data limitation – is on credit risk related to the banking 
book which arises from realizing non-performing or past-due loans. This is 
accommodated for by the incorporation of an ex post proxy of credit risk in efficiency 
and analyses both at a country- as well as bank-specific levels. The proxy is 
represented by the ratio of Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans. This ratio has 
traditionally been employed by past research as in Mester (1996), Clark (1996), Berger 
and Mester (1997), Altunbas et al (2000), and Casu and Girardone (2004). However, 
this research takes a step further and accounts for credit risk from an ex ante (external 
to the bank) perspective, that is, a measure of credit risk exposure prior to any loan 
impairments or losses occurring. This is achieved by the introduction of Credit Risk 
Appetite measure (CRA) suggested by the Bank of England (2003) such that              
CRA = Risk Weighted Assets / Total Assets. CRA is introduced to efficiency 
analysis only as an explanatory variable to the inefficiency term due to data limitations. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no previous banking efficiency research 
has applied this measure to date, bearing in mind that calculating the level of RWA is 
a regulatory requirement of Basel I Accord which has been in place for about two 
decades. 
 
3.4.6.2 Market Trading Risk: A research perspective 
 
Banking efficiency studies seem to completely ignore the impact of trading risk on 
bank performance. This research attempts to bridge this gap by integrating a measure 
of trading risk at bank- as well as country-specific levels as represented by the ratio of 
Net Trading Revenue / Total Revenues. This ratio is believed to provide information 
on (1) the level of exposure to trading risk and on (2) the risk-return relationship related 
to trading. The absolute value of the trading risk ratio is indicative of the level of 
exposure to trading regardless of whether it is positive (reflecting trading profits) or 
negative (reflecting trading losses), whereas the sign of the trading risk ratio reflects 
the risk-return pay-off in trading. So, if net trading revenue is relatively large and 





which is paying off because of the positive net trading revenue (trading profits) 
achieved.    
 
3.4.6.3 Liquidity risk: A Research Perspective 
 
Banking efficiency research seems to largely overlook accounting for liquidity risk 
which is one of the most serious risks as the current financial crisis has shown. The 
only study that have applied a proxy for liquidity risk at bank- and country- level in a 
European context is, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, Altunbas et al (2000).  
Therefore, to provide more reliable analysis to banking performance, liquidity risk has 
to be addressed. This research, accordingly, incorporates a proxy for liquidity risk into 
efficiency and analyses. Liquidity risk is measured as Customer & Short-term 
Funding / Liquid Assets. This ratio is introduced both at country- and bank-levels. 
This ratio measures the ability of one bank to fulfill its short-term commitments or 
liabilities using liquid assets. The higher the ratio, the greater the liquidity risk is and 
vice-a-versa. 
 
Liquidity risk measure is incorporated at a bank-specific level in efficiency analysis as 
a determinant variable of the profit and cost inefficiency terms (empirical chapter 1), 
and as a control variable in the cost function used to estimate (empirical chapter 2). 
To account for liquidity risk at a country-specific level, the liquidity ratio is averaged for 
the number of banks operating in a given European country following BankScope’s 
(the database utilized) geographical classification. The aim is to control for the impact 
of banking systems’ differences in terms of liquidity risk on the profit and cost 
efficiencies for the small sample of 541 banks (empirical chapter 1), as well as on the 
using a bigger sample of 2026 banks (empirical chapter 2).   
 
3.4.6.4 Insolvency risk: A research perspective 
 
This research accounts for insolvency risk both in the efficiency and analyses. 
Insolvency risk is proxied by Capital Ratio = Equity Capital/ Total Assets. In this 
sense, the lower the ratio, the greater the possibility for the bank to become insolvent 





have accounted for insolvency risk in different ways.  For instance, Spong et al (1995), 
in Berger and Mester (1997), Maudos et al (2002), Bos and Kolari (2005) and Kasman 
and Yildirim (2006) use capital buffer ratio (equity capital / total assets) to proxy for 
insolvency risk. Altunbas et al (2000), however, use the level of financial capital to 
proxy for insolvency risk. All past research applies insolvency risk measure on a bank-
specific level. This research takes a step further and applies insolvency risk measure 
at a country-specific level as well in both efficiency and analysis. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that accounting for credit, trading, liquidity, and insolvency 
risks at a country-specific level helps in isolating the exiguous impact that these factors 
can have on banks’ estimated inefficiencies and. This procedure is motivated by the 




The table below summarizes the risk variables this research uses to modify bank 
efficiency and analyses and highlights the gaps in the literature that this research 
attempts to bridge (as shown in the last column #5 to the right of the table). The table 
also shows whether the risk variable is applied at country-specific and/or bank-specific 
levels for each of the two samples and indicates if any previous empirical work has 







































Customer & SR 
Funding ÷ 
Liquid Assets 
Accounted for at 
bank- and country- 
level 
Accounted for at 
bank- and 
country- level 
Accounted for at a 
bank-level only  
(Altunbas et al, 2000) 
 






Accounted for at 
country- and bank-
level 
Accounted for at 
bank- and 
country- level 
Accounted for at a 
bank-level only  
(Altunbas et al, 2000) 
 




Assets ÷ Total 
Assets 
Accounted for at 
bank- level only 
(because the aim is to 










Income ÷ Total 
Revenue 
Accounted for at 
country- and bank-
level  








Equity Capital ÷ 
Total Assets 
Accounted for at 
bank- and country- 
level 
Accounted for at 
bank- and 
country- level 
Accounted for at a 
bank-level only (past 
studies mostly used 
raw equity capital to 
this end, e.g.  
Altunbas et al, 2001) 
 
It is probably worth noting that this research utilizes accounting measures for banking 





do not have publicly traded securities. Risk measures used in this research to modify 
efficiency analyses may seem quite simple at face value, yet, empirical results have 
shown the significant impact these measures can have on profit and cost efficiencies 
as well as on estimates. This is besides the fact that the vast majority of past research 
has approached risk in a similar manner. The contribution of this research lies in 
accounting for a wider range of risks more comprehensively. The proposed risk 
proxies are not only applied at bank-specific level as the vast majority of past research 
do, but also at a country-specific level to account for country differences and to control 
for the exogenous impact these risks might have on bank profits or costs (the 
dependent variables). Despite some statistical limitation to the measures, the inclusion 
of risk extends the boundaries of efficiency and research significantly as will be 
demonstrated in the following empirical chapters. 
 
Sophisticated and statistically-oriented risk models may not, after all, be the answer 
given their underlying assumptions. Such assumptions may, in abnormal 
circumstances, result in decoupling these models’ outcomes from their ability to 
anticipate real problems.  Allan Greenspan – the former Federal Reserve chief – in 
commenting on the latest financial unrest that has been sparked by the US mortgage 
crisis reasserted the importance of having sound and capable risk models in place, 
but equally admitted that “these models do not fully capture what I believe has been, 
to date, only a peripheral addendum to business-cycle and financial modelling – the 
innate human responses that result in swings between euphoria and fear repeat 
themselves generation after generation with little evidence of a learning curve”. 
Greenspan concludes that “we will never have a perfect model of risk” (The FT, March 
16th 2008). Notwithstanding this reality, this research suggests that it is informative to 
recognize the link between the different types of risks and banking efficiency and 
analysis. The risk variables introduced have demonstrated significant impact in both 
















































5.1 Research Sample and Data 
 
The research sample comprises of an unbalanced panel dataset of 541 observations 
on large European banks (with minimum total assets of US$1bn) that were active over 
10-year period between 2008 and 2018 (inclusive) and located in 14 European 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.   
 
Data was obtained from Bankscope resource package of 2018 produced by Bureau 
Van Dijk (BVD) which is widely used in the literature [e.g. Altunbas et al (2001), Cavallo 
and Rossi (2001), Casu, Girardone, and Molyneux (2004), Kasman and Yildirim 
(2006), Yildirim et al (2007), and Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2008)]. The sample 
contains monetary values obtained from balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. 
The analysis uses data from consolidated accounts only so as to avoid the potential 
problem of double counting for globally-operating institutions50.  
 
Moreover, the justification for using a panel data set stems from the argument of 
Altunbas et al (2000, p 1611) in that “technical efficiency is better studied and modelled 
with panels”. This is because panel data allows factors with changing effects over time 
to be modelled and consequently affect the estimated profit and cost efficiencies. This 
in turn will reduce the potential for biasness in estimates that can result from ignoring 
these changes.   
 
It is also important to use consolidated data in the analysis (i.e. data produced on an 
organizational-level rather than on a subsidiary-level). This is because the use of 
unconsolidated (subsidiary-level) banking data allows for several factors to create 
some bias in the data. These factors can include: shifting profits between subsidiaries 
hence affecting the reliability of the estimated profit efficiency results, and sharing 
inputs or any other intra-organizational arrangements as pointed out by Berger et al 
(2000) and Bos and Kolari (2005). 
 
                                               
50 Financial statements are consolidated on the basis of country of operation, i.e. the data is produced in Bankscope 
as country-based consolidated accounts. For instance: ING Bank has many branches across Europe such as ING 
Bank (France), ING Bank (Netherlands) and ING Bank (Deutschland). Each of these banks is accounted for as a 





Furthermore, the study focuses on large EU banks only (with minimum total assets of 
US$1bn) so as to minimize potential scale-bias which could result from estimating a 
common (single) efficient frontier for both small and large European banks (Casu and 
Girardone, 2004). This is because large and small banks may have different 
production technologies (i.e. different input mixes and prices and different output 
levels and mixes) as explained by McAllister and McManus (1993), hence fitting a 
single frontier for a sample of banks with distinctively different production technologies 
and cost structures is very likely to produce unreliable estimates. Accordingly, focusing 
on large banks only helps mitigating this problem as estimating a single frontier for the 
entire sample which inherently assumes that all banks have similar production 
technologies (McAllister and McManus, 1993). 
 
Moreover, the study focuses on commercial banks only so as to avoid producing 
biased efficiency estimates due to different production technologies or other effects 
assumed by analysing non-commercial banks (Fitzpatrick and McQuinn, 2008). 
Therefore, the study analyses commercial banks because they have similar 
production technologies (e.g. output mixes), an assumption that is also consistent with 
estimating a single frontier for the entire sample (Bos and Kolari, 2005). Although large 
commercial banks can have different insurance businesses lines and investment 
banking windows, their core business is related to banking book activities, i.e., their 
activities are mainly related to taking deposits and lending which qualify them to be 
classified as commercial banks. 
 
More importantly, Monetary values were deflated using country-specific GDP deflators 
with the year of 2008 being considered as the base year. Deflators were produced on 
the basis of Consumer Price Index (CPI) data obtained from same database, 
Bankscope of 2018. Row CPI data appeared to have different base years for the 
different countries involved therefore deflators (CPIs) were rescaled to have a unified 
base year of 2008. So, for instance: if raw data shows that the CPI for 2008 = 0.95 
using 2018 as base year (meaning that the CPI for 2018 = 1), then using 2008 as the 
new base year will rescale the CPI for 2018 to be 1.0526 (= 1/0.95), while CPI for 2008 
will become equal to (1) and so forth. The resulting deflators were then applied to the 





subsequently deployed in the estimation of profit and cost frontiers. 
 
5.1.2 Standardizing data denominations 
 
Since raw monetary values extracted from Bankscope of 2018 have different currency 
denominations including Danish Koruna (DKK), Swiss Frank (CHF), UK pound (GBP), 
euro (EUR) …etc, a Euro-standardization procedure was necessary to neutralize the 
currency effect and therefore achieve consistency in monetary denominations across 
the different 14 countries. The process involved obtaining end-of-year euro exchange 
rates from Bankscope to convert the relevant currency denominations into euros for 
the entire dataset.   
 
It is important to show how Euro-standardization process was conducted to the 
different currency denominations of balance sheet items employed in the analysis. 
Row data extracted from Bankscope of 2018 for the 14 European countries involved 
in this analysis was denominated in 6 different currencies in including the euro. Banks 
from 5 countries had their data denominated in domestic currencies. This required that 
pair exchange rates with the euro to be obtained. Exchange rates were used to return 
all monetary values expressed in different currency denominations for these 5 
countries to euros so as to achieve consistency in data denominations before 
conducting the estimation. Data for the remaining 9 countries was already expressed 
in euros because this analysis covers the period between 2008 and 2018 which is 
after the introduction of the euro in January of 1999. 
 
5.1.3 Variable Specification 1: Frontier Variables 
 
Table 2 below provides definitions and descriptive statistics of outputs, input prices, 
risk factors, and other control variables over the sample period of 2008 – 2018 for 541 







Table 2: Frontier Variables 
 
Variable51 Description Mean Std. Min. Max. 
 
This is bank-specific Profits representing 
the dependent variable in the profit frontier 
function that is normalized by (equity 
capital  price of labour) and transformed 
such that: 
 = [Profits + |Minimum Profits| + 1] 
290.4314     91.43972    101.7152    1220.853 
 
 
This is bank-specific Total Costs 
representing the dependent variable in the 
cost frontier function that is normalized by 
(equity capital  price of labour) such that: 
 = Total Costs / (equity capital  
price of labour)  
212.2038     649.4181    10.78203    7167.011 
 
Price of funds / Price of labour 
Where: 
(1) Price of funds = interest expenses/ 
(customer deposits + short-term funding + 
other funding). 
(2) Price of Labour = Personal expenses / 
Total assets 
6.74572 16.58709 .3079903 143.1213 
 
Price of fixed capital / Price of labour 
Where: 
Price of fixed capital = 
(Other admin + Other operating 
expenses) / Fixed assets 
985.0027 1311.287 2.583052 7429.839 
 
Loans / Equity Capital 
Where: 
Loans = Total Loans + Total Problem 
Loans – Loan Loss Reserves 
11.82536 4.242392 1.451099 23.5694 
 Other earning assets / Equity Capital 8.890328 6.383754 1.402524 50.58273 
 
Off-balance sheet (OBS) items / Equity 
Capital 
(the credit equivalent of OBS) 
6.537319 6.249379 1.013514 40.92739 
 Linear form of the time effect - - 1 5 
                                               
51 It should be noted that profits, costs, input prices and outputs are presented in de-logged format in as these 
terms will be logged when forming in the functional form to be estimated. It is a standard practice in the literature 























 EU membership dummy - - 0 1 
 Euro adoption dummy - - 0 1 
 Country-specific GDP growth rate 2.032018 1.548122 -.2742983 9.191397 
 Country-specific Inflation Rate   
Where =1, 2…14 countries. 
2.236773 .823539 .2016129 5.524239 
 Country-specific SR interest rates 
(3 months Interbank rates) 
3.160949 1.251038 .32917 6.9075 
 Country-specific financial 
intermediation proxy 
= M2 money supply52/GDP 
(this is a country-averaged measure) 
10.71031 73.23825 .028205 618.5877 
 
Country-specific Herfindahl Index for 
loan market concentration 
(this is a country-averaged measure) 
.2453979 .1633645 .0974596 .8044983 
 Country-specific Trading Risk 
= Net Trading Income / Total Revenue 
(this is a country-averaged measure) 
.0382202 .0230007 .0183452 .1260356 
 Country-specific Credit Risk 
= Loan loss provisions / Total Loans 
(this is a country-averaged measure) 
.0067729 .0032692 -.0001864 .0232085 
 Country-specific Liquidity Risk 
= (Customer and Short-term Funding) / 
Liquid assets 
(this is a country-averaged measure) 
26.33519 7.695861 19.701667 49.18933 
 Country-specific Insolvency Risk 
= Equity capital (equity + equity reserves) 
/ Total Assets 
(this is a country-averaged measure) 
.0929344 .049738 .0402072 .171592 
 
 
Frontier variables presented in the first 7 rows in the table above are further defined 
and explained in the following sections. This will be followed by a brief discussion on 
descriptive statistics on the remaining macroeconomic and country-specific variables. 
                                               
52 M2 measures the monetary supply in terms of the Broad Money which includes the value of cash currency in the 





















5.1.4 Dependent Variables Specification (Profits & Total Costs) 
 
This section illustrates the steps according to which the dependent variable ( ) of the 
profit frontier and ( ) of the cost frontier are computed. 
 
The specification of profits requires specifying total revenues first, and second, 
deriving total net income. Total revenues are defined as: 
 
Total Revenues = Interest Income + Net Fee Income + Net Commission Income + 
Net Trading Income + Other Operating Income 
 
This leads to defining net total revenues as: 
 
Net Revenues = Total Revenues – Total Costs (incl. Loan Loss Provisions)      
 
Loan loss provisions (LLPs) are considered as costs and therefore should be deducted 
from total revenues to reach net revenues.  This is because LLPs constitute a buffer 
against bad debt that is set aside as expense and are used to build up loan loss 
reserves to hedge against ‘expected losses’ in loan portfolio (Drake et al, 2006). 
 
Net revenues need to be normalized by the product of equity capital and price of 
labour. This is because the right-hand side variables, input prices and outputs, in the 
frontier function are normalized by the price of labour and outputs are normalized by 
equity capital respectively following Berger and Mester (1997). Accordingly, hence the 
dependent variable, profits in this case, has to be normalized by the product of equity 
and labour price. This procedure ensures that variables on both sides of the frontier 
equation are consistently normalized by both the price of labour and by equity capital. 
Accordingly:   
 
Profits = Net Revenues/ [Equity Capital  Price of Labour53] 
                                               










The rationale for normalizing Profits by equity capital and price of labour is to strip out 
the effects of scale-bias and wage differences across sample banks (Berger and 
Mester, 1997)54. 
 
It is worth noting that this research applies a different input price normalization 
procedure to that of Girardone et al (2004) where the authors normalize input prices 
by the price of fixed capital rather than the price of labour. This research thoroughly 
tests for the different input price normalizations and concludes that the most suitable 
procedure involves normalizing input prices by the price of labour. This will extensively 
be discussed later in this chapter as part of the process of reaching the preferred 
functional form to estimate.   
 
Following Berger and Mester (1997), the final step involves producing 
 
 = [Profits + |Minimum Profits| + 1] 
(41) 
 
As the dependent variable ( ) will be logged in the functional form of the alternative 
profit frontier, such transformation ensures positive values of ( ) for all observations. 
To illustrate, since some banks might make losses or negative Profits as defined in 
(40) in a given year(s) over the sample period, therefore applying no transformation to 
Profits means occasionally taking the log of negative Profits which is impossible. 
Therefore, the observation with the minimum Profits (or maximum losses) is chosen 
and the absolute value of which is taken and added back to Profits. This step alone 
would mean that the observation with the minimum Profits will have a value for Profits 
of zero which also makes it impossible to log. For this reason, the value of (1) is added 
                                               
54 Akhigbe and McNulty (2003) normalize profits by assets, rather than equity and find that small banks have higher 
profit efficiency. Akhigbe and McNulty (2005, p 290) argue that normalizing by equity produces the opposite result 
since large banks use more leverage (less equity) than small banks. However normalizing profits by equity capital, 
as Berger and Mester (1997) explain, has more of an economic rationale as it is closer the ROE ratio which should 
show greater profit efficiency for larger banks (given their relatively lower equity base). Normalizing by assets is 
likely to produce opposite results (lower profit efficiency for larger banks compared to small banks as large banks 









to complete the transformation. This way, the observation with the minimum Profits (or 
maximum losses) will have the variable Profits as defined in (41) equal to 1 as its 
corresponding Profits and minimum value of Profits will cancel out. Accordingly, such 
transformation makes it possible to express Profits for all observations in logs.   
 
Turning to the cost side, equation (42) below defines total costs ( ) which is the 
dependent variable in the cost frontier’s functional form. First, total costs are calculated 
as: 
 
Total Costs = Interest Expenses + Personal Expenses + Other Admin Expenses + 
Other Operating Expenses 
(42) 
 
Total costs are then normalized by the product of equity capital and the price of 
labour to neutralize scale- and wage-difference effects as illustrated earlier. This 
yields the dependent variable ( ) such that: 
 
 = Total Costs / [Equity Capital  Price of Labour] 
(43) 
 
Total costs variable ( ) is then logged to be used as the dependent variable in the 
cost frontier’s functional form. 
 
5.1.5 Inputs and Outputs specification 
 
As illustrated in the methodology chapter, the intermediation approach found by Sealy 
and Lindley (1977) is used in specifying inputs and outputs of banks. The distinctive 
feature of this approach is to account for deposits as inputs. Consequently, inputs of 
the banking production process include labour, funds (financial capital)55, and real 
capital (fixed assets)56.  Banks are assumed to operate under perfectly competitive 
                                               
55 Funds (or financial capital) comprises of equity and equity reserves, deposits and short-term funding, and other 
long-term finance. 









input markets (Bos and Kolari, 2005). The prices of these inputs are defined as follows: 
 
1. Price of Labour =       
2. Price of Funds =  
 
3. Price of Real Capital =   
 
The rationale for approximating the price of labour by the ratio of personal expenses 
to total assets is twofold.  
 
First, it was practically difficult to obtain data on employees’ numbers and their wages 
for each bank in this research panel. Second, Maudos et al (2002) explain that the 
ratio ( ) of personal expenses (PE) to total assets (A) can be interpreted as labour 
cost per worker ( ) adjusted for differences in labour (L) productivity ( ), such 
that . 
 
As the prices of funds and real capital are normalized by the price of labour, input 
prices that are accounted for in the profit and cost frontiers’ functional forms are 
therefore defined in (44) and (45) below. According to Berger and Mester (2003), 
normalization by input price (price of labour) is applied to achieve the homogeneity 
restriction57.  Denoting the normalized price of funds and the price of real capital as 




                                               
57 The homogeneity restriction should be applied to the cost function but does not have to be imposed on the 
alternative profit function, however it is applied to the latter to keep the functional forms equivalent as Berger and 
































On the other hand, the literature typically recognizes three main outputs of the banking 
production process, these are: loans, other earning assets, and off-balance sheet 
items. These three outputs are believed to cover all outputs generated by the entire 
bank’s balance sheet. As can be noticed, the specification as such caters for a third 
type of output: off-balance sheet items (OBS). It is argued in a number of studies such 
as Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996), Altunbas et al (2000), and Altunbas et al (2001) 
that OBS should be accounted as an output when modelling bank cost function given 
their increasing importance as a source of income for banks, otherwise the bank’s 
output would seriously be understated. This indeed is evident as far as this research 
sample is concerned. It is found (as shown in Table 3) that OBS items account for 
around 1/3 of European banks total assets on average over the study period 2008 - 
2018. Thus, accounting for OBS is imperative to achieving credibility in the analysis. 
Thus, the three outputs are defined as follows: 
 
1. Loans = total loans net of total problem loans and loan loss reserves 
2. Other earning assets (OEA) = deposits with banks, different types of listed 
and   non-listed securities, T-bills, Bonds, CDs, equity investment…etc. 
3. Off-balance sheet items (OBS) = credit-equivalent of off-balance sheet assets 
and liabilities. 
 
As illustrated earlier, these outputs are normalized by equity capital to strip out scale-
bias effect. Denoting loans as ( ), other earning assets OEA as ( ), and off-balance 
























The resulting normalized output variables above, , , and , will be incorporated 
in the efficient frontier functional form that is to be estimated. The next section reflects 
on the arguments underpinning the need to incorporate and normalize by equity capital 
in frontier analysis given its significant impact on estimates as will be demonstrated. 
This will then be followed by the summary statistics for bank-specific variables that are 
employed as profit and cost inefficiency term correlates. 
 
5.1.6 Accounting for Equity Capital 
 
It is crucial to include equity capital in the cost and profit functions for many reasons. 
First, Hughes et al (2001, p 2174) explain that equity capital serves as a source of 
funding, a cushion to absorb loan losses and financial distress, and a signal of asset 
quality in terms of the resources allocated to maintain this quality to outside creditors.  
Hence it is important to account for equity capital in the cost and profit functions. 
Second, Berger and Mester (1997) argue that the inclusion of equity in the analysis 
corrects for the potential scale bias arising from differences in bank dependence on 
borrowed funds since large banks tend to rely more heavily on borrowed funds and 
therefore employ less equity capital (in relative terms) than smaller banks. Third, equity 
capital is an alternative source of finance to deposits in funding loans and investments 
hence it would ultimately affect the bank’s costs and profits. In this sense, ignoring 
equity capital may produce biased inefficiency estimates in favour of large banks or 










finance. Fourth, in terms of risk, Mester (1996) argues that, other things held constant, 
a higher level of equity suggests lower default risk. The potential of default risk is 
reflected on the bank’s cost and profit via the risk premium the bank has to pay for 
borrowing. It follows that, the inclusion of equity is also believed to capture the risk 
preferences of the bank as risk-averse banks would tend to hold higher levels of equity 
– although incurring higher costs – than that of a cost-minimizing bank. Therefore, 
equity capital has been used in the literature as a proxy for default risk the level of 
which would ultimately impact the bank’s cost and profits. Thus, unless risk is 
accounted for, efficiency estimates might be misleading due to potential bias58.   
 
On the treatment of equity capital, some studies have employed bank equity capital 
as a control variable in the cost function to account for risk. For instance, the study by 
Altunbas et al (2000) find that financial capital has a significant impact on bank’s costs 
that is greater than that of non-performing loans and liquidity ratios which are used to 
account for credit and liquidity risks respectively. However, the noticeable impact of 
financial capital should be treated with caution according to the authors, because its 
influence appears to stem from the number of its interactive terms with other variables 
in the cost function, whereas parameters accounting for the other two risks (credit and 
liquidity) are incorporated with no interaction with other variables. The rationale for 
accounting for equity capital as a proxy for risk as such is that the level of equity capital 
is believed to be responsive to the level of financial risks the bank takes such that, with 
more risks taken, more equity capital is required, and this in turn translates into higher 
financing costs for the bank since equity is the most expensive source of finance.   
 
The inclusion of equity capital in the cost function as such has been criticized in the 
literature due to the oversimplification in representing risk. Akhigbe and McNulty 
(2003, p 312) argue that it is rather simplistic to include equity capital in the cost 
function “to control, in a very rough fashion, for the potential increased cost of funds 
due to financial risk”. This study avoids the inherent scale-bias stemming from applying 
raw equity capital as a control variable by introducing equity capital as a ratio to total 
                                               
58 Mester (1996, p 1026) adds that it is the level rather than the price of equity capital that should be employed in 
the cost function. She states that “Financial capital should be accounted for in the cost function and the level rather 
than the price of financial capital should be included since there is good reason to believe that cost-minimization 
does not fully explain a bank’s capital level – e.g., regulations set minimum capital-to-asset ratios and bank 





assets as a variable in the cost function. 
 
More importantly, equity capital is used to normalize dependent and output variables 
in the frontier model following Berger and Mester (1997 and 2003). Accordingly, rather 
than using equity capital as a control variable, it is used as a netput to deflate or 
normalize the dependent variable and output quantities. This way scale-biasness is 
neutralized to a large extent. Netputs are basically inputs or outputs which are taken 
to be fixed and/or where input prices are difficult to measure. Berger and Mester (2003) 
specify off-balance sheet items (OBS), real capital (premises and equipments), and 
equity capital as netputs.  The authors account for OBS items in terms of a ‘fixed’ 
netput using Basel I OBS risk weights as a rough proxy since these items are difficult 
to measure according to the authors. This research, on the other hand, accounts for 
the credit-equivalent of OBS hence OBS items are included as a third output.   
 
Further, the argument of Berger and Mester for treating real capital as fixed netput is 
that it is difficult to obtain data on the prices of these inputs. Fixed or real capital is not 
treated as netput in this research because it is possible to proxy the price of which by 
taking the ratio of other admin and non-operating expenses to fixed assets as shown 
in the earlier section.  In this research, only equity capital is specified as netput for two 
reasons: first, because it is difficult to measure the price of equity capital (in terms of 
the risk-adjusted return on equity) across the 14 European countries involved in the 
study, and second, because equity capital is difficult to change quickly.   
 
Furthermore, the rationale for using equity capital to deflate profits, costs, and outputs 
is to neutralize scale-bias as Berger and Mester (1997, p 918) explain that “since the 
costs and profits of the largest firms are many times larger than those of the smallest 
firms, large firms undoubtedly would have random errors with much larger variances 
in the absence of the normalization. In contrast, firms of different sizes have ratios of 
costs or profits to equity that typically vary only by a few-fold. This is particularly 
important because the inefficiency term is derived from the composite residual, which 
might make the variance of the efficiencies dependent on bank size in the absence of 
normalization”. In this sense, normalization is important so as to reduce heterogeneity 





reduce heterogeneity-bias in efficiency estimates by keeping variables away from 
being skewed in favor of the larger banks. This is particularly important given the 
considerable level of heterogeneity (variability) in bank total assets of this research.   
 
The sample data of 541 observations shows a minimum, maximum, and mean bank 
size of €984.6186mil, €1125494mil, and €190918.8mil respectively with a standard 
deviation of €240967.5mil. It is clear that the sample banks demonstrate a 
considerable level of variation given that the standard deviation is about 200 times the 
size of the minimum size bank in the sample. Such normalization process is therefore 
believed to level the ground upon which banks’ efficiencies are compared to one 
another because “large banks will tend to have higher profits for a given set of prices, 
primarily because they were able to gain size over a period of decades, a feature that 
small banks cannot achieve in the short run. However, the profits per dollar of equity 
and costs per dollar of equity of large banks are well within the achievable range for 
small banks.   
 
The next section presents summary statistics for bank-specific variables that are used 
to explain the variation in the profit and cost inefficiency terms. These variables will 
specify the inefficiency term functions which will simultaneously be estimated with the 
corresponding cost and profit frontier functions. 
 
5.1.7 Summary Statistics: A Brief Discussion 
 
This section briefly discusses summary statistics presented in Table 3 (page 203). 
Summary statistics shows that traditional banking activity (lending) relative to equity 
capital, represented by ( ), seems to dominate other types of business lines in 
European banking given that the average size of performing loan portfolio net of 
provisions over 2008 – 2018 was about twice the average size of off-balance sheet 
items relative to equity capital as represented by ( ). Still, this indicates to the 
significance of OBS activities as a bank output which some studies fail to account for 
and therefore underestimate the scale of banking output (as in Vennet, 2002). Further, 
the size of other earning assets relative to equity capital as shown by ( ) seems to be 









OBS items are accounted for as a third output using their credit risk equivalent. This 
is based on the Basle Accord of 1988 credit conversion factors of 100%, 50%, 20%, 
and 0% which aim at converting OBS items into the credit equivalent amount of            
on-balance-sheet assets. Taking account of OBS items as an output is very important. 
Earlier studies confirm the significance of accounting for OBS activities such as Boyd 
and Gertler (1994) and Clark and Siems (2002) using US data. The argument of Clark 
and Siems (2002) is that, over the 90s, the banking industry has experienced a 
dramatic increase in financial derivative activities by more than 600 percent. 
Accordingly, “noninterest income, which is heavily influenced by OBS activities, has 
increased as a percentage of total income from 19 percent in the late 1970s to nearly 
46 percent by 1999, thus, it is increasingly important to include these activities in any 
evaluation of efficiency of commercial banks” (p 988).  
 
As for macroeconomic variables, the rationale for introducing the GDP growth factor 
(GDP) is quite important, since banks tend to do well in good times (positive GDP 
growth) but not so in bad times (sluggish or negative GDP growth). This is recognized 
in the literature as an exogenous factor impacting the efficiency of banking institutions. 
Berger and Mester (1997) model this as a ‘bad luck’ factor and find strong evidence 
supporting its effect. Further, other studies demonstrated that changes in 
macroeconomic conditions can have significant influence on bank performance. 
Barros et al (2007) for instance observe that bank profits are pro-cyclical – i.e. 
positively correlated with business cycle movements – while the level of loan loss 
provisions is counter-cyclical.   
 
Moreover, Drake et al (2006) demonstrate the importance of accounting for 
macroeconomic factors when analyzing bank profit and cost efficiencies. This 
research accommodates for Drake et al’s observation and includes, in addition to the 
 factor, three more country-specific macroeconomic variables including: inflation 
rate ( ), base interest rate ( ), and a proxy for the level of financial intermediation (
) as in Kasman and Yildirim (2006). The proxy for financial intermediation ( ) 
reflects the level at which banks are involved in the economic activity. Therefore, the 
higher this proxy the greater the degree of financial intermediation in a given economy. 
GDP
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Statistics in Table 2 show a considerable dispersion in ( ), reflecting distinctive 
differences amongst the 14 European banking systems involved in this study. Again, 
this stress the fact that accounting for country differences is vital given the pro-cyclical 
nature of the banking business. The average of this financial intermediation proxy of 
11 suggests that M2, broad money supply (which accounts for bank deposits), is 11 
times the value of GDP.   
 
On the other hand, the loan market concentration index ( ) reflects a distinctive 
dispersion in the level of competition amongst the 14 European countries involved. 
The higher the  index the less competitive (more concentrated) the loan market 
is because fewer banks will be dominating a large share of the market. Statistics show 
a maximum  of about 80% reflecting a highly concentrated loan market, and a 
minimum of under 1% reflecting a highly competitive loan market. On average, 
score of about 24% represents a relatively competitive European loan market over the 
period of 2008 to 2018. 
 
The idea of producing a Herfindahl index for loans ( ) stems from the Loans 
work of Berger and Mester (2003) and Berger et al (2007) who use this index to gauge 
deposit market concentration for a number of banks operating in a given country. 
was produced and incorporated into the efficient frontier functional form 
instead of  for two reasons. First, to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, no previous research has applied Herfindahl methodology to gauge the 
level of competition (concentration) in the loan market. Herfindahl index seems to have 
only been applied to deposit markets. Second, convergence of the log-likelihood 
function could not be achieved if  is specified possibly due to the strong 
collinearity it showed with other macroeconomic variables. Also, including both 
 and  was also inappropriate due to the very high collinearity 
between the two indices, therefore only  is accounted for.  
 

















on a country level to investigate the potential impact of operating in different economic 
environments could have on profit and cost efficiencies of the sample banks. It would 
be interesting to see if the UK banking system– which is an EU- but non-Euro-
economy – has any significant impact on profit or costs of UK-based banks compared 
to the French banking system for instance– which is an EU- and Euro-economy as 
well, or would opting out of both the EU and Euro would provide better environment 
for banks to operate more efficiently as it is the case for the Swiss banking system.   
 
With regard to time dummies, Battese and Coelli (1995) explain that introducing time 
dummies as stochastic frontier variables serves the purpose of detecting shifts in the 
frontier due to technological changes over time. This research introduces linear ( ) 
and non-linear ( ) forms of time dummies following Altunbas et al (2007) to capture 
any possible shifts of the efficient frontier brought about by technological advances. 
The introduction of time dummies to capture possible technological changes as such 
was also applied by a number of earlier studies such as Jagtiani and Khanthavit 
(1996), Altunbas et al (2000), and Huang and Wang (2001).   
 
As for country-specific risk factors, country-specific trading risk factor ( ), which 
is proxied as country-averaged ratio of net trading revenue to total revenue, shows a 
mean value of just under 4% over 2010 – 201859.  
 
Furthermore, country-specific credit risk factor ( ) shows that the average 
proportion of 2008 provisions relative to total loans was about 0.7% over the study 
period between 2008 and 2018. European banks seem to have been able to maintain 
low  ratio possibly because of well-diversified loan portfolios and good quality 
collateral in general. 
 
With regard to country-specific liquidity risk factor ( ), represented by the ratio of 
                                               
59 The size of net trading revenues is believed to be reflective of the level of exposure to trading activities. This is 
because the greater the absolute value or the size of Net trading revenue reflects the bank’s exposure to trading 
activities, whereas the sign of which represents whether there are losses or profits being made from trading. That 
is why Net rather than Gross trading revenue is considered because Gross trading income does not provide the 
extent of exposure to trading as it ignores potential trading costs. This is because unless costs are deducted, it is 













customer and short-term funding to liquid assets, summary statistics show that over 
2008 – 2018 European banking systems seem to hold customer deposits and other 
short-term funding as liabilities that are, on average, about 26 times the value of their 
liquid assets. In other words, the liquidity cover over that period was about 4% (1/26) 
on average. This relatively low ratio for liquidity cover (or high ) indicates 
increasing reliance on customer deposits and short-term funding resources 
(numerator effect), or reduced liquid assets holdings (denominator effect). The former 
view is somehow supported by the findings of the 2004 banking stability report of the 
European Central Bank ECB which may offer a deeper understanding on the 
‘numerator effect’ of the liquidity risk measure ( ) applied in this research. The 
report finds that European banks seem to have relied more on money market funding 
than customer deposits as “the need to rely more on market funding has contributed 
negatively to banks’ net interest income in the past few years. The funding gap60 
between loans granted to the non-bank sectors and deposits taken from these sectors 
has been positive in the last few years” (ECB, 2004a, p 10). Increasing funding gap 
suggests increasing reliance on market funding as opposed to customer deposits 
which in turn suggest higher liquidity risk (i.e. higher ). The ECB shows that 
customer funding gap was lowest in 2008 of around 10%, which then peaked in 2012 
(nearly 22%) but dropped slightly in 2015 to just under 20% (ECB, 2004a, p 13). 
 
Lastly, summary statistics for country-specific insolvency risk factor ( ), 
calculated as the country-averaged ratio of equity capital to total assets, indicate that 
European banking systems held a core capital ratio at an average of nearly 9.5% over 
2008 – 2018, which is slightly above the minimum capital requirements proposed by 
Basel I. This could reflect a somehow low risk of insolvency from a regulatory 
perspective. This in fact is confirmed by the ECB’s 2010 bank stability report which 
found that “EU-15 banks’ capital adequacy levels improved on average in 2012, as 
indicated by the increased overall solvency61 and Tier 1 ratios…where overall 
                                               
60 Customer funding (deposits) is defined as non-bank deposits which include deposits from non-financial 
institutions, government and households (ECB, 2004a, p. 10). Market funding includes “issuance of debt securities 
such as medium-term notes, repos and unsecured interbank borrowing” (ECB, 2004a, p. 10).  
Customer funding gap = (customer loans – customer deposits) / customer loans. Positive gap requires the bank to 
secure additional funding to support its lending operations as its sole core deposits base would not suffice.    
61 Overall solvency is represented in ECB’s 2004 report by Total capital ratio which is (debt + equity 









solvency ratio shifted towards the higher buckets, further indicating a strengthening in 
the solvency of EU-15 banks” (ECB, 2004a, p 15).   
 
5.1.8 Variable Specification 2: Inefficiency Explanatory Variables 
 
Since part of this chapter’s contribution is to investigate the potential correlates (or  
variables) of the technical inefficiency term  (Battese and Coelli, 1995), Table 3 
below provides definitions and summary statistics for each of the proposed 




































Description Mean Std. Min. Max. 
 
Credit Risk Appetite (ex ante) 
= RWA62 / Total Assets 
.5672538 .1923314 .3000077 .9061569 
 
Credit Risk (ex post) 
= Loan Loss Provisions /  
Total Loans 
.0068087 .0076441 -.0027105 .0636142 
 
Trading Risk 
Net Trading Revenue (trading 
income – trading costs)/  
Total Revenues 
.0382202 .0525289 -.0356843 .4288608 
 
Insolvency Risk 
Equity Capital / Total Assets 
.0829675 .0410361 .013538 .1559656 
 
Liquidity Risk 
= (Customer Deposits + SR 
Funding) / Liquid Assets 
22.39321     13.73667 .0012587 95.72 
 
Income Structure 
Net Interest Revenue / Total 
Revenue 
.3061708 .12194  .0466709 .5748032 
 
Funding Structure 
= Customer Deposits / Total 
Funding  
0.83053 0.179414 0.069534 .9470765 
 
Off-Balance Sheet ratio 
= Credit-equivalent of OBS items/ 
Total Assets 
 
.2868564 .3516229 .0001681 2.789446 
 
A non-linear form of Total 
Assets63 
62.8225 19.18659 23.75159 97.07446 





 Non-linear form of time - - 0.5 12.5 
                                               
62 RWA stands for Risk Weighted Assets. 
63 The point of regressing the inefficiency term against this non-linear expression of assets was to account for the 
size-effect on efficiency.  It is worth noting that other non-linear forms of Assets were tested the form used in this 
research is the only one with which the model could converge. Lastly, specifying linear and non-linear forms of 
assets simultaneously in the function was not possible because the model could not converge even after 16000 





















The discussion below provides a brief reflection on some of the bank-specific variables 
explaining inefficiency as provided in Table 3.   
 
To start with, summary statistics for credit risk appetite factor ( ) suggest that 
European banks had about 57 % of these assets as risk weighted assets (RWA) in 
compliance with Basel I over the study period 2008 – 2018.  is introduced in the 
analysis as an ex ante measure of credit risk which provides –from a regulatory 
prospective– a pre-emptive measure for credit risk before the risk of default 
materializes. In terms of interpretation, the higher the  ratio the higher the level of 
RWA relative to the bank’s total assets, which suggests that the bank is taking more 
credit risk from an ex ante perspective. 
 
On the other hand,  provides an ex post perspective on credit risk where 
provisions are built up on the basis of the perceived default risk on loans. The ratio of 
LLPs to total loans is typically investigated in efficiency literature as a proxy for credit 
risk. Statistics shows that loan loss provisions (LLPs) seem to account for 1.7% of total 
loans, which probably reflects a well-managed credit risk by European banks in 
general over 2010 – 2018. Nevertheless, the dispersion of  reflects quite 
distinctive differences in exposure to credit risk by the sample banks, which makes it 
an interesting issue to investigate the impact of on technical efficiency. In terms of 
interpretation, the higher the  ratio the greater the credit risk a given bank 
takes from an ex post perspective, which basically reflects the bank’s assessment for 
the scale of default on the loan portfolio.   
 
Bank-specific trading risk , which is calculated as the ratio of net trading 
revenue to total revenues, reflects the risk-return payoff related to trading activities 
such that the larger the positive value of  (i.e. the larger the value of net trading 
revenue proportionate to total revenues) the better the payoff. Statistics show that the 
average value for is about 4%, meaning that over 2008 – 2018, average 
European bank in this sample made about 4% of its total revenues from trading. The 
drop-in trading and investment banking activities due to the economic slowdown in the 















Bank-specific liquidity risk ( ) is calculated as the ratio of customer and short-
term funding to liquid assets. Statistics show that  has an average of about 
22, suggesting that the average value of customer and short-term funding is about 22 
times the value of liquid assets held by European banks over 2010 – 2018. In other 
words, liquid assets accounted for about 4.6% of customer deposits and short-term 
funding. Higher value of  reflects greater exposure to liquidity risk and vice-
a-versa. 
 
For income structure as represented by (  ),calculated as the ratio of net interest 
income to total income, suggests that this sample of European banks seem to have 
generated, on average, around 30% of their total revenues from interest-related 
activities over the study period. It should be noted however that over the study period 
of 2010 -2018, the slowdown in the Euro area was reflected in reduced demand for 
credit which negatively impacted net interest income. Specifically, annual lending 
growth for the corporate sector dramatically declined from around 11% in 2010 down 
to nearly 4% in 2018. Equally, annual loan growth to households dropped from about 
8% in 2010 to around 6% in 2018 (ECB, 2018). This translated in sluggish growth in 
retail interest margins. The changes that influenced net interest income constitute an 
interesting case to investigate the impact of on profit and cost efficiencies of European 
banks. 
 
Concerning the funding structure ( ), it seems that large European banks were 
heavily dependent on customer deposits given the average value of ratio of 
about 83%. Statistics show a considerable dispersion amongst this sample of 
European banks (with minimum and maximum of 7% and 94% respectively) in terms 
of their reliance on customer deposits to support their assets. Such considerable 
dispersion constitutes an interesting case to investigate in relation to both profit and 
cost efficiencies of the sample banks. 
 
With regards to  variable (calculated as the ratio of the credit-equivalent of off-
balance sheet items to total assets), statistics show an average of  ratio of around 













sheet of an average European bank was held in OBS items over 2010 – 2018. This 
may have some implications on the profit and cost efficiencies as will be shown later. 
 
The discussion now turns to exploring the preferred cost and profit functional forms to 
be estimated. The following sections will test the different modifications applied to both 
profit and cost functions from the statistical and regulatory conditions perspectives. 
The rationale behind modifying the functional form of the efficient frontier is twofold: 
first is to address the risk of estimating a functional form that does not fit the observed 
data (which parametric approaches are often criticized for in DEA literature), and 
second is to test for the impact of the risk factors. The modification process involves 
two main parts: the first is to modify the functional form itself to see whether the 
departure from the Translog form to more flexible forms is justified, and the second is 
to risk-modify the resulting functional form from the first step. The aim is to uncover 
the preferred models to be estimated and therefore to generate the corresponding 
profit and cost efficiencies for this sample of European banks. This in fact constitutes 
the main contribution of this empirical chapter. 
 
5.2 Basic Translog Model ‘T-Basic’ 
 
The starting point is to specify the basic form of Translog function which contains 
standard Translog terms (input prices, output quantities and their interactive terms) in 
addition to time dummies and their interactions with input prices and outputs. The 













































































Following Berger and Mester (1997 and 2003), the alternative profit and cost frontier 
functions have identical specification but with obviously different dependent variables 
and with different treatment for the composite error term . The composite error term 
under the profit functional specification is the result of subtracting the random error 
component ( ) from the inefficiency component ( ) such that  = ( ). Thus, 
the profit efficiency scores can take values up to unity which means that profit 
inefficient observations can only lie beneath the efficient frontier. On the other hand, 
under the cost function specification  = ( ) yielding cost efficiency scores 
with a minimum value of unity. This means that cost inefficient observations can only 
lie above the efficient frontier. 
 
As can be seen, Translog function involves interaction between funding costs  and 
fixed costs  (which are normalized by the price of labour) with the different three 
outputs forming the terms . The rationale for including the 
interactive terms of funding costs with outputs, for instance, is to reflect the variations 
of funding costs ( ) - as a percentage of labor expenses – over the business cycle 
of outputs. These variations can affect the mix of funding liabilities between retail 
deposits and money market or interbank funding (Humphrey and Vale, 2004). Such 
interaction is empirically captured by the coefficients of these interactive input prices-
output quantities terms. The same logic applies to the interaction between fixed capital 
costs ( ) and output quantities.  
 
Now, before embarking on modifying the basic form of the Translog function (T-Basic) 
any further, it is necessary to test the initial appropriateness of the Translog form given 
this research data. This is delivered by subjecting T-Basic to three main tests: 
Homotheticity, Cobb-Douglas, and Non-jointness as shown in the next section. 
 
5.2.1 Testing the Appropriateness of ‘T-Basic’ 
 
Certain structural tests should be applied in order to decide on the initial 
appropriateness of the Translog functional form following Kolari and Zardkoohi (1990). 
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According to Altunbas et al (1996), these tests include: Homotheticity, Cobb-Douglas, 
and Non-jointness. The notion of these structural tests is to impose certain restrictions 
on the Translog function defined in (49) page 202 and then compare the restricted 
against the unrestricted models using F tests. The following table summarizes the 
results of the three tests. 
 





Chi2 Degrees of 
Freedom 
P-value Decision at the 1% 
level 
Homotheticity 86.11 6 0.0000 Reject 
Cobb-
Douglas 
1.1e+08 15 0.0000 Reject 
Non-jointness 689.74 6 0.0000 Reject 
 
 
The Homotheticity restriction implies that the cost function is separable in outputs and 
input prices (Altunbas and Molyneux, 1996). In terms of the Translog function T-Basic 
specified above, such separability of the cost function requires that coefficients are 
significantly not different from zero for all . Results in Table 4 show that the 
homotheticity restriction is strongly rejected at 1% level suggesting that the outputs-
input prices interactive terms are statistically significant and therefore should be 
included in the Translog function.   
 
The Cobb-Douglas restriction implies testing whether all second-order parameters 
introduced by the Translog form are insignificantly different from zero.  In terms of the 
T-Basic cost function defined above, this restriction entails that: = 0, = 0, and
= 0. The Cobb-Douglas test is firmly rejected at the 1% level, suggesting the statistical 
significance of all second-order Translog terms hence confirming the appropriateness 
of a more flexible cost function under the Translog specification compared to the 
restrictive specification of Cobb-Douglas. 
 








a separate production function for each output, i.e. the banking production technology 
implies non-joint production process. In terms of Translog form specified, non-
jointness implies that  are significantly not different from zero for all . The non-
jointness restriction is strongly rejected at the 1% level, indicating that the production 
process cannot be separated for each output. In other words, the marginal cost of a 
given output depends on the level of production of the other output, suggesting that 
cost savings can only be realized if outputs are jointly produced.   
 
All the above-mentioned structural tests for the cost function specified by Translog 
form in (46) are decisively rejected at the 1% critical level. Therefore, the conclusion 
is that, given this research data set, there is no support for homothetic, Cobb-Douglas, 
or non-joint cost function. This result accordingly suggests that the more appropriate 
functional form to represent this sample banks’ cost structure and production 
technology is a multi-input and multi-output Translog functional form.    
 
With these results in mind, it is now safe to discuss the modification process of the 
Translog functional forms for profit and cost-efficient frontiers. The model T-Basic 
defined in (49) page 202 is therefore split into two functional forms: profit and cost-
efficient frontier models. This step is necessary to take now because the two models 
have different dependent variables and the tests for regulatory conditions which will 
be applied on each form later necessitate this separation. The resulting functional 
forms are denoted as T-Basic-C when the dependent variable total costs ( ) is 
specified in equation (50) and T-Basic-P when the dependent variable profits ( ) is 
specified in equation (51). This separation is necessary because the corresponding 
log-likelihood functions will have different values accordingly.  
 
In the next section, these two basic Translog forms will be tested against more 
advanced Translog forms T-C (Translog cost function) and T-P (Translog profit 
function) to decide whether it is justified to depart from the T-Basic functional forms. 
 
5.2.2 Translog Cost function ‘T-C’ 
 








and Euro-adoption dummies denoted as and  respectively, in addition to a 
set of country-specific macroeconomic variables including: GDP growth ( ), 
inflation rate ( ), short-term interest rates ( ), bank-intermediation measure ( ), 
and a loan-market concentration index ( ). These additional variables are all 
defined in Table 2. The introduction of these variables is vital to capture the potential 
impact of country-specific differences on cost efficiency. The resulting Translog cost 





To assess the statistical significance of the added variables under the T-C 
specification, two tests are applied: the log-likelihood ratio and Wald Chi-squared 
tests. Both tests achieve the same purpose of assessing the joint significance of the 
added variables however both are used simply to provide alternative ways of verifying 
the validity of the functional form modification process. To conduct these tests, the T-
Basic-C and T-C models are estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
technique so as to evaluate the corresponding log-likelihood functions for the two 
models and evaluate if improvements to the values of these functions are statistically 












































































































T-Basic-C 27 269.8357 31.02** 42.23** 
T-Basic-C  
nested in T-C 
T-C 34 291.847 - - - 
 
It is clear that the improvement in the value of the log-likelihood function from 269.8357 
to 291.847 is statistically significant at 1% level. This is brought about by the 7 added 
dummies and macroeconomic variables in the T-C model. Also, both test statistics 
show that the H0 stating the joint insignificance of the (7) added variables can 
comfortably be rejected at 1% critical level. Therefore, the departure from the basic 
Translog cost function T-Basic-C to the Translog cost function T-C is well justified.   
 
5.2.3 Translog Profit function ‘T-P’ 
 
Similar methodology to that of the previous section is applied to test whether the 
departure from the basic Translog profit function T-Basic-P to the more flexible 
Translog profit function T-P is justified.  The seven added variables in the Translog 
profit function T-P specified in (51) were defined earlier in the previous section, with 
the difference between T-P and T-C being that the dependent variable under T-P is 
profits instead of total costs. Accordingly, the Translog profit functional form is 
specified as follows: 
 
                                               
64 (**) and (*) indicate that P-value > Chi2 at 1% and 5% significance levels respectively. This notation applies 
throughout the chapter. The value in parenthesis refers to the number of additional variables in the unrestricted 








Table 6 below investigates whether adding these seven variables to improve the T-

















T-Basic-P 27 173.7211 21.25** 22.50** 
T-Basic-P  
nested in T-P 
T-P 34 197.3437 - - - 
 
Table 6 shows that the improved value of the estimated log-likelihood function under 
the T-P specification from 173.7211 to 197.3437 is statistically significant at 1% critical 
level. Both test statistics show that the H0 stating the joint insignificance of the (7) 
added variables can comfortably be rejected at 1% critical level. Thus, the departure 
from T-Basic-P to T-P is well supported. 
 
5.2.4 Fourier Flexible Cost Function ‘F-C’ 
 
In this section a set of Fourier Flexible terms is introduced in an attempt to overcome 
the restrictions of the Translog specification (McAllister and McManus, 1993). 
Specifically, first-order Fourier terms containing both rescaled input prices and output 
quantities are added. The Fourier series is restricted to first order terms in order to 

















































































The introduction of the Fourier terms as such has proven to be essential to meet the 
cost function’s regulatory conditions in a satisfactory manner. The specification of 
Fourier Flexible Cost function F-C is similar to that of T-C as the latter is nested in the 





















T-C 34 291.847 61.07** 72.22** 
T-C nested 
in F-C 
F-C 44 314.3805 - - - 
 
                                               
65 Altunbas et al (2000) provides an excellent summary of the arguments for using the Fourier as opposed to the 
Translog specification. They point out that “the Fourier Flexible functional form should be preferred over the 
Translog because the former better approximates the underlying cost function across a broad range of outputs. 
The semi-non-parametric Fourier functional form has desirable mathematical and statistical properties because an 
(infinite) Fourier series is capable of representing any function exactly, and even truncated Fourier series can 
approximate a function reasonably well throughout its entire range. In contrast, when using parametric methods 
like the Translog, one holds the maintained hypothesis that the bank industry’s true cost function has the Translog 
form. If this maintained hypothesis is false misspecification error occurs. When using the Fourier functional form, 
one avoids holding any maintained hypothesis by allowing the data to reveal the true cost function through a large 


























































































Table 7 shows that the enhanced value of the estimated log-likelihood function under 
the F-C specification from 291.847 to 314.3805 is statistically significant at 1% level. 
Both test statistics show that the H0 stating the joint insignificance of the (10) added 
Fourier terms can comfortably be rejected at 1% critical level. Thus, the departure from 
T-C functional form to F-C is well supported. 
 
5.2.5 Fourier Flexible Profit function ‘F-P’ 
 
The specification of Fourier Flexible Profit frontier F-P is an augmented form of 
Translog Profit frontier T-P. The latter is nested in the former because of the added 



















Wald Chi2  
(10) 
Description 
T-P 34 197.3437 40.43** 45.14** 
T-P nested in 
F-P 




























































































Table 8 shows that the increase in the value of the estimated log-likelihood function 
under the F-P specification from 197.3437 to 204.5602 is statistically significant at 1% 
level. Both test statistics show that the H0 stating the joint insignificance of the (10) 
added Fourier terms can comfortably be rejected at 1% critical level. Thus, the 
departure from T-P to F-P is well supported. 
 
The second stage of the modification process involves incorporating risk factors into 
the frontier functional form. A set of four country-specific risk proxies for trading, credit, 
liquidity, and insolvency risks are introduced which are denoted as , , 
, and  respectively. These risk factors are basically bank-specific that are 
averaged for each group of banks operating in a specific country yielding the country-
specific risk factors. All of the risk factors are defined in Table 1. 
 
Prior to introducing these risk factors, it is necessary to test for potential 
multicollinearity amongst these variables by establishing the correlation coefficient 
matrix showed in Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9 
     
 1    
 0.0176 1   
 -0.1109 0.1936 1  
 0.009 0.2967 0.366 1 
 
 
Results in Table 9 show little evidence of multicollinearity amongst the four risk 
variables. Nonetheless, the correlation between country-specific liquidity risk ( ) 
and insolvency risk ( ) might be suspected as problematic. Such doubt is 
clarified by estimating both profit and cost-efficient frontiers twice, i.e., with and without 
one of the suspected variables, so as to examine whether this would alter the statistical 
significance of the remaining variable. To this end, country-specific liquidity risk  
is chosen as the dropped variable. The cost and profit frontiers, F-C and F-P, are 
TRC. CRC. LRC.
InsRC.












accordingly specified and each is twice estimated with and without . The results 
of this testing procedure are shown in Table 10 below. 
 




    Variable 
Specification 
Results for Country-specific Insolvency 
Risk  
( )  
Coeff. Std. Err. z P|z| 
Cost 
Frontier 
With  .2738111 .1027331 2.67 0.008 
Without  .3283691 .1253198 2.62 0.009 
Profit 
Frontier 
With  -.1461599 .0808376 1.81 0.071 
Without  -.1000841 .0715507 1.40 0.162 
 
Under the cost frontier specification, it is clear that the suspected high correlation 
between country-specific liquidity and insolvency risks,  and , is having no 
significant effect for the estimation results of  when the model is estimated with 
and without  the other risk variable, . The impact of insolvency risk  
remains significant and positive at 1% critical level although changing slightly in 
magnitude. The standard error of  is also not showing dramatic increase. 
Likewise, under the profit frontier specification, estimation results of  are also 
not showing dramatic change.  remains negative and statistically insignificant 
at 1% levels when the profit model is estimated with and without introducing . 
The standard error of  is also not showing any dramatic change. 
 
In light of the results above, it is therefore statistically safe to estimate profit and cost-
efficient frontiers with the two risk variables simultaneously accounted for. This paves 
the way for further modification to be applied to the Fourier Flexible cost F-C and profit 
F-P models discussed above in terms of introducing the proposed four country-specific 
risk variables: trading, credit, liquidity, and insolvency risks. This will accordingly yield 
two new models: The Risk-modified Fourier Flexible Cost model R-F-C and the Risk-




















5.2.6 Risk-Modified Fourier Flexible Cost Model ‘R-F-C’ 
 
The Risk-modified Fourier Flexible Cost model R-F-C is an augmented form of the 
Fourier Flexible Cost model F-C function defined in ((54)). This is achieved by 
incorporating the four country-specific risk variables including: trading, credit, liquidity, 














To test the validity of this modification, log-likelihood and Wald Chi-squared tests are 















F-C 44 314.3805 43.27** 48.68** 
F-C nested  
in R-F-C 
R-F-C 48 336.0138 - - - 
(**) refer to statistical significance at 1% level respectively. 
 
Clearly, the improvement in the value of the log-likelihood function from 314.3805 to 
336.0138 is statistically significant at 1% level. This is caused by the added (4) 































































































joint insignificance of the (4) added risk factors can comfortably be rejected at 1% 
critical level. The conclusion therefore is that the four risk factors are jointly significant 
in improving the model’s fit to the data. Accordingly, the departure from the Fourier 
Flexible Cost function F-C to the Risk-modified Fourier Flexible Cost function R-F-C is 
well justified.   
 
As a final check, the two structural tests are conducted on the most restrictive model 
of Basic Translog Cost function (T-Basic-C) and the preferred Risk-modified Fourier 
Flexible Cost function (R-F-C). This is to further ensure the validity of the preferred R-
F-C model before conducting the estimation. The results of these tests are presented 


















27 269.8357 132.36** 192.52** 
T-Basic-C 
nested in R-F-C 
R-F-C 48 336.0138 - - - 
(**) refer to statistical significance at 1% level respectively. 
 
The dramatic increase in the value of the log-likelihood function brought about by the 
additional 21 variables is statistically significant. This is confirmed by the statistical 
significance of both test statistics in rejecting the null hypothesis at the 1% level. Hence 
the 21 added variables are jointly significant. Therefore, the conclusion that can be 
derived is this: the R-F-C model is strongly preferred to the less flexible cost models 
tested as it offers a significantly enhanced representation (fit) to the data. Therefore, 
the R-F-C model is estimated to analyse European banks cost efficiency.   
 
5.2.7 Risk-Modified Fourier Flexible Profit Model ‘R-F-P’ 
 
The Risk-modified Fourier Flexible Profit model R-F-P is a modified functional form of 
the Fourier Flexible Profit model F-P defined in (55). This is achieved by incorporating 
























F-P 44 204.5602 14.49** 15.06** 
F-P. nested  
in R-F-P 
R-F-P 48 211.8043 - - - 
 
 
The enhanced value of the log-likelihood function from 204.5602 to 211.8043 is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This is caused by the added (4) risk factors in 
R-F-P. Both test statistics show that the H0 stating the joint insignificance of the (4) 
added risk factors can comfortably be rejected at 1% critical level. The conclusion 
therefore is that the four risk factors are jointly significant in improving the model’s fit 
to the data. This suggests that the departure from the F-P to the R-F-P model is well 
justified. 
 
As a final check, the two structural tests are conducted on the most restrictive model 
of Basic Translog Profit function (T-Basic-P) and the preferred Risk-modified Fourier 































































































F-P model before conducting the estimation. The results of these tests are presented 






















R-F-P 48 211.8043 - - - 
 
This is confirmed by the statistical significance of both test statistics in rejecting the 
null hypothesis at the 1% level hence the 21 added variables are jointly significant. 
Therefore, the conclusion that can be derived is this: R-F-P model is strongly preferred 
to the less flexible profit models tested as it offers a significantly enhanced 
representation (fit) to the data, therefore the R-F-P model is estimated to analyse 
European banks profit efficiency.   
 
Having decided on the preferred profit and cost frontier models, the preferred cost 
model is tested for regulatory conditions. Despite the similar specification of the profit 
and cost functions, the literature implies that the profit function does not have to be 
tested for regulatory conditions as does the cost function (Diewert and Wales, 1987 
and Berger and Mester, 1997). Testing the regulatory of the preferred cost function 
(R-F-C) is the subject of the next section. 
 
5.3 Estimating the Preferred Profit and Cost Models 
 
Having explored the different specifications of the preferred model and tested the 
regularity conditions of each, this led to deciding on estimating the Risk-modified Cost 
and Profit frontier functions, namely, R-F-C and R-F-P. These models are defined 
again in equations below. These two models are used to produce the corresponding 













Where  Specifies the number of countries in the panel  = 1, 2… 14. The two 
frontiers are estimated using the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) following the 
single-stage estimation approach where the explanatory variables of the inefficiency 
term are simultaneously estimated with the frontier functional form. The literature 
postulates two mainly applied models for specifying the technical inefficiency model: 
Battese and Coelli (1992) and Battese and Coelli (1995). The inefficiency term’s model 
adopted in this research is the time-flexible model of Battese and Coelli (1995). The 



























































































































































































Estimating the more time-flexible model of Battese and Coelli (1995) is preferred to 
the (1992) model for two reasons. First, the (1995) model permits the application of 
single-stage estimation procedure. Second, the (1995) model does not impose a time 
trend on inefficiencies. For these reasons, Battese and Coelli (1995) inefficiency 
model is adopted. 
 
Because the values of the inefficiency term effects  are unobservable, but the values 
of  are,  is therefore predicted conditional on  estimates. This is achieved by 
applying the conditional expatiation of  on the observed value of  (Coelli, 1996). 
Accordingly, observation-specific predicted inefficiencies are obtained as .  
 
Once predicted inefficiencies  are obtained, bank-specific inefficiency scores (





Equation (54) produces cost efficiency scores, where   is the actual total cost of 
the bank  at time period , which effectively will be equal to and  will be 
expressed as  as the dependent variable in the frontier function is logged.  
are the frontier variables of the R-F-C cost model. Cost efficiency scores take the 
values between one and infinity. On the other hand, producing profit efficiency scores 
follows similar methodology to that of equation ((56)) with profits  being specified 
instead of total costs . Profit efficiency scores take the values up to unity. 
 
Predicted inefficiencies  can then be regressed against a set of explanatory ( ) 
variables in order to explore the drivers of technical inefficiency, and to allow for time-
variancy, both linear and non-linear forms of the time dummy are specified as 
variables as shown in equation (59) below. Following Battese and Coelli (1995, p 328), 
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Where  is the number of banks in the panel: =1, 2, 3… 541, and  represents time 
periods hence takes the values of 1, 2… 5. A full description of these bank-specific 
variables can be found in the table below. 
 
Before estimating the profit and cost frontier models specified above in a single-stage 
process, it is important to check the pair-wise correlations amongst the variables to 
detect any possible multicollinearity. To this purpose, the correlation coefficient 
(variance-covariance) matrix is produced as presented below: 
 
Table 15: Variance-Covariance matrix for bank-specific Risk factors 
 
          
 1         
 0.10 
(0.1564)* 





















































































































Generally, all variables seem to be well-behaving in terms of collinearity as none of 
the correlation coefficients is greater than 0.5 (Newbold, 2007), and none of these 
correlations is statistically significant at the 1% level (although some are at the 5% 
level, however given the small size of the sample the 1% level is considered as the 
main criterion for correlation significance). Accordingly, it is statistically sound to 
include all of the above  variables in the inefficiency model. The following section 
discusses estimation results of the preferred cost model R-F-C and the determinants 
of the cost inefficiency term.   
 
5.4 Empirical Results 1: Cost Function (R-F-C) 
 
The discussion now turns onto analysing the empirical findings related to the estimated 
cost and profit frontiers and their corresponding inefficiencies. To this end, a common 
profit and cost-efficient frontiers are specified because of similarities in regulation and 
technology across European banking markets as illustrated by Berger et al (2001), 
Casu and Molyneux (2003), Casu et al (2004), and Barros et al (2007). McAllister and 
McManus (1993) reinforces the argument of fitting a single (common) frontier over the 
entire sample period on the basis of avoiding the degrees of freedom problem for 
parametric methods. Estimating a single frontier assumes that all countries (banking 
systems) in the sample are situated on the same frontier despite their differences. The 
potential downside of this assumption is mitigated by accounting for country-specific 
differences in terms of risk profiles and macroeconomic conditions as control variables 
in the frontier functional form.   
 
5.4.1 Hypothesis Testing 
 
Prior to conducting the estimation of the preferred cost model R-F-C and producing 
the corresponding cost efficiency estimates, there are three main tests that need to be 
applied to the model, these, according to Battese and Coelli (1995, p 330), are: 
technical inefficiency test, stochasticity test, and inefficiency correlates test. The aim 
of these tests is to ensure whether the cost model (1) has an inefficiency effect, (2) it 
is stochastic, and (3) if the proposed inefficiency term’s correlates are jointly 







5.4.2 Technical Cost Inefficiency Test 
 
This test investigates whether the cost model R-F-C has inefficiency effects or not. 
Coelli (1998) explains that this test examines if the inefficiency variance is significantly 
different from zero. This entails testing  against the alternative   
since inefficiencies can only be nonnegative. The results of this test are resented in 
the table below: 
 
Table 16: Composite error term components 
 
 
Findings clearly show that the null of absent inefficiency effects is strongly rejected 
since  is found to be statistically very significant at the 1% level. Hence the R-F-
C cost model has technical inefficiency effects. 
 
5.4.3 Stochasticity Test 
 
Having ensured the existence of the inefficiency effects, these effects will need to be 
checked for stochasticity. This is because applying the single-stage estimation 
approach requires that the inefficiency effects to be stochastic as assumed by the 
Battese and Coelli (1995) model. This will also have a direct impact on the choice of 
the estimation technique (OLS or SFA). Stochasticity test involves testing the 
significance of the parameter  which implies testing whether the variance 
of the inefficiency term constitute a statistically significant proportion of the variation of 
the composite (or aggregate) error term. 




Components of the composite error 
term 
Coeff. Std. Err. z P|z| 
Variance of the Random Error 
component  
( ) 
-24.32985 5.773881 -4.21 0.000 
Variance of the Technical inefficiency 
component ( ) 








Accordingly, the null states that the technical inefficiency is not stochastic, that is 
, which effectively suggests testing whether  is statistically different from 
zero in relation to . This is tested against  (as technical inefficiency is 
always assumed as being nonnegative) which implies that the frontier is stochastic. 
Not rejecting the null suggests that the frontier’s parameters can consistently be 
estimated using ordinary least squares OLS where the inefficiency term can be 
removed from the model (Coelli, 1996, p 5).   
 
To empirically perform this, according to Gutierrez et al (2001), the R-F-C cost model 
is estimated using MLE and subsequently using the log-likelihood ratio test (LR)66. 
Results show that the null hypothesis that = 0 is comfortably rejected at 1% critical 
level: LR statistics ( ) = 79.83 with P-value = 0.000. Therefore, the technical 
inefficiency model associated with the cost model R-F-C is stochastic because the 
inefficiency term has a significant variation in relation to the variation of the composite 
error term hence the model should be estimated using SFA.   
 
5.4.4 Inefficiency Correlates Test 
 
This test tests the null hypothesis that the inefficiency term’s correlates are jointly 
insignificantly different from zero, although the individual effects of one or more of the 
correlates (determinants) may be statistically insignificant. Given the inefficiency 
model specified in equation (19(59)), . The test statistics is 
Chi-squared distributed with its parameter being equal to the parameters assumed to 
be zero. Results show that  is comfortably rejected at the 1% critical level where 
the tests statistics chi2 (11) = 38.81 and Prob. > chi2 = 0.0002.   
 
                                               
66 The LR test here performs the test on the boundary of the parameter space since the tested parameter is always 
positive and the test examines whether the parameter is different from zero (Coelli, 1996). Gutierrez et al (2001, p 
15) states that “In such cases, the limiting distribution of the maximum-likelihood estimate of the parameter in 
question is a normal distribution that is halved, or chopped-off at the boundary zero in this case.  As a result the 
distribution of the LR test statistic is not the usual chi-square with 1 degree of freedom, but instead a 50:50 mixture 
of a chi-square with no degrees of freedom (i.e. a point mass at zero or normal distribution) and a chi-square with 
1 degree of freedom”. Having said that, the p-value will be equal 1 if LR statistic is close to zero, and one-half of 













All in all, the results of the above three tests indicate that the preferred cost model R-
F-C has a technical inefficiency effects that is stochastic and that its suggested 
correlates are jointly significant. Having found that, the next step now is to estimate 
the R-F-C model as defined in equation (54) simultaneously with the inefficiency model 
defined in equation (19), according to the single-stage SFA approach. 
 
5.4.4.1 Estimating the Cost Function (R-F-C) 
 
To produce observation-specific technical cost inefficiency estimates, the cost frontier 
model, R-F-C that is defined in ((56)), and the technical cost inefficiency model defined 
in ((59)) are estimated under the single-stage SFA. Crucial to producing efficient 
parameters’ estimates (lowest standard errors possible) is to ensure the function’s 
convergence. Convergence is important to achieve since this is indicative of reaching 
the greatest value of the log-likelihood function (LL) which corresponds to the R-F-C 
model in the estimation process. Without achieving the convergence of (LL), the 
resulting parameters’ estimates would be less reliable (or less efficient). In light of this, 
Figure 8 graphically displays the convergence of the (LL) function representing the 
estimated cost frontier which specifies the R-F-C model jointly with the inefficiency 
model. 
 
Figure 8: Convergence of estimated R-F-C cost frontier with Battese & Coelli 

























Figure 8 depicts the progression of the iterative process applied by the maximum 
likelihood estimation technique MLE to evaluate the LL function which corresponds to 
the R-F-C model. Convergence is achieved when the curve becomes eventually flat. 
Figure 4 shows that the cost function converges to its maximum possible value of 
390.46699 after 26 iterations. The estimation outcome for the cost frontier model is 
shown below: 
 
Iteration 24:  log likelihood =  490.45501   
Iteration 25:  log likelihood =  490.46623   
Iteration 26:  log likelihood =  490.46699   
 
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model   
Number of obs = 541 
      Wald chi2(48) = 1.089e+09 
      Prob > chi2  = 0.0000 






















 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
 .8540357 .1593414 5.36 0.000 .5417322 1.166339 
 .3764798 .0950634 3.96 0.000 .1901588 .5628007 
 -2.298756 .7925618 -2.90 0.004 -3.852148 -.7453634 
 -.5442946 .7110157 -0.77 0.444 -1.93786 .8492705 
 .2851808 .1043743 2.73 0.006 .080611 .4897507 
 -.1531868 .0912211 -1.68 0.093 -.3319769 .0256033 
 -.0308776 .0172508 -1.79 0.073 -.0646886 .0029333 
 .0022103 .0067954 0.33 0.745 -.0111085 .0155291 
 1.416898 .3488817 4.06 0.000 .7331028 2.100694 
 .9341489 .3470001 2.69 0.007 .2540413 1.614257 
 -.123604 .0548469 -2.25 0.024 -.231102 -.016106 
 -.0368887 .0454413 -0.81 0.417 -.1259521 .0521747 
 .0236013 .0321541 0.73 0.463 -.0394196 .0866223 
 -.1172417 .0198196 -5.92 0.000 -.1560875 -.078396 
 .0122847 .0153713 0.80 0.424 -.0178425 .0424119 
 -.0667754 .020713 -3.22 0.001 -.1073722 -.0261787 
 .0411668 .0097096 4.24 0.000 .0221364 .0601972 
 -.0567643 .007637 -7.43 0.000 -.0717324 -.0417961 
 -.0512964 .0092335 -5.56 0.000 -.0693937 -.0331991 
 .0070236 .0047713 1.47 0.141 -.002328 .0163753 
 -.0020947 .0042805 -0.49 0.625 -.0104843 .0062949 
 .0086007 .0019827 4.34 0.000 .0047148 .0124867 
 -.0099285 .006155 -1.61 0.107 -.0219921 .0021351 
 -.0202139 .0048177 -4.20 0.000 -.0296565 -.0107714 
 .0106774 .0053617 1.99 0.046 .0001687 .0211862 
 .0089875 .0403856 0.22 0.824 -.0701669 .0881419 
 -.0055524 .0086188 -0.64 0.519 -.0224449 .0113402 









































 -.3728306 .096756 -3.85 0.000 -.5624689 -.1831923 
 -.2737374 .1975796 -1.39 0.166 -.6609863 .1135116 
 .1599284 .1000625 1.60 0.110 -.0361906 .3560473 
 .1392772 .0480462 2.90 0.004 .0451083 .233446 
 .0415813 .0194783 2.13 0.033 .0034046 .0797579 
 .5135955 .1503312 3.42 0.001 .2189519 .8082392 
 -.3552356 .1097121 -3.24 0.001 -.5702674 -.1402038 
 .0824003 .0590216 1.40 0.163 -.0332799 .1980804 
 .1111981 .0258736 4.30 0.000 .0604868 .1619094 
 .0698374 .0327915 2.13 0.033 .0055673 .1341076 
 .0061857 .0082689 0.75 0.454 -.010021 .0223924 
 -.0031762 .003979 -0.80 0.425 -.0109748 .0046225 
 -.0068753 .0074374 -0.92 0.355 -.0214523 .0077017 
 .0051477 .0090592 0.57 0.570 -.0126081 .0229034 
 .000221 .0000676 3.27 0.001 .0000884 .0003535 
 -.0160632 .047639 -0.34 0.736 -.109434 .0773076 
 6.903923 1.639471 4.21 0.000 3.69062 10.11723 
 .5577072 .1561363 -3.57 0.000 -.8637287 -.2516858 
 .0039784 .000822 4.84 0.000 .0023672 .0055895 



































The estimation outcome shows that the (LL) function converges at the value of 
390.46699 after 26 iterations. The model is estimated using SFA approach with a half-
normal distribution specified for the model’s inefficiency term.   
 
For the purpose of interpreting the frontier variables’ estimation results, it is assumed 
that all observed banks pursue the objective of cost minimization. Accordingly, a cost 
frontier is defined as the “minimum expenditure required to produce any scalar output, 
given input prices” (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p 33 – 34), implying that the 
expenditure of each observed bank must be on or above the cost frontier. This 
relationship is depicted by Figure 9 below. Time variables in the stochastic frontier 
model R-F-C defined above account for technological changes that are detected by 
the frontier’s shifts. Accordingly, time-related shifts in the cost frontier are caused by 
the significant impact (estimated coefficient) of any time or time-interactive variables 
describing the frontier function.   
 
The frontier can be depicted according to Battese and Coelli (1995, p 329) as follows: 
 
Figure 9: A Cost Frontier (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p 33) 
 
The frontier shown above is a single-dimensional cost frontier used for the sole 
purpose of illustrating the impact of the cost frontier’s shift. It is a simple representation 
of the true frontier which would be shaped as a surface since total costs are regressed 
against several independent variables including outputs, input prices, time interactive 





frontier over time which translates into enhanced cost efficiency. This is because for a 
given level of outputs, a bank would incur less costs to produce the given level of 
outputs, or that for the same level of costs more outputs can be produced. In both 
cases the result is better usage of resources that is reflected in better cost efficiency 
(lower costs). 
 
Considering the estimation results above, it appears that there are 3-time interactive 
terms showing a significant impact at the 5% critical level on total costs over 2010 – 
2018 but with different directions. (representing the interaction of time with the 
price of funds) is found to cause an upward shift in the cost frontier causing cost 
efficiency to decline over time. Similarly,  (representing the time interaction with 
the third output, off-balance-sheet items OBS) is also found to drive the cost frontier 
upwards. On the other hand,  (representing the time interaction with the second 
output, other earning assets or OEA) is showing a negative impact suggesting that 
there have been favorable technological advances related to producing OEA which 
seems to cause a downward shift in the cost frontier (i.e., enhanced cost efficiency). 
Estimates for the latter time-interactive factor ( ) show that it has the most significant 
negative coefficient in terms of size and statistical significance. 
 
All in all, the collective impact of these three significant time-interactive terms seems 
to suggest that the cost frontier follows a non-linear trend over time. The cost frontier 
function can reveal a maximum stationary point(s) relating total costs and time: this 
can be seen by twice differentiating it with respect to time (given the negative sing of 
the 2nd order time interactive term, ). 
 
More generally, the cost function estimated above shows that 56% of the frontier’s 
variables (27 out of 48) are found to be significant at 5% (45% of these variables are 
significant at 1%, that is 22 variables). The model’s Translog terms (including time-
interactive terms and time dummies) seem to perform well in explaining the variation 
of total costs as the majority of them display significant coefficient estimates. 
Specifically, 15 out of the 27 Translog terms (i.e. 55% of these terms) are significant 
at 5% critical level, indicating a good fit to the data by Translog terms. Compared to 












Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2008) for instance using Translog functional form, found 
44% only of the frontier variables as significant at 5% with an additional 1 variable 
found significant at 1%.   
 
As for EU-membership and Euro-adoption dummies ( and ), results show 
that only the  factor has a positive and significant relationship with total costs at 
5% critical level.  This result indicates that, over 2010 – 2018, banking systems of 
Member States (i.e. EU-economy) would incur higher costs than banks operating in a 
non-EU-economy. Specifically, estimation results indicate that banks operating in an 
EU-economy are likely to run higher costs by around67 7% (.0698374) compared to 
banks operating in a Non-EU-economy. That is the significant impact of  is found 
to cause banking systems of Member States to incur around 7% higher costs than 
banking systems of Non-EU countries. 
 
Concerning the impact of the macroeconomic variables, it appears that has a 
significant and positive impact on total costs.  is the ratio of M2 money supply to 
GDP that is used as a proxy for the level of bank intermediation in economy . 
Therefore, the greater the value of , the greater the degree of banks’ 
intermediation (or financial depth) in the financial system. Results indicate that, in a 
given economy, banks’ costs are likely to increase as they become more involved in 
financial intermediation (taking deposits and making loans), however such increase is 
minor given the relatively small size of ’s coefficient (.000221). Despite that this 
result indicates that greater financial depth suggests more costs incurred, this does 
not imply lower cost efficiency for a given banking system as costs could increase less 
proportionately than outputs. Previous studies have tested the correlation between 
financial intermediation and cost efficiency but not total costs. Kasman and Yildirim 
(2006) use SFA in a single-stage estimation approach to estimate cost and profit 
functions (truncated at the 2nd order terms) for commercial banks in 8 new member 
                                               
67 If both the dependent and independent variables are logged, then the interpretation of coefficient estimates (
) follows the elasticity interpretation, that is, when  increases by 1%,  increases by %. On the other hand, if 
the dependent is logged and the independent is not logged, then the interpretation of coefficient estimates ( ) 

















states of the EU in 2004. They found that cost efficiency is positively correlated with 
the level of financial development (M2/GDP). 
 
In relation to the country-level risk variables, three out of the four risk factors 
introduced into the frontier functional form seem to have very significant impact on 
total costs at the 1% critical level. For country-specific credit risk , calculated as 
the country-averaged ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, estimation shows that 
it has a positive and significant impact on European banks’ total costs. The positive 
correlation of  with total costs indicates that as the proportion of loan provisions 
to the size of loans portfolio increases by 1%, total cost would tend to increase by 
6.9% (given the coefficient of  of 6.903923). In other words, for an average 
increase of 1% in a given banking system’s , total costs of that country’s banking 
system are likely to increase by around 6.9% on average. Notably,  is found to 
have the most significant impact in magnitude on costs amongst the other risk factors, 
which can indicate that loan loss provisions are one major factor affecting European 
banking costs. 
 
As for country-specific trading risk , calculated as the country-averaged ratio of 
net trading revenue to total revenues, results show a significant and positive impact of 
on total costs. Specifically, for a 1% increase in the value of net trading income 
relative to total income, total costs are likely to increase by nearly 5.5% (coefficient of 
.5577072). The positive relationship between an increase in net trading revenue (the 
numerator effect) and total costs can only be explained as follows. The increase in net 
trading revenue (the numerator) can be the result of a more proportionate increase in 
trading revenues relative to the increase in trading costs (losses), leading to larger net 
trading revenue as a result. Accordingly, the positive correlation between net trading 
revenue and total costs can only be explained by a parallel, but less proportionate, 
increase in trading costs that is translating into increasing losses. Therefore, this 
positive correlation between an increase in net trading revenue (hence increasing the 
value of ) and total costs is probably the result of increasing trading costs as 













seems to suggest that the European banking systems seem to incur increasing costs 
as they expand their trading activities. 
 
Finally, results for country-averaged liquidity risk  show a positive and significant 
impact on total costs with a relatively small magnitude of (.0039784).  is 
calculated as the ratio of customer and short-term funding to liquid assets. Results 
show that for a 1% increase in liquidity risk (or in customer and short-term funding 
relative to liquid assets), total costs increase by about 0.004%. It is worth noting that 
the combination of customer and short-term funding can suggest a funding-mix effect 
on total costs, however to more closely represent the lines of defense banks use 
against short-term liquidity shortages, both sources of funding had to be included to 
more realistically represent banks’ exposure to liquidity risk. The funding-mix effect 
can be isolated by comparing the cost of customer and short-term funding.   
 
All in all, estimation results on banking system level indicate that, over 2010 – 2018, 
total costs for European banking systems tend to increase relative to the depth of the 
financial system. Moreover, banking systems of Member States tend to incur higher 
costs than banks operating in non-EU-economies. Lastly, results show a positive 
correlation between total costs, loan losses, exposure to trading risk and money 
market (or short term) funding. 
 
5.4.5 Determinants of Technical Cost Inefficiency 
 
This section discusses the determinants of technical cost inefficiency model defined 
in (19). The estimates of these inefficiency correlates are produced simultaneously 
with those of the cost frontier R-F-C. As pointed earlier, Battese and Coelli (1995) 
time-flexible technical inefficiency model is followed in this research where the 
technical inefficiency is regressed against a set of potential explanatory variables 
(determinants or correlates). These determinants of cost inefficiency are bank-specific 
variables that can be classified into 7 categories. Full description of these variables is 
presented in Table 3. These variables include: 
 







by the credit risk appetite ( ) which is calculated as the ratio of risk weighted 
assets to total assets, (b) an ex post measure for credit risk represented by the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans ( ), (c) a proxy for trading risk 
( ) ) calculated as the ratio of net trading revenue to total revenues, (d) 
a proxy for liquidity risk ( ) calculated as the ratio of customer and 
short-term funding to total funding, and (e) a proxy for insolvency risk (
) calculated as the ratio of equity capital to total assets. 
2. Business Structure ( ) represented by the ratio of the credit equivalent of 
Off-Balance-Sheet items (OBS) to total assets. 
3. Income Structure ( ) represented by the ratio of interest income to total 
income. 
4. Funding Structure ( ) represented by the ratio of short-term funding 
customer deposits to total funding. 
5. Bank Size represented by a non-linear form of assets ( ) following Berger 
et al (1993)68.  
6. Two forms of time dummies  and  re included to ensure the time-flexibility 
of the technical inefficiency model so as to capture the change in inefficiency 
effects over time69.  
 




                                               
68 The idea of applying the second-order logarithmic form of (assets) stems from the work of Berger and Mester 
(1997, p 924) who apply a second-order logarithmic form of credit risk measure (NPL/Loans) as a control variable 
in the cost function to control for the effect of bad luck. The second-order logarithmic form of (assets) is applied 
because the model could not converge with other forms of (assets), and including a linear (log of assets) along 
with this non-linear form of (assets) has demonstrated considerable multicollinearity. 
69 Empirically, it is the mean or the variance of the inefficiency term’s distribution that is regressed 
conditionally against the proposed set of determinants or z variables (according to the inefficiency models 
suggested by Battese and Collie 1995 and Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000 respectively). The research applies the 
conditional variance model of Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) as the conditional mean model was tested but 
convergence could not be achieved under which. However, results are interpreted as the inefficiency term being 
correlated with a set of z variables (see for instance Girardone, Molyneux and Gardener, 2004). Neither the mean 
nor the variance of the inefficiency term’s distribution should be thought of as constants because every 
observation’s inefficiency term will have a unique distribution with different mean or variance as the sample is 
drawn from an unknown population. The conditional variance model is also consistent with the half-normal 
distributional assumption of the inefficiency term since for the conditional mean model half-normality cannot be 
assumed since the mean would be zero. The latter can accommodate the truncated normal distribution with 















Table 17: Determinants of Technical Cost Inefficiency70 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
 .2328846 .9673399 0.24 0.810 -1.663067 2.128836 
 -25.53426 23.98459 -1.06 0.287 -72.5432 21.47468 
 8.940631 3.473104 2.57 0.010 2.133472 15.74779 
 -.0130596 .0132164 -0.99 0.323 -.0389633 .0128441 
 -15.67597 6.46373 -2.43 0.015 -28.34465 -3.007292 
 .3149656 .5511261 0.57 0.568 -.7652219 1.395153 
 1.063079 2.209279 0.48 0.630 -3.267028 5.393541 
 2.229046 1.523265 1.46 0.143 -.7564979 5.214589 
 -.01226 .0078235 -1.57 0.117 -.0275938 .0030737 
 -.3569105 .5751851 -0.62 0.535 -1.484253 .7704315 
 .1234843 .1954843 0.63 0.528 -.259658 .5066265 
 
Prior to discussing the results, it should be noted that bank-specific variables 
described above are correlated with inefficiency effects as defined in (55). Therefore, 
a variable that is shown to have a significant and negative coefficient (such as 
) suggests that it is negatively correlated with cost inefficiency. This can 
alternatively be interpreted as being positively correlated with cost 
efficiency. Estimates highlighted with bold typeface are the statistically significant 
factors at the 5% critical level.  
 
Results show that cost inefficiency seems to significantly be influenced by two main 
factors: trading risk ( ) and insolvency risk ( ). Trading risk (
), represented by the ratio of net trading revenue to total revenues, is found to have a 
positive and significant impact on cost inefficiency. Taking on more trading risk, i.e. 
the larger the value of ( ), results either from larger numerator (net trading 
revenue) or smaller denominator (total revenue). Moreover, the larger value of (
) can reflect the business-mix effect as in this case the bank chooses to 
generate more income from trading as opposed to other activities related to the 
                                               


























banking book for instance. Both scenarios suggest greater involvement in trading. 
Therefore, the finding suggests that as banks take more trading risk, i.e. as net trading 
revenue increases relative to total revenues, European banks become less cost 
efficient. A negative impact on cost efficiency can possibly be explained by increasing 
trading losses incurred by European banks on average over 2010 – 2018.   
 
On the other hand, insolvency risk ( ), calculated as the ratio of equity capital 
to total assets, is found to have a negative impact on cost inefficiency. In other words, 
banks are likely to be more cost efficient if they are better capitalized. This finding is 
consistent with that of Mester (1993 and 1996) and Girardone et al (2004) who also 
find a negative correlation between capital ratio (equity/assets) and cost inefficiency. 
Likewise, Pasiouras (2008) also applies the capital ratio and finds a positive correlation 
with technical efficiency using Greek banking data. This is also consistent with the 
findings of Isik and Hassan (2003) using data on Turkish banking, Rao (2005) using 
data on United Arab Emirates and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) using US data. There 
are four potential interpretations to this positive correlation between capitalization and 
efficiency.   
 
First, well-capitalized banks are more capable of expanding their balance sheets and 
further spread there costs over higher levels of outputs which would translate into 
reduced average costs and ultimately enhance the bank’s cost efficiency. Second, the 
positive relationship between  and cost efficiency can be explained from the 
cost of finance perspective. Better capitalization is associated with lower levels of 
default risk which would be perceived by regulators, investors, and capital markets 
providing long term finance as a good sign of the bank’s safety.  As a result, regulators 
would require less regulatory capital to be set aside, investors would ask for less 
expected returns to compensate for the risk they are taking, and capital markets would 
translate better capitalization into less interest required on long term finance. This is 
based on the moral hazard argument of Mester (1996) such that, better capitalization 
reduces the potential for moral hazard by bank mangers which in turn would positively 
be reflected on the short- as well as long-term cost of finance. In any of these cases, 
better capitalized banks can enjoy lower long-term funding costs and therefore 








Third, an alternative view based on the argument of Girardone et al (2004) suggest 
that, the inverse relationship between capital and cost inefficiency can be explained 
as: banks with low cost inefficiency are more capable of generating profits and 
therefore retaining more earnings as capital. Fourth, greater capitalization is believed 
to reduce the adverse impact of principal-agent problem stemming from information 
asymmetry. In this sense, Pasiouras (2008) argues that the level of equity capital 
reflects shareholders incentive to monitor the bank management to ensure that it 
operates efficiently since equity is their capital that is at risk. Hence greater 
capitalization in this sense would result in greater technical efficiency. 
 
Notably, insolvency risk ( ) displays the largest and most significant 
coefficient amongst all other bank-specific cost efficiency determinants. This strong 
relationship indicates that bank capitalization is the main factor affecting its technical 
cost efficiency. With this in mind, the conclusion therefore is that: European banks can 
operate more cost efficiently if they are better capitalized. It should be noted here that 
this conclusion should be treated with caution, as it should not be interpreted as 
increasing the ratio of equity funding to total assets (as represented by ) will 
improve cost efficiency at any level. This is because the right balance of equity to debt 
finance needs to be established as a bank will surely be cost inefficient if it is 
excessively financed by equity since equity is more expensive source of finance than 
debt. On the other hand, equity finance is of a unique importance for banks as it 
delivers safety that distance the bank from the risk of insolvency (which is paramount 
not only for individual banks but also for the banking systems they are part of), which 
is why the argument of moral hazard for instance applies. The impact of bank safety 
on cost efficiency is what the insolvency risk measure ( ) attempts to 
capture. In this sense, better capitalized banks can improve their cost efficiency as 
results suggest but up to the level where equity capitalization achieves the right 
balance between the banks’ risk profile, insolvency, and cost of finance. Beyond this 
point, further equity capitalization would cause costs to increase dramatically and 
therefore increase cost inefficiency as a result.   
 








findings. The credit risk appetite ratio ( ) is found to have no significant impact on 
European banks cost efficiency. The size of the  ratio indicates to the level of 
exposure to credit risk, and the impact of   on cost efficiency indicate to how well-
managed credit risk is. Finding no significant impact of  is quite interesting as it 
could be an indication of the ineffectiveness of the capital requirements set by Basel I 
as far as the criteria of risk-weighted assets is concerned. Having found no significant 
impact by on cost efficiency provides no indication on how well credit risk is 
managed by European banks over the sample period 2008 – 2018. If  was 
effective in representing credit risk from an ex ante perspective, it could have shown 
a significant positive or negative impact on banks cost efficiency.   
 
In this sense, if  had a positive and significant impact on bank cost efficiency, this 
would have indicated that credit risk is well managed by European banks. This 
suggests that taking on more credit risk is having a positive impact on costs (in terms 
of lesser defaults) as loans mature which could be a direct result of the diversification 
effect. On the other hand, if was to show a negative and significant impact on 
cost efficiency, this would have reflected an excessive credit risk that is being reflected 
in increasing defaults. However, having found no significant impact for  on cost 
efficiency may well indicate to the insensitivity of Basel I regulatory risk weights since 
they are based on the criteria of one-size-fits-all (Dowd, 2002).   
 
Moreover, the ratio of interest margin to total revenues (as represented by ) is 
showing no significant impact on European bank’s cost efficiency. This is in contrast 
to the findings of Girardone et al (2004) where the ratio of interest margin to total 
assets was found with a negative impact on cost efficiency in Italian banks over 1993 
– 1996.   
 
Furthermore, cost efficiency correlates show no significant impact of ex post credit risk 
(represented by the ratio of loan losses to total loans) on cost efficiency. 
Estimation result for is quite mixed as credit risk is found to be negatively 
correlated with cost inefficiency, which is counterintuitive, however this is not 

















more, the size of OBS items relative to the bank total assets as represented by  
factor also shows no significant impact on cost efficiency. 
 
Lastly, concerning the relationship between size, represented , and cost 
efficiency, results show no evidence of a significant impact of size on cost efficiency.  
This is further confirmed by conducting a correlation (covariance) test between bank 
size (total assets) and cost efficiency scores. The test reveals very weak correlation 
(a coefficient of -0.0372) that is insignificant at 5% or 10% level (p-value = 0.6134). 
Such finding is in line with Mester (1993), Berger and DeYong (1997), Altunbas et al 
(2000) and Girardone et al (2004). The conclusion therefore is that there is no strong 
evidence to suggest that larger banks are more cost efficient than smaller banks or 
vice-a-versa. These results are in contrast to, for instance, Cavallo and Rossi (2001) 
who apply the two-stage estimation technique and specify a Translog cost function 
and the time-inflexible inefficiency model, Battese and Coelli (1992), to banks in 6 
major EU countries over 1992 – 1997 and find that smaller banks are more cost 
efficient than larger banks. 
 
To sum up, estimation results for bank-specific cost efficiency determinates over 2008 
– 2018 seem to suggest the following: European banks can operate more cost 
efficiently by (1) reducing their exposure to trading risk (in terms of reducing trading 
losses), and (2) being better capitalized. Moreover, it seems that Basel I credit risk 
weighting criteria has no significant impact on European banks cost efficiency given 
the insignificance of the credit risk appetite measure ( ) found. Further, there 
seems to be no significant correlation between cost efficiency and the level interest 
margin (relative to total revenues) or the level of OBS items (relative to total assets). 
Finally, there is also no evidence to suggest that cost efficiency is related to bank size. 
 
5.5 Empirical Results 2: Profit Function (R-F-P) 
 
Prior to conducting the estimation on the preferred profit model R-F-P and produce 
the corresponding profit efficiency estimates, there are three main tests that need to 
be applied to the model, these, according to Battese and Coelli (1995, p 330), are: 










of these tests is to ensure that the profit model (1) has an inefficiency effect, (2) it is 
stochastic, and (3) if the proposed inefficiency term’s correlates are jointly significant.   
 
5.5.1 Hypothesis Testing 
 
5.5.1.1 Technical Profit Inefficiency Test 
 
This test investigates whether the cost model R-F-P has inefficiency effects or not. 
This entails testing  against the alternative  since inefficiencies 
can only be nonnegative. The results of this test are resented in the table below: 
 
Table 18: Technical Profit Inefficiency 
 
Findings clearly show that the null hypothesis of absent inefficiency effects is strongly 
rejected since  is found to be statistically very significant at the 1% level. Hence 
the R-F-P profit frontier model has a technical inefficiency effect. 
 
5.5.2 Stochasticity Test 
 
Having ensured the existence of the inefficiency effects, these effects will need to be 
checked for stochasticity. Stochasticity test involves testing the significance of the 
parameter which in effect tests if the variation of the inefficiency term is 
statistically significant in relation to the total variation of the composite error term. 
 
Accordingly, the null states that the technical inefficiency is not stochastic, that is 




Components of the composite error 
term 
Coeff. Std. Err. z P|z| 




25.61103    
20.04917     -1.28 0.201     
Variance of the Technical Inefficiency 
component ( ) 
-
4.324954    










 implying that frontier is not stochastic, and the alternative  (as 
technical inefficiency is always assumed as being nonnegative) implies that the 
frontier is stochastic. Not rejecting the null suggests that the frontier’s parameters can 
consistently be estimated using ordinary least squares OLS where the inefficiency 
term can be removed from the model (Coelli, 1996, p 5). Results show that the null 
hypothesis is comfortably rejected at 1% critical level: LR statistics ( ) = 1.1e+02 
with P-value = 0.000. Therefore, the variation of the technical inefficiency term is 
significant in relation to the variation of the composite error term hence the profit model 
R-F-P is stochastic, implying that the model should be estimated according to the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach. 
 
5.5.3 Inefficiency Correlates Test 
 
This test tests the null hypothesis that the inefficiency term’s correlates are jointly 
insignificantly different from zero, although the individual effects of one or more of the 
correlates (determinants) may be statistically insignificant. Given the inefficiency 
model specified in equation ((59)(19)), .  The test statistics is 
Chi-squared distributed with its parameter being equal to the parameters assumed to 
be zero. Results show that is comfortably rejected at the 1% critical level where 
the tests statistics chi2 (11) = 489.13 and Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000.   
 
All in all, the results of the above three tests indicate that the preferred profit frontier 
model R-F-P has a technical inefficiency effects and the model is stochastic, and that 
the suggested correlates of the profit inefficiency term are jointly significant. Having 
found that, the next step now is to estimate the R-F-P model as defined in equation 
((55)) simultaneously with the inefficiency model defined in equation ((19)) according 
to the single-stage SFA approach.   
 
5.5.4 Estimating Profit Function (R-F-P) 
 
Crucial to producing efficient parameters estimates (lowest standard errors possible) 
is to ensure convergence of the estimated function. Convergence is important to 
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achieve since it indicates that the greatest value of the log-likelihood function (LL) 
which corresponds to the R-F-P model is achieved. Without achieving the 
convergence of (LL), the resulting parameters’ estimates would be less reliable (or 
less efficient). In light of this, Figure 10 graphically displays the convergence of the (LL) 
function representing the profit frontier model which comprises of the frontier model 
R-F-P defined in ((55)) and the corresponding inefficiency model defined in ((59)(19)). 
 
Figure 10: Convergence of R-F-P frontier model with Battese & Coelli (1995) 




Figure 10 depicts the progression of the iterative process applied by the maximum 
likelihood estimation technique MLE to evaluate the LL function. Convergence is 
achieved when the curve becomes eventually flat. Figure 6 shows that the profit 
function converges to its maximum possible value of 460.06731 after 297 iterations. 
The estimation outcome for the profit frontier model is shown below: 
 
Iteration 295: log likelihood =  459.43983   
Iteration 296: log likelihood =  459.55414   
Iteration 297: log likelihood =  460.06731   
 
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model            
 Number of obs   =        541 






















 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 




































 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
 -.1357753 .0589063 -2.30 0.021 -.2512296 -.0203211 
 -.4223962 .0597759 -7.07 0.000 -.5395548 -.3052375 
 1.619623 .4163719 3.89 0.000 .803549 2.435697 
 -.2658352 .2012139 -1.32 0.186 -.6602071 .1285367 
 .0005074 .0522326 0.01 0.992 -.1018667 .1028814 
 .2841759 .034546 8.23 0.000 .216467 .3518848 
 .0722887 .0089373 8.09 0.000 .054772 .0898054 
 -.0359784 .0035643 -10.09 0.000 -.0429643 -.0289924 
 -.8424527 .1907209 -4.42 0.000 -1.216259 -.4686466 
 .1688598 .0873803 1.93 0.053 -.0024024 .340122 
 -.0349755 .0244934 -1.43 0.153 -.0829817 .0130306 
 -.0746498 .0106057 -7.04 0.000 -.0954365 -.053863 
 .0450624 .0110283 4.09 0.000 .0234474 .0666775 
 .0050695 .0053627 0.95 0.344 -.0054412 .0155803 
 .0475205 .0112738 4.22 0.000 .0254242 .0696168 
 -.0062002 .0090865 -0.68 0.495 -.0240094 .0116091 
 .0119354 .007757 1.54 0.124 -.0032681 .0271389 
 .0184969 .0034657 5.34 0.000 .0117044 .0252895 
 .0105026 .0046663 2.25 0.024 .0013568 .0196485 
 -.0123641 .00287 -4.31 0.000 -.0179893 -.006739 
 .0094042 .0037032 2.54 0.011 .0021462 .0166623 
 -.0032676 .0007813 -4.18 0.000 -.0047989 -.0017363 
 .0123355 .0035433 3.48 0.000 .0053907 .0192803 
 .0049389 .0033683 1.47 0.143 -.0016629 .0115406 
 .0001776 .0016585 0.11 0.915 -.003073 .0034282 
 -.0656819 .0162856 -4.03 0.000 -.0976011 -.0337627 
 .0104154 .0029972 3.48 0.001 .004541 .0162898 









































 .124142 .0438299 2.83 0.005 .038237 .210047 
 -.1038874 .0546648 -1.90 0.057 -.2110285 .0032537 
 .0209514 .0297249 0.70 0.481 -.0373083 .0792111 
 .0098205 .0208366 0.47 0.637 -.0310185 .0506596 
 -.0054497 .0086593 -0.63 0.529 -.0224216 .0115222 
 -.2264442 .0735719 -3.08 0.002 -.3706424 -.082246 
 .311149 .0233132 13.35 0.000 .2654561 .3568419 
 -.175989 .0262042 -6.72 0.000 -.2273483 -.1246297 
 -.1075219 .0204796 -5.25 0.000 -.1476611 -.0673826 
 .0397273 .0125506 3.17 0.002 .0151286 .0643261 
 -.0455074 .0065705 -6.93 0.000 -.0583852 -.0326295 
 -.0023406 .0019989 -1.17 0.242 -.0062584 .0015772 
 .0082125 .0034989 2.35 0.019 .0013548 .0150703 
 -.011919 .0024669 -4.83 0.000 -.0167541 -.0070839 
 .0000542 .0000397 1.37 0.172 -.0000236 .000132 
 .0040224 .0242246 0.17 0.868 -.0434569 .0515017 
 -.4141348 .4192986 -0.99 0.323 -1.235945 .4076754 
 -.1556754 .1133088 -1.37 0.169 -.3777565 .0664057 
 -.0013971 .0003116 -4.48 0.000 -.0020078 -.0007864 



































The estimation outcome shows that the (LL) function converges at the value of 
460.06731 after 297 iterations. The model is estimated using SFA approach with a 
half-normal distribution specified for the model’s inefficiency term. The Wald Chi-
squared test confirms that the model’s 48 parameters (representing the frontier 
variables) are jointly very significant at the 1% level in explaining the variation of the 
dependent variable, total profits ( ). 
 
For the purpose of interpreting the frontier variables’ estimation results, it is assumed 
that all observed banks pursue the objective of profit maximization. Accordingly, a 
profit frontier corresponds to the maximum profits attainable from producing a given 
output level and mix under given input prices (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The profit 
frontier represents the best performance possible and therefore is applied as a bench 
mark against which the observed profits of sample banks are compared. As the 
maximum obtainable profit is characterized by efficient profit frontier, observed banks’ 
profits must lie on or beneath the frontier, causing profit efficiency scores to range 
between (0) and (1). 
 
With regard to the time and time-interactive terms, estimation results show that 5 out 
of a total of 7 variables are found to significantly affect the profit frontier R-F-P. As 
illustrated earlier, any significant impact of these time interactive terms cause the 
frontier to shift upwards or downwards depending on the sign of their estimated 
coefficients. The inclusion of these time and time-interactive terms as frontier variables 
serves the purpose of detecting the impact of technological changes over time 
(Battese and Coelli, 1995). Figure 11 below is introduced to simply illustrate the 
implications of shifts in the profit frontier. Figure 7 shows an upward frontier shift that 
translates into higher profits resulting from the same level of expenses incurred which 
























Estimation results show that the time-interactive terms , , and  are all 
significant at 1% critical level.  
 
The time-price of funds interactive term with the price of funds ( ) is found with a 
positive and significant coefficient resulting in an upward shift in the profit frontier, this 
is due to favorable changes over time in the price of funds that are causing profits to 
increase. Likewise, estimation shows that the time-loans interactive term ( ) has a 
positive and significant impact suggesting that technological changes in producing 
outputs seem to also contribute to an upward shift in the profit frontier for European 
banks, leading to higher levels of profits as a result. This time-interactive factor is found 
with the largest significant and positive coefficient amongst the other two significant 
time-interactive terms.   
 
On the other hand, the third term which involves time interaction with the price of real 
capital ( ) is found with a significant and negative coefficient causing a downward 
shift in the profit frontier over time due to changes in the price of real capital. The 
overall impact of these three significant time-interactive terms seems to suggest that 
the profit frontier follows a non-linear trend over 2010 - 2018. The profit frontier function 
R-F-P can reveal a minimum stationary point(s) relating profits and time (this can be 
seen by twice differentiating it with respect to time given the positive sing of the 2nd 













With regards to the EU-membership and Euro-adoption factors,  and  , 
estimation shows that both are found to significantly affect European banks’ profits 
over 2008 – 2018 at the 1% critical level. EU-membership factor is showing a positive 
impact of (.0397273) while Euro-adoption factor is showing a negative impact of (-
.0455074). These findings indicate that operating in the EU Member States has 
positively influenced profits for banks operating in these countries however adopting 
the euro by some countries seems to negatively affect profits. Specifically, results 
seem to suggest that operating in an EU- but Non-euro-economy (such as the UK and 
Sweden) provides a better economic environment for banks to make more profits.   
 
Part of this conclusion might seem in contradiction to the impact of the EU membership 
factor ( as a frontier variable) on total costs where being a Member State was found 
to cause bank total costs to increase. Nonetheless, incurring higher costs does not 
suggest that profits will be lower, as profits and costs can both increase 
disproportionately. Therefore, the only way that the estimated impact of  on profits 
and total costs can make sense is that: for EU banking systems, profits and costs can 
increase simultaneously, but disproportionately. More specifically, estimation results 
show that costs tend to increase more proportionately than profits on a banking system 
level given the estimated impact (i.e. magnitude or coefficient) of the  factor on 
profits and total costs under the profit and cost functions which is around 0.4 and 0.7 
respectively.   
 
The estimation outcome also shows that there are two macroeconomic factors with 
significant impact on European banking profits over 2008 - 2018, these are: inflation 
rate ( ) and short-term interest rates ( ). Results show that profits are positively 
associated with the inflation rate. This reiterates the fact that the banking business is 
pro-cyclical as banks tend to do well in good times where economic growth is positive. 
The inflation rate under these conditions tends to be higher which explains the positive 
correlation found between inflation rate and bank profits. 
 
On the other hand, short-term interest rates are found to negatively and significantly 










rates, European banks profits tend to decline by around 1.19% on average over 2010 
– 2018. Such result is economically justified as increasing short-term interest rates 
tightens the bank’s interest rate spread since commercial banks are exposed to the 
yield-curve effect because they borrow short and lend long. Accordingly, if short-term 
interest rates become lower (higher) than long-term rates suggesting positive 
(negative) slope of the yield curve and implying looser (tighter) monetary policy, banks 
can enjoy wider (tighter) interest rate spreads which can ultimately and positively 
(negatively) affect profits.   
 
With regards to country-specific (or banking systems-specific) risks, estimation 
outcome shows that the only risk factor with significant impact on European banks’ 
profits is country-specific liquidity risk . Country-specific liquidity risk , 
calculated as the country-averaged ratio of customer and short-term funding to liquid 
assets, is found with a significant and negative correlation with profits (-.0013971).  
This finding suggests that the higher the liquidity risk or the higher the value of , 
the lower the profitability will be.   
 
Increasing liquidity risk can be the result of the denominator effect (lower level of 
liquid assets), or numerator effect (increasing level of customer deposits and money 
market funding relative to liquid assets holdings).   
 
The only logical way to interpret this result is by considering the numerator effect, 
hence this result suggests that relying more on customer and short-term funding is 
negatively affecting European banks’ profits. However, this interpretation embodies 
the funding-mix effect so it is important to isolate or decompose the funding-mix to 
reach a more accurate conclusion. Results presented on a bank-specific level in the 
following section (Table 19) clearly shows that increased reliance on customer 
deposits relative to total funding is found to have a significant positive impact on profit 
efficiency. Accordingly, it can be inferred that the money market funding part of the 
funding mix in the numerator effect is what is causing the negative correlation between 
liquidity risk and profits. This is also consistent with the earlier finding in that liquidity 
risk was found as positively correlated with total cost such that: the greater the 







isolated the funding-mix effect, the higher the costs. Therefore, the overall conclusion 
that can be drawn given results above is that: greater reliance on money market 
funding significantly increases total costs and reduces profits at a banking system 
level.   
 
All in all, estimation results at banking system level seem to suggest that profits tend 
to increase if banks operate in an EU- but non-euro economy. For EU banking 
systems, results show that profits and costs can increase simultaneously, however, 
with the greater impact of the  factor on total costs in mind, can increase more 
proportionately than profits given the estimated impact (i.e. magnitude or coefficient) 
of the  factor on profits and total costs. Further, results show that profits are 
positively associated with the inflation rate and negatively correlated with short-term 
interest rates. Finally, results seem to suggest that the lower the liquidity risk, in the 
sense of using less money market funding, the higher the profitability in European 
banking. 
 
5.5.5 Determinants of Technical Profit Inefficiency 
 
In this section, the determinants of technical profit inefficiency will be discussed as 
defined by the inefficiency model. These estimates are produced simultaneously with 
those of the profit frontier R-F-P defined above. The inefficiency model follows is 
Battese and Coelli (1995) time-flexible technical model specification assuming half-
normal distribution for the inefficiency term. Technical profit inefficiency term is 
regressed against the same bank-specific determinants used to explain the variation 
of technical cost inefficiency so as to draw consistent conclusions and to investigate 
any possible correlation between bank-specific profit and cost efficiencies. Table 














Table 19: Determinants of Profit Inefficiency 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
 -.2489303 .6231717 -0.40 0.690 -1.470324 .9724638 
 135.9684 25.42431 5.35 0.000 86.13771 185.7992 
 -12.2112 4.101109 -2.98 0.003 -20.24922 -4.173174 
 -.0212271 .0083284 -2.55 0.011 -.0375506 -.0049037 
 -5.011016 6.003927 -0.83 0.404 -16.7785 6.756465 
 -1.881221 .7427958 -2.53 0.011 -3.337074 -.425368 
 -9.345881 1.922006 -4.86 0.000 -13.11294 -5.578819 
 -2.789421 1.262326 -2.21 0.027 -5.263535 -.3153077 
 -.0860225 .0066432 -
12.95 
0.000 -.0990429 -.073002 
 .087296 .5258422 0.17 0.868 -.9433358 1.117928 
 -.0135856 .160738 -0.08 0.933 -.3286262 .301455 
 
To more clearly interpret the results in Table 19, it should be noted that explanatory 
variables defined above are correlated with profit inefficiency as specified in equation 
((59)). Therefore, a negatively correlated variable with profit inefficiency can be 
interpreted as being positively correlated with profit efficiency. Estimates highlighted 
in bold typeface are those found significant at 1% or 5% critical levels. 
 
Interestingly, results show that the ex post measure of credit risk ( ) which is 
calculated as the ratio of loan loss provisions (LLPs) to total loans, seems to have the 
most significant and positive impact on European banks profit inefficiency (given its 
relatively large magnitude or coefficient). This can alternatively be viewed as (
) having a significant and negative impact on profit efficiency. The positive correlation 
of  with profit inefficiency can always be expected, because the larger the level 
of loan losses (in terms of higher LLPs), the lower the profits and therefore the less 
profit efficient a given bank is. This is because LLPs are accounted for as expenses, 
and therefore the larger the value of LLPs (reflecting lower loans’ quality), the lower 

























In fact, it is the notably large magnitude of the credit risk impact on profit efficiency that 
is worth contemplating. The large magnitude of this ex post credit risk measure 
indicates to a highly-sensitive risk-return tradeoff due to the considerable sensitivity of 
profit efficiency to the variation in credit risk. The risk-return tradeoff here suggests 
that for a slight increase in credit risk (in terms of increasing LLPs relative to loans), 
profit efficiency can experience a considerable and significant deterioration. 
Conversely, a slight decrease in credit risk (in terms of declining LLPs relative to loans) 
can translate into a considerable and significant improvement in profit efficiency.   
 
This in turn suggests that maintaining the quality of the loans portfolio for European 
banks is vital to making profits more efficiently. This is despite that summary statistics 
are showing that the ratio of LLPs to total loans ( ) has a maximum value of 
about 6.5% and a mean of under 1% (Table 3, page 199). In absolute terms, such a 
low ratio may indicate very low credit risk involved, however as the ratio of LLPs to 
total loans reflects the downside of credit risk, the low (  ) ratio therefore 
suggests a favorable risk-return payoff given the low level of LLPs relative to the size 
of the loan portfolio. Looking into this differently, this low ( ) ratio suggests that 
the size of total loans (denominator) is relatively too big relative to the level of loan 
losses (numerator). This indicates that a considerable credit risk was taken by 
European banks over the study period which seems to pay off given the very low level 
of defaults as represented by the corresponding low level of LLPs.   
 
Accordingly, the relatively big magnitude of the impact of the ( ) implies that 
profit efficiency is very sensitive to the quality of the loans portfolio, and the very low 
average value of ( ) in absolute terms suggests a favorable risk-return payoff 
as the credit risk taken seem to have translated into very low level of loan losses. 
 
On the other hand, trading risk ( ), calculated as the ratio of net trading 
revenues (trading revenues – trading costs) to total revenues, is showing a significant 
and negative impact on profit inefficiency. The absolute value of the trading risk ratio 
is indicative of the level of exposure to trading regardless of whether it is positive 











the trading risk ratio reflects the risk-return pay-off in trading. The estimation result is 
logical as more net trading revenue suggests more profits and higher profit efficiency 
ultimately. In other words, taking on more trading risk, in the sense of achieving more 
net trading revenue relative to the bank’s total income, results in higher profit efficiency 
for the sample of European banks involved. This also suggests that trading revenue 
is an important source of profitability given its significant impact on European banking 
profit efficiency. 
 
Considering the positive impact of ( ) on profit efficiency in conjunction with its 
negative impact on cost efficiency may seem contradicting, whereas it is not the case 
for two reasons. First, as will be seen later in this chapter, there is no significant 
correlation between profit and cost efficiencies, therefore drivers of cost and profit 
efficiencies can have different effects on both efficiencies. Second, the negative 
correlation of  with cost efficiency suggests that, as banks take on more 
trading risk, increasing trading costs (and ultimately trading losses) seem to be 
incurred for a given level of output in trading, however considering this in line with its 
positive correlation with profit efficiency suggests that taking on more trading risk is 
also associated with increasing revenues from trading which translates into a positive 
impact on profit efficiency. The net impact for taking on more trading risk on technical 
efficiency, after all, seems to be in favor of greater profit efficiency. This is based on 
estimation results where  is found with a larger and significant impact of on 
profit inefficiency (a coefficient of -12.2112) compared to its impact on cost inefficiency 
(a coefficient of 8.940631 as shown in Table 17). 
 
Analyzing the impact of funding structure ( ), which is calculated as the ratio 
of customer deposits to total funding, serves two purposes: it tests the impact of relying 
on customer deposits relative to other forms of funding on profit efficiency, and it also 
serves the purpose of isolating the funding-mix effect embodied in the liquidity risk 
ratio which will be discussed next. Estimation results for the variable ( ) show 
a negative and significant correlation with profit inefficiency of (-2.789421), implying 
that: the greater the reliance on customer funding, hence the larger the ( ) 
ratio, the better the ability of European banks to make profits more efficiently. This is 











can boost profits as funding costs can be reduced because customer deposits is a 
relatively cheaper source of funding. This can ultimately result in enhancing profit 
efficiency.   
 
Greater reliance on customer deposits to support the bank’s assets is not only 
important to improve profitability as results here show, but this also has wider 
systematic implications. This is because banks with wide and diversified deposit bases 
can more effectively withstand pressures on liquidity in times of financial uncertainty. 
The recent example of Northern Rock is clear evidence on the vital role customer 
deposits have.    
 
Liquidity risk ( ), calculated as the ratio of customer and short-term funding to 
liquid assets, is also showing a significant and negative impact on profit inefficiency. 
This finding suggests that taking more liquidity risk is associated with enhanced profit 
efficiency. This result can be interpreted from two perspectives as higher exposure to 
 can be the result of: (1) holding proportionately fewer liquid assets (the 
denominator effect), or (2) using more customer and short-term funding (the 
numerator effect). In this context, since liquid assets are the least revenue-generating 
assets on the bank’s balance sheet, holding fewer liquid assets therefore suggests 
that more funds can be invested in more profitable assets which ultimately translate to 
enhanced profit efficiency.   
 
The alternative explanation comes from looking into the numerator-effect, that is, 
taking more liquidity risk in terms of increasing reliance on customer and short-term 
funding which seems to be associated with enhanced profit efficiency. This result 
should only be interpreted in terms of increasing reliance on customer deposits as 
opposed to wholesale short-term funding. This is because such funding-mix effect is 
disentangled by two findings: (a) the positive correlation found between the funding 
ratio (  = customer deposits / total funding) and profit efficiency which implies 
that customer funding is a cheap source of funding, and (b) the qualitative evidence in 
that money market funding is more expensive than customer funding (deposits) 
according to the ECB’s financial stability report (ECB, 2004a). Consequently, with the 








given the estimation result is that: taking on more liquidity risk by increasing the 
reliance on customer deposits and reducing liquid asset holdings improves profit 
efficiency. It should be noted however that the impact of liquidity risk is found with the 
least magnitude on profit inefficiency (a coefficient of -.0212271) compared to other 
significant factors. 
 
Further, estimation shows a negative and significant influence of  (the credit 
equivalent of off-balance sheet items / total assets) on profit inefficiency (a coefficient 
of -1.881221). Such finding suggests that expansion in OBS activities enhances profit 
efficiency for European banking. Therefore, the greater the involvement in OBS 
activities, the greater the ability of European banks to make profits more efficiently. In 
comparison with recent past research, this result is in contrast to the finding of 
Pasiouras (2008) using Greek banking data over the period of 2008 – 2018, where the 
author found that the inclusion of OBS items as an output does not have any impact 
on the efficiency scores. 
 
Notwithstanding the significant impact of the OBS activities on profit efficiency, income 
generated by traditional lending business remains a major factor driving profit 
efficiency for European banks. Findings indicate a very significant and negative impact 
at the 1% critical level of , calculated as net interest income to total income, on 
profit inefficiency (-9.345881). That is to say, the greater the proportion of net interest 
income to total income, the better the ability of European banks to make profits more 
efficiently. However, by comparing the influence of non-interest versus interest-related 
incomes on profit efficiency as results suggest, it is interesting to note that the impact 
of interest income ( ) is second in importance to that of net trading income (
) given that the magnitude (estimated coefficient) of the latter is greater than 
that of the former, where both are statistically significant at the 1% critical level. 
 
It is interesting to reflect on the estimation outcome related to the ex ante credit risk 
measure, that is, credit risk appetite . Results show that  (that is calculated 
as the ratio of risk weighted assets RWA to total assets) has no significant impact on 
European banks profit efficiency. That is, the size of risk weighted assets (RWA) 










no significant influence on profit efficiency. Moreover,  was also found to be 
insignificantly correlated with European banks cost efficiency. Such a result may 
indicate that CRA is an insensitive credit risk measure in terms of reflecting the 
outcome of the risk-return payoff for European banks over 2008 – 2018. This is 
possibly because  is based on Basel I risk weighting criteria that has long been 
criticized for having the problem of one-size-fits-all. Had the percentage of RWA to 
total assets been representative of the bank’s ex ante credit risk exposure, results 
could have shown either a significantly positive or negative correlation with profit or 
cost efficiencies reflecting the state of the risk-return payoff.   
 
Both cost and profit efficiency estimation results related to ( ) represent good 
evidence of the limitedness of Basel I and the need for more comprehensive and risk-
sensitive regulatory framework. The Economist (Nov. 22nd 2007, p 31) confirms this 
view by arguing that regulators may tighten capital requirements “as confidence in the 
tier-one capital ratio favoured by European regulators seems to have 
evaporated…investors seem to pay closer attention to more cautious capital 
measures which does not allow for any risk-weighted adjustment to assets”. The 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors CEBS, which is responsible for setting 
the regulatory framework for Europe's evolving single market in financial services, 
have realized the increasing complexity of the banking business and the need for a 
more developed framework. This is clearly recognized by the head of the CEBS as it 
is stressed that "banking used to be a very easy business 20 or 30 years ago. It was 
a plain vanilla business. You only have to look at Basel II and the risk management 
techniques to realise that the complexity of the business has increased and the 
complexity of the supervisory approaches has increased parallel to that" (The 
Financial Times, Apr 20th 2004). 
 
Estimation result for the total assets variable ( ) shows a significant and 
negative correlation with profit inefficiency at 1% level (a coefficient of -.0860225). 
Such finding is indicative of a significantly positive size-profit efficiency relationship 
which suggests that the larger the bank the greater its ability to make profits more 
efficiently. This result is possibly supported by the significantly positive correlation 











efficiency. The expansion in off-balance sheets activities (OBS) therefore may be one 
reason causing this positive size-profit efficiency relationship considering that, on 
average, around 1/3 (28%) of European banks’ assets over 2010 -2018 were held as 
OBS items. To further investigate this size-profit efficiency relationship, a correlation 
(covariance) test was conducted between observation-specific bank sizes (assets) 
and profit efficiency scores. Interestingly, the test reveals quite a moderate relationship 
(a correlation coefficient of 0.26) but with considerable statistical significance at the 
1% critical level (p-value = 0.0004). To shed some more light on this issue, the 
following subsection classifies sample banks into 5 asset groups and provides group-
specific profit and cost efficiency scores.   
 
5.5.6 Profit Efficiencies by Asset Group 
 
The aim of this exercise is to further explore the significant correlation found between 
bank size and profit efficiency. Sample banks are classified into 5 asset groups and 
efficiency scores were re-produced as group-specific averages as shown in the table 
below: 
 
Table 20: Profit Efficiencies by Asset Group 
Asset Group  Profit Efficiency 
 Freq. Mean Std. Dev. 
AG1: assets < €15bn    47    .8104252       .2447349 
AG2: €15bn ≥ assets < €50 141 .9503112     .0614937 
AG3: €50 ≥ assets < €150bn 83 .9639498     .0406772 
AG4: €150bn ≥ assets < 
€400bn 
241 .9819510      .0187410 
AG5: assets ≥ €400bn 29 .9806375  .0322163 
Sample Mean 541 .9368076     .1306509 
 
The positive correlation between bank size and profit efficiency found in the estimation 
is further confirmed by the results shown in the table above. It is clear that profit 
efficiency is improving as banks get larger, with AG4 and AG5 banks demonstrating 
the highest levels of profit efficiency of about 98%. Notably, AG4 banks are shown to 





under 2%. The conclusion that can be drawn here is that larger banks are more profit 
efficient than smaller banks, where banks with total assets between €150bn and 
€400bn are shown to be the most profit efficient. 
 
Previous European and US studies found mixed evidence on the size-profit efficiency 
relationship. Maudos et al (2002) using banking data from 10 EU countries over 1993 
– 1996 find a non-linear relationship between bank size and profit efficiency, as only 
medium size banks (up to $10bn) were found with a negative and significant 
correlation with profit efficiency. On the other hand, Vennet (2002) uses a sample from 
17 European countries over 1995 – 1996 and finds little evidence on size-profit 
efficiency relationship. Likewise, Kasman and Yildirim (2006) use SFA in a single-
stage estimation approach to estimate profit function (truncated at the 2nd order terms) 
for commercial banks in 8 new member states of the EU in 2004 and find no significant 
relationship between size and profit efficiency.   
 
Moreover, Berger et al (1993a) using US data over 1984 – 1989 find strong and 
positive correlation between profit efficiency and size. Berger and Mester (1997) use 
US data over 1990 – 1995 and find a negative correlation between size and profit 
efficiency.  Akhigbe and McNulty (2005) use SFA and the two-stage approach to 
estimate year-wise alternative profit function over the period of 1995 – 2001 and also 
find a positive size-efficiency relationship. Further, Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2008) 
estimate a Translog ‘alternative’ profit function for large commercial banks in Canada, 
the UK, Ireland and Australia over 1996 – 2002 and use SFA and the single-stage 
estimation approach (specifying Battese and Coelli 1995 inefficiency model) find a 
positive size-profit efficiency relationship. 
 
Estimation results for profit efficiency determinants of European banks have revealed 
the following conclusions. For European banks to make profits more efficiently, they 
need to – in terms of priority (i.e. impact significance): (1) maintain high quality loan 
portfolio (2) better manage their trading risks (3) reduce liquid asset holdings and rely 
more on customer deposits, (4) focus on non-interest income and expand their OBS 
activities, and finally (5) expand in size, as results suggest that larger banks with total 





they are found with the highest profit efficiency in the sample. 
 
5.5.6.1 Correlation Between Efficiencies 
 
This study extends the analysis of bank-specific cost and profit efficiency estimates by 
investigating any potential correlation between the two efficiencies. To this end, 
Spearman test for ranks correlation is applied. The null hypothesis here states that the 
two efficiencies are independent. Empirical results show a correlation coefficient of 
(0.0287) that is statistically insignificant at 5% level (P > |t| = 0.6969). Thus, the null of 
no correlation between profit and cost efficiencies cannot be rejected. The conclusion 
therefore is that there is no significant correlation between European banks’ profit and 
cost efficiencies as far as this sample data is concerned. This finding is consistent with 
that of Berger and Mester (1997) using US data. 
 
Now, in order to provide some further insights into profit and cost efficiency results, 
the progression of profit and cost efficiencies over time is analysed. The aim is to see 
if more conclusions can be drawn from this analysis results which may in turn imply 


























































7.1 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This research has yielded findings that can be recognized as a genuine contribution 
to knowledge in the area of banking efficiency analysis. To elaborate, this research 
results are presented from three main perspectives: functional form modification 
outcome, frontier estimation results and inefficiency explanatory variables estimation 
results.  
 
First, the systematic modification of the functional form has proved to be pivotal to 
conduct prior to the estimation of the efficiency frontier. Results clearly show that, not 
only it is statistically vital to incorporate the fourier flexible terms, but also its equally 
important to include risk factors (on a country level) in the fabric of both the cost and 
profit functional forms (as shown Table 12 and Error! Reference source not found.). 
Accordingly, the first well-founded finding of this research can be articulated as follows: 
ignoring this risk-modified fourier flexible functional forms modification is most likely to 
produce misleading estimation results.  
 
Second, cost frontier estimation results have shown that banks operating in EU-
economies are found to incur higher costs than banks operating in non-EU-
economies, thus it is less cost efficient to operate in an EU economy over the study 
period. Moreover, results have also shown that banks’ costs increase with country-
specific credit, trading, and liquidity risks, indicating that total costs increase with (1) 
loan losses, (2) trading costs (that are translating into trading losses), and (3) money 
market (or short term) funding. This implies that credit, trading and liquidity risks are 
not well managed on the Macro-economic level over the study period of 2008 – 2018 
causing banks to incur higher cost to operate.  
 
Third, the estimation results regarding the determinants of technical cost inefficiency 
indicate that as banks take more trading risk, i.e. as net trading revenue increases 
relative to total revenues, European banks become less cost efficient. Such result is 
in line with the negative impact of the country-level trading risk on banking costs, 
suggesting that as banks take more trading risk, they incur more costs and become 





bank and policy makers’ levels. Results also confirm that European banks can operate 
more cost efficiently when banks are better capitalized. On the other hand, there is no 
significant evidence supporting the correlation of cost efficiency with the level interest 
margin (relative to total revenues) nor that with bank size either. This suggest that 
policy makers may consider the fact that better capitalizing banks would assist them 
in becoming more profit efficient, regardless of their size. 
 
Fourth, profit frontier estimation results suggest that profits tend to increase if banks 
operate in a non-euro-economy, whereas banks’ profits experience an upward shift 
for if they are operating in the EU. Further, results show that profits are positively 
associated with inflation rate and negatively correlated with short-term interest rates, 
a result that is economically justified. Risk-wise, results clearly show a negative 
correlation between country-level liquidity risk and banks’ profitability, such that the 
lower the liquidity risk (in the sense of using less money market funding) the higher 
the profitability, suggesting that less reliance on money market funding leads to greater 
profits. 
 
Fifth, the estimation results regarding the determinants of technical profit inefficiency 
indicate that, for European banks to make profits more efficiently, they can support the 
following six recommendations. First of all, maintain high quality loan portfolios given 
the considerable sensitivity of profit efficiency to credit risk, second, better manage 
trading risk to enhance trading risk-return payoff, since trading risk measure is found 
to significantly and negatively correlate with profit inefficiency. Third, banks need to 
rely more on customer deposits relative to total funding, as the funding ratio is showing 
a significantly negative correlation with profit inefficiency.  
 
In addition, banks need to reduce liquid asset holdings as liquidity risk is negatively 
correlated with profit efficiency, and/or rely more on customer funding as shown in the 
previous point, to significantly increase profit efficiency. Moreover, banks should 
consider expanding their OBS activities, given the negative and significant correlation 
of the OBS ratio (credit-equivalent of OBS items/total assets) with profit inefficiency. 
Finally, focus on interest income and therefore expand their lending activities, given 





efficiency. For policy implications, banks can be more profit efficient as they better 
manage their loan portfolios in terms of diversity and quality, reduce their trading 
activities and focus more on their core business of attracting customer deposits as the 
main source of funding and making loans. Banks are also advised to hold fewer liquid 
assets, yet expand their OBS activities. 
 
Sixth, concerning the Credit Risk Appetite (CRA), which is used as a proxy for bank-
specific credit risk, results show that it has no significant impact on European banks 
profit efficiency. Equally, CRA is also found to be insignificantly correlated with 
European banks cost efficiency. These two results together seem to indicate that is 
an insensitive credit risk measure as it is a poor indicator of the level of credit risk 
exposure, hence it seems to fail to provide an indication of the state of the risk-return 
payoff for European banks over 2008 – 2018. This is possibly because seems to be 
somehow detached from real credit risk exposure taken on by banks. The research 
implication of this result is that further studies should consider more reflective measure 
of credit risk than the CRA. 
 
Finally, results show that there are slightly more profit inefficiencies than cost 
inefficiencies in European banking. This is consistent with the finding of the majority 
of past European, US, and International research. Average profit efficiency is around 
93.68% (or an average profit inefficiency of about 6.32%), whereas average cost 
efficiency is found at about 1.050 (or an average cost inefficiency of about 5%). Lastly, 
the analysis shows that there is no significant correlation between bank-specific cost 
and profit efficiencies. For policy implications, the priority for European banks is to 
focus on the factors and procedures that minimize their profit inefficiencies, and then 
take actions that minimize their cost inefficiencies.  
 
7.2 Implications for Policy Makers and Further Research 
 
Given the above-mentioned research findings, a number of policy and research 
implications can be derived accordingly. European banking policy makers may 
consider a set of financial regulations in the aim of assisting European banks to 
encourage banks to have more robust capitalization and better manage credit, trading 





should be minimized, regardless of their size. Banks should improve their loan portfolio 
management, hold less liquid assets, widen their customer deposit base, expand their 
off-the-balance sheet activities, yet, downsize their trading activities. Lastly, the priority 
for European banks is to  minimize their profit inefficiencies, and then take actions 
that minimize their cost inefficiencies. 
 
 
Finally, to pave the way for more robust bank-efficiency studies in the future, risk-
modified fourier flexible functional forms must be considered prior to estimating 
efficiency scores, as ignoring which is most likely to produce misleading estimation 
results. Further studies should also consider more representative measure of credit 
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